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The Limits of Control takes Switzerland’s programme for assisted voluntary 
return migration (AVR) as an example to study the emerging contradictions of 
the sovereign liberal nation state in the governance of transnational mobility. 
The aim to remove the “undesirable alien” from the commonwealth governed 
by the state bureaucracy produces a fundamental problem for the liberal nation 
state as it questions the bureaucracy’s universal promise of equality and fairness.  
The ethnographic case study focuses on Switzerland’s AVR programme for 
Tunisian asylum seekers after the 2011 uprising against the Ben Ali regime and 
shows how the migration bureaucracy produces, shapes, and governs migrants’ 
“voluntariness.” It is based on ethnographic fieldwork among return migrants 
and return migration bureaucrats in Tunisia and Switzerland in 2013 and 2014. 
The paradoxical notion of governed voluntariness serves as the analytical lens to 
explore the efforts of the migration bureaucracy to reconcile the attempts to 
 
anticipate and enforce negative asylum decisions with the bureaucratic self-
understanding of a governance by mutual consent. Therefore, The Limits of 
Control tells the story of the failing attempt to uphold the illusion of governing 
transnational migration by mutual consent creating a so-called win-win-win 
situation for the country of origin, the country of destination, and the migrant 
as well.  
Adopting the thesis of the autonomy of migration AoM as an analytical 
proposition, the ethnography confronts the experiences and expectations of 
mobility and return of six Tunisian migrants of different age and origin with the 
attempts of Switzerland’s migration bureaucracy to regulate migrants’ mobility 
through AVR programs. Therefore, this study exemplarily shows how these 
contested controls at the margins of the state (of undocumented migration) 
contradict the modern liberal nation state’s self-understanding of a governance 
by mutual consent.  
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Expectations of Mobility and Experiences of Immobility in Jebel Jelloud 
A dusty main road dissects the neighbourhood. Two-story buildings line the 
street; some made of brick, some built in concrete. Hardly any building is 
finished; here a staircase that ends in the air, there some reinforcing irons that 
give a hint to a projected upper floor yet to be realised. The road is full of 
potholes, the sidewalk mostly missing or occupied by shops that sell their goods 
in the street.  
Jebel Jelloud is a typical quartier populaire in the South-Western suburbs of 
Tunis. It is not at all a slum, although you can spot a lot of informal settlements. 
But it lacks any sign of modest wealth you can find in the middle-class 
neighbourhoods. In former times, Jebel Jelloud was the neighbourhood of the 
tanners, hence the name. As a less honourable profession, the tanners were 
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banned from settling within the medina or in its immediate proximity. It was a 
dirty job with little prestige. Today, apart from its name nothing reminds of the 
former inhabitants’ profession. The workshops closed long time ago. Yet, what 
remains is the attitude of Tunis’s middle-class towards Jebel Jelloud’s 
populations. In their imagination, it has remained a dirty neighbourhood 
somewhere in the outskirts of the town. This is also linked to the later history of 
this neighbourhood. During the French protectorate, the colonial 
administration settled the heavy industry in Jebel Jelloud. The phosphate and 
cement industries built big processing facilities. This brought new jobs to the 
neighbourhood. Newcomers from the internal, rural parts of Tunisia found 
work as well and settled in the proximity of the factories where prices for land 
and houses were affordable. Some of the factories survived after independence in 
1956. However, Jebel Jelloud has remained a dirty corner of the town.  
The residential areas are scattered between big factory sites. Some of them are 
the result of an uncontrolled urbanisation due to the rural-urban migration and 
the need for additional housing facilities.  
Abdellah was sitting with me at a shaky plastic table of a small café on the 
sidewalk of one of the main roads that dissects the neighbourhood.1 On the table 
 
1 I anonymised my informants throughout the whole dissertation in order to protect their privacy. This 
includes changing their names, but also some further details that would allow to identify them. Although 
some of my informants would have preferred to appear with their real names in the text and tell ‘the real 
story to the world’, as someone once formulated in a conversation, I decided to apply the same 
anonymisation rules for everyone.   
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two glasses of strong, bitter coffee, as usually served with the two sugar cubes the 
waiter clamped between the edges of the tulip-shaped glass building a kind of a 
sweet bridge over the black liquid. It was late in April but the sun was already 
burning without mercy. From time to time, a lorry passed by, trailing a white 
cloud of dust. Each time, its roaring engine noise interrupted our conversation. 
Children in school uniforms were passing by in small groups, chatting and 
laughing. Abdellah drew on his cigarette and continued with sonorous voice: 
“No, no… it was so easy. Imagine, at that time, you just took the next ferry from 
La Goulette—and off you go!2 No paperwork, no visa. And once in France, it 
was almost certain that you will find some work.” He quit Jebel Jelloud when he 
was 21 and followed his brother who was already living in Lyon. Thanks to him, 
it was “really easy to find work.” And when he was fed up with one job, he simply 
changed the construction site and started to work for a different employer. In 
total, Abdellah spent nearly 20 years of his life in France. “I never had any visa, 
and most of the time not even a carte de séjour. Al-ḥamdu lil-lāh!” 
Abdellah ordered the next coffee and took me on his journey as a migrant 
worker; from Marseille to Lyon and the suburbs of Paris, back to Marseille, the 
harbour town where he debarked and embarked so many times over the years. It 
was complicated to keep track with his migration biography. Each time we sat 
together and tried to reconstruct his trajectory, we ended up with a slightly 
 
2 La Goulette is the port city of Tunis.  
 16 
different version. Sometimes, even he confused some dates and the order of 
events. It is a life that leaves almost no traces but in your memory, some furrows 
on the forehead, and scarred hands. Not to forget the few faded photographs he 
once brought to one of our meetings.  
Originally, I intended to meet Abdellah as an intermediary, who would bring 
me in touch with a group of harragas who came back from Europe only recently.3 
He knows everybody, and everybody knows him, I was told. Therefore, Abdellah 
was a precious gatekeeper for me who helped me to make the neighbourhood 
legible. But as our conversation about his own migration trajectory between 
Tunisia and Europe unfolded on this sunny day in April 2014, I began to realise 
how his own biography is intertwined with the other migration biographies of 
the young harragas I collected during my fieldwork. Add to this picture my very 
own presence in the field and how it is conditioned by the European migration 
regime (indeed, in a very favourable and different way), and you end up with a 
pattern of differentiated mobility that structures the transnational space between 
Tunisia and Europe.  
“Let’s go. I take you to the guys,” he said, stubbed out his cigarette, slipped into 
his jacket and pointed to the left with the tip of the next cigarette he was already 
 
3 Harraga is a widely used term in Tunisia and the other North African countries. It has several meanings. 
The term derives from the Arabic root قرح , which has the meaning of ‘to burn’. It refers to the practice of 
clandestine, almost exclusively male, migration across the Mediterranean, typically in small fishing boats 
that are no longer in use. Simultaneously, harraga designates the person who performs this type of 
clandestine border crossing. In everyday language, the French equivalents ‘brûler la frontière’ (for border-
crossing) and ‘brûleur’ (a person who ‘burns’ the border) are also used quite widely.  
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holding between thumb and index finger. I followed him to his car; a dented 
black Peugeot 205 Abdellah had parked in the shadow of an acacia tree. A few 
turns later – I already lost my orientation – we were bumping over an unpaved 
dead-end road full of potholes towards and abandoned garage, enclosed by a 
three-meter-tall courtyard wall made of a mixture between rugged concrete and 
brick stone. The rusty metal gate was half open.  
When I had contacted him a few days ago, he told me that he would know some 
harragas who had come back recently and who had spent some time in 
Switzerland; exactly the type of informants I was desperately looking for. When 
I started fieldwork in Tunisia, I quickly began to realise that it was very difficult 
to find return migrants who firstly applied for asylum in Switzerland after 2011, 
and secondly decided to return back home neither with the programme of so-
called assisted voluntary return AVR, nor forcibly deported. And in order to 
better understand the conflicting relationship between return migrants and the 
migration bureaucracy, I was especially interested in return migrants who 
abandoned the programme at a certain point or never joined it. A top-down 
approach through the organisation would not only have been a dead-end, but 
also questionable with regard to research ethics.  
Abdellah pushed the gate open. The courtyard’s soil was soaked with oil. Five 
young men were sitting around, sharing two cans of Celtia, the local brand of 
beer. Better to drink it here in this hidden place, I thought. Abdellah quickly 
introduced me to the group and explained them my concerns. The five men 
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pretended to ignore me. No one spoke a word. I felt uncomfortable, as an 
unwelcomed intruder. After an awkward moment of silence, one of the guys 
stood up and approached me. It later turned out that it was the one Abdellah 
had told me before that he had spent some time in Switzerland. Mohsen is a tall 
young man in his early twenty, with short black curly hair. In his left hand, he 
held a can of Celtia. With his distinct cheekbones he had a harsh appearance. 
This expression was emphasised by a distinct long scar on the left side of the 
neck. His jeans were worn-out and covered with splashes of concrete and paint; 
traces from yesterday’s work I suspected. In a mix between Italian and French 
interspersed with a couple of expressions in Arabic, we exchanged some 
courtesies, and I explained my concerns. It took some time until we got into a 
proper conversation; not very surprising, given the way I entered the scene. In 
this first encounter, Mohsen remained rather scant with his remarks on his 
migration trajectory. For good reason, as I would learn only later. Interviewed 
so many times by migration officers in order to decide on his asylum application, 
he was just tired of repeating his story again and again. Even more, he had 
repeatedly made the experience that the narration of one’s migration biography 
was a means of the state to control and govern his trajectory; an experience that 
contradicts what most of the textbooks on biographical interviews would tell 
you.  
“Well, I spent the last three years in Italy,” Mohsen told me. “When the borders 
were open in 2011, I quit this damned place with a couple of friends.” During 
these weeks in the beginning of 2011, no one bothered who left the 
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neighbourhood. Security forces had other concerns than looking after a couple 
of young adult men eager for an adventure abroad and on the brink of escaping 
the country with its – at the same time exciting and threatening – presence full 
of uncertain promises and possibilities and an even more uncertain future. The 
parents were busy navigating through these times of uncertainty and unrest. 
Mohsen spent most of his time in Italy. “And to be honest, I did not work a lot.” 
He had “a hard time” to find a job, most of the time anyway only as a day 
labourer. Yet his initial idea was to go to France, where a cousin of him was living 
near Marseille.4  
Mohsen never made it to Marseille. He got stuck at the French-Italian border in 
Ventimiglia. It was the time when the French authorities closed the border due 
to the growing influx of especially Tunisian harragas in March and April 2011.5 
Therefore, he was forced to change his plans. Instead of Marseille, he went to 
Parma, where a cousin of him was living. He knew him from Jebel Jelloud. “He 
comes back visiting us regularly. At least twice a year: for the Aïd-el-Kebir and 
Ramadan. You have to know, he is rich, owns a house in our street and drives a 
 
4 In this and our subsequent conversation, we repeatedly came back to this cousin. Yet I was unable to 
clarify whether he refers to a cousin in the strict sense of (i.e. a son of a mother’s or father’s brother) or if he 
uses the term to identify a relative of the wider family in the same age as himself.  
5 Since then, the temporal closure of the border has become a usual measure of the French authorities. For 
example it was applied again in 2015 during the so-called European migration crisis.  
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big car. I’ll show you his home next time.” Mohsen called him and he gave him 
shelter for a couple of weeks.  
But times have changed in Italy. Until 2008 when the financial crisis hit hard 
the country, it was comparatively easy to find work somewhere in Italy’s informal 
labour market. Especially for Tunisian migrants: There was a well-established 
network of fellow nationals with a residence permit, and Italian migration and 
labour law allowed Tunisian migrants to enter the country and register 
themselves for a certain time as self-employed persons. After the expiration of 
this permit and as the renewal of it would have required to document a certain 
income from this self-employment, many of these Tunisians simply decided to 
refrain from filing an application and stayed as undocumented migrants in the 
country. This tactic was no longer possible after 2008 with the changing 
migration laws.  
In contrast to his cousin, Mohsen struggled to find any employment, yet he 
stayed with his cousin for almost three years in Parma and tried to make a living 
as a day labourer for different small companies. At a certain point, he decided to 
search for alternatives. At that time in the middle 2013, rumours spread among 
the Tunisian community in Parma that it would be possible to apply for asylum 
in Switzerland. One of Mohsen’s friend even got the information that you would 
receive money when you decide to return back to Tunisia; a change not to miss 
in his opinion. He was anyway fed up with his actual situation and did not see 
any real prospective in Italy.  
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In the meantime, Abdellah had left us. Mohsen sat down on a used tyre that was 
lying around. I followed his example and sat down as well. He offered me a sip 
of his beer, which I refused. I was not in the mood of drinking alcohol, especially 
not in the morning. Instead, he took a sip from his can and continued: “Don’t 
ask me the details how I got to Switzerland. I can’t remember… And I wouldn’t 
tell you anyway…,” he added with a smile. He just mentioned that it “took me 
a few days” to reach the Swiss border. After more than two weeks of immobility 
in Italy, the decision to move to Switzerland was taken quickly. He arrived in 
the reception centre in Chiasso and was subsequently transferred to the centre 
in Altstätten.6 “Everything happened very fast. I spent only a couple of weeks in 
Altstätten and immediately asked for return assistance.”  
Our conversation continued and we were talking about his experience of 
Switzerland’s asylum regime. He recalled the moment when he got an 
appointment at the reception centre for asylum seekers to apply for return 
assistance. Mohsen also explained how disappointed he was when he realised that 
the return assistance does not consist in just receiving money and an airplane 
ticket, as the rumour went in the community of Tunisian asylum seekers at that 
time. Instead, it would have implied submitting a project description, following 
a business training course, long periods of waiting, and the constant supervision 
 
6 Chiasso is a border town at the Swiss-Italian border and one of the main entrance points to Switzerland 
from Italy. Altstätten is a small town in the Eastern part of Switzerland and hosts one of the reception 
centers for asylum seekers.  
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by return migration officials. Mohsen explained: “But all I wanted was going 
home. And yeah… sure with some money in my pocket.” Therefore, he signed 
the return migration agreement. “But for me it was clear; I wouldn’t continue 
the programme once back home.” After the paperwork was settled, Mohsen 
received a ticket and flew back home to Enfidha-Hammamet, where he was 
received by an official. “He was Tunisian. Very arrogant… He gave me 50 
Dinars for traveling home.” Mohsen told him that he would contact him again, 
but actually knew already that he wouldn’t get back in touch. “So that’s it. 50 
Dinars. That’s all I ever received.” 
All the sudden Mohsen interrupted his explanations. He fixed me with his eyes. 
A long moment of silence was following. Then he turned the table and began to 
interrogating me. Why am I spending time in Tunisia, hanging around with 
guys like him? Why is it interesting to collect stories of departure and return? 
Why am I nosing around here in this run-down neighbourhood instead of 
“having a nice time” in one of the tourist hotspots in Djerba or Hammamet? I 
sensed a sarcastic undertone in his questions but tried to overplay my insecurity. 
I replied that actually I have never been to Djerba or Hammamet. He laughed 
and said: “Nor have I… I don’t know these places neither. But you should. You 
are from Europe.” And as a tourist, I should go to visit these places, instead of 
hanging around in this “dull neighbourhood”, thus far his advice.  
Our conversation moved back and forth between the possibilities and 
impossibilities of mobility, the differences between him and me, the dreams and 
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hopes of a better life, and the chances to realise one’s dreams. Mohsen emptied 
the can of Celtia, crushed it and kicked it in the direction of his buddies who 
were still observing us in silence. Our chat faded out, and I tried to integrate his 
friends into the conversation. Apparently, they were not very interested, I 
deduced from their short one-word answers. At a certain point, I decided to leave 
and meet Mohsen again the other day. We exchanged numbers, and he 
accompanied me back to the main road, where we separated.  
Regimes of Mobility 
Back in my flat the same evening, I sat down at my desk to write up the summary 
of this day; just the usual ethnographer’s habit. During the writing I realised that 
I did not understand what was happening earlier this morning. In the very 
situation, I was just embarrassed how Mohsen began to interrogate me all the 
sudden. He forced me to leave my position as the neutral observer and researcher 
and take a stance. He dragged me into the picture and highlighted different 
conditions of possibility of transnational mobility that structure the 
transnational space of mobility between Tunisia and Europe in terms of social 
hierarchies, racialisation, and in its temporal dimension. His critical attitude 
threw a spotlight on the conditionalities that shape our respective mobile 
practices. Add to this picture the transnational trajectories of Abdellah, who 
moved back and forth between Tunisia and France a few decades earlier, and 
you end with a collage of different experiences of mobility and border-crossing 
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that are related to each other, all of them conditioned and shaped by the 
European border regime.  
Abdellah’s experience of transnational mobility is shaped by the post-war 
economic boom in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s and the labour 
migration policy that ensured the constant supply of cheap and unskilled 
Tunisian workforce for a growing labour market especially in France, 
underpinned by the close relationship between France and Tunisia, which is the 
heritage of the colonial past that ties the two countries together.  
Mohsen’s experience of transnational mobility is shaped by the effects of the 
2008 financial crisis and the political responses. For a long time, Italy served as 
a steppingstone for Tunisian migrants to continue their migration trajectory 
through Europe. Italian migration laws allowed Tunisians to obtain a temporary 
residence permit for independent labour. It was common practice to use this 
permit to enter Italy legally and find work in the informal labour market and 
overstay the residence permit. This opportunity was closed after the financial 
crisis and the transformation of the informal Italian labour market. In addition, 
the turmoil after the fall of the Ben-Ali regime on 14 January 2011 led to a 
temporal and sharp increase of clandestine migration to Europe and provoked 
improvised short-term answers by European governments. This allowed Mohsen 
to escape Tunisia. Simultaneously, as a newcomer in the informal Italian labour 
market, he failed to establish himself and find a job. Only the establishment of 
Switzerland’s AVR programme for Tunisian asylum seekers in the same year 
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allowed him to unlock his situation and move forward, although it signified a 
subjugation of his mobility under the rules of AVR.  
My own pattern of transnational mobility is shaped by the racialised regime of 
differentiated mobility (see Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013). It allows people like 
me holding a Swiss passport to travel relatively freely between Switzerland and 
Tunisia with the only restriction to leave the country temporarily after three 
months. The only inconvenience I was facing were the few questions at the 
customs about my frequent entries and exits, documented by the growing 
number of stamps in my passport.7  
All three experiences of transnational mobility are driven by autonomous 
decisions to cross border, and simultaneously they are shaped by the modern 
liberal nation state’s desire to regulate and govern transnational mobility.  
Studying the State Through the Lens of Mobility 
Although this dissertation starts in Jebel Jelloud, it is not an ethnography of 
Tunis’s banlieue and this specific working-class neighbourhood, nor is it an 
ethnography of Tunisian harraga culture and the young people who live, dream, 
and hope in this run-down quartier populaire. It is also not a dissertation about 
 
7 In addition, I benefitted from the political situation of the post-Ben-Ali era. The whole security apparatus 
was much less visible than before. Before 2011, it would have been much more complicated, even 
impossible, to do this type of fieldwork without catching the attention of the authorities immediately.  
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those who return from their adventure abroad, sometimes broken, desperate, and 
disillusioned, sometimes triumphant and decorated with the insignia of a 
successful stay abroad, where they made – compared to the ordinary norm in the 
neighbourhood – a fortune.  
Rather, the dissertation takes the transnational mobile trajectories and the 
expectations of mobility as a starting point to examine state practices of control 
and governance. It thus adopts the analytical perspective the thesis of the 
autonomy of migration AoM (de Genova 2017, de Genova et al. 2018, Scheel 
2019) proposes and develops an analysis of the contemporary European border 
regime from a standpoint of border crossings, rather than from a standpoint of 
demarcations and boundary making. Ethnographically, it focuses on 
Switzerland’s programme for assisted voluntary return migration (AVR) for 
Tunisians and examines what I will call the paradox of governed voluntariness that 
is inscribed in this particular form of governing mobility. Switzerland realised 
this programme after the temporary sharp increase in the number of Tunisian 
asylum seekers in the turmoil following the overthrow of the long-standing Ben-
Ali regime in Tunisia in 2011. The programme promoted the return of Tunisian 
asylum seekers and granted support for individual return project, when they 
revoke their asylum application in return. AVR aims at replacing forced 
deportation with a mix of incentives and the threat of the looming rejection of 
the asylum application, thus creating a permanent state of insecurity, otherwise 
described as deportability (de Genova 2002, Hasselberg 2016).  
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The paradox of governed voluntariness refers to the emerging contradictions of 
the liberal nation state in the governance of transnational mobility. Arendt 
argues that state sovereignty is most absolute in matters of transnational 
migration and border control (Arendt 1951: 278). For the modern liberal nation 
state, migration control—the sovereign control of a nation’s geographical and 
social borders—threats the liberal promise of individual freedom, as liberal 
political philosophers as Carens (1995) or Cassee (2016) show. State sovereignty 
and liberalism thus maintain a conflicting relationship. Yet instead of a 
normative defence of liberalism and open borders as Carens, Cassee, and others 
do, this dissertation examines the dilemma from an empirical perspective. AVR 
programme allow a privileged insight into the emerging contradictions between 
migrants’ mobile practices and the return migration bureaucracy’s aim of a 
removal of “the undesirable alien” by mutual consent and without the 
mobilisation of brute force, which would contradict the self-understanding of 
the return migration bureaucrats.  
Three constitutive aspects are critical for the understanding of the paradox of 
governed voluntariness. First, it is imperative to understand the genealogy of the 
transnational space of mobility between Europe and Tunisia. It is on the one 
hand shaped by the colonial past and the post-world war economic boom in 
Western Europe, as chapter 3 explores. On the other hand, the organisation of 
the AVR programme privileges certain forms of transnational mobility, while 
inhibiting others (chapter 4). Second, the dissertation analyses the imaginations 
of mobility and return of Tunisian migrants and migration bureaucrats in order 
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to understand the expectations and images (chapter 5). And third, it explores 
ethnographically how the governance of voluntariness is produced in everyday 
bureaucratic practices (chapter 6). 
From Transnational Migration Trajectories to the Governance of 
Voluntariness 
The dissertation starts with a theoretical and a methodological chapter that 
answer the question how to study border regimes. In chapter 2, I introduce the 
theoretical framework. The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the discussion 
of the notion of border regimes (Tsianos and Karakayalı 2010; Hess 2012; 
Mezzadra and Neilson 2013;). It introduces the term as an analytical tool to 
understand how borders are organised through institutions, practices, and 
narratives. It then compares it to an alternative approach that can be found in 
the anthropology of policy. It explains why I prefer the border regime approach 
over a border policy approach, although they are closely related to each other 
and sometimes overlapping. The chapter continues with a critical discussion of 
the concept of the autonomy of migration AOM (Mezzadra 2007; Bojadžijev 
and Karakayalı 2007; Scheel 2015) and explains why I prefer the analytical notion 
of AOM and reject its synthetical notion. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion how the notion of the border regime and the AOM thesis are related 
to the concept of the transnational social field, as discussed in the work of Levitt 
and Glick Schiller (2004). 
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Chapter 3 discusses the dissertation’s methodology. It introduces the extended 
case method as the point of reference for the research design, drawing on the 
work of Buroway (1991, 1998) and Gluckman (1961). The chapter includes a 
brief discussion of the possibilities and pitfalls of biographical interviews as a 
research method in the context of undocumented migration, and it critically 
reviews the epistemological status and empirical value of (official) documents as 
artefacts for ethnographic research in a research context that is characterised by 
the attempt of migrants to escape state control and the gaze of the state in general  
Chapter 4 and 5 sketch the transnational space of migration in its historical 
perspective (chapter 4) and through the concrete and everyday experiences and 
biographies of six Tunisian migrants (chapter 5). The aim of chapter 4 is to 
explore how this particular transnational space of migration is structured by 
historical developments and legal frameworks. The chapter argues that historical 
transnational connections continue to structure the contemporary transnational 
space of migration. This chapter thus embeds the recent phenomenon of 
clandestine migration between Tunisia and Europe in a broader perspective. It 
shows that transnational migration is not a recent and only short episode in 
Tunisian history, but rather accompanies the formation of Tunisian society over 
centuries.  
In contrast to the historical perspective, chapter 5 explores the transnational 
space of migration through the concrete experience and the migration 
biographies of six male Tunisians. It thus adopts the thesis of the autonomy of 
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migration AOM in its analytical dimension and explores border through the 
experiences and practices of the mobile subjects. The focus on migration 
biographies allows to examine border policies through migrants’ individual 
experiences. Two ideas guide the specific selection of migration biographies. 
Firstly, in order to explore the effects of border regimes on individual migration 
trajectories, the sample aims at representing the most diverse experiences of 
clandestine migration. For this reason, the sample includes not only the examples 
of successful escapes, but also two migration biographies of young Tunisians who 
were – for various reasons – denied exercising their transnational mobility. These 
two cases invite the reader to explore how some individuals are completely 
excluded from the possibility of transnational mobility, although they would 
consider themselves also as harragas. Furthermore, these two migration 
biographies allow us to explore transnational mobile practices and the experience 
of border regimes and border making not only from an inside perspective, but 
also from an outside perspective, where the harraga is the imagination of an 
escape from suffering, oppression, and denial. And secondly, the sample aims at 
a historical comparison within the limited possibilities narrated migration 
biographies offer. Thus, it includes the case of Abdellah, the broker and 
gatekeeper we already encountered briefly in the introduction. His migration 
biography serves as a contrast to the other contemporary migration biographies 
of the young male clandestine Tunisian migrants. As this chapter argues, rather 
than a change in migration practices, we witness a change in the governance of 
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precarious labour migration, and how clandestine migration is discursively 
framed.  
The following two chapters 6 and 7 change perspective and look from a different 
angle on mobility, departure, and return. In contrast to the previous chapter, 
both chapters narrow down the focus to state practices and – more precisely – to 
one specific type of migration management; Switzerland’s programme for 
assisted voluntary return migration for Tunisian migrants. Chapter 6 asks how 
the state sees migration, thereby drawing on James Scott’s influential work on 
the state and the question how administrative tools to measure, plan, and classify 
the world is shaping this world at the same time (see Scott 1998). The chapter 
features two ethnographic vignettes. One explores how flowcharts represent the 
perfect imagination of migration management. The other examines how the 
state assesses and imagines a successful return within the programme for assisted 
voluntary return. These two vignettes explore how migration regimes are shaped 
by the way the state sees migration. This chapter focuses exclusively on 
Switzerland’s return migration regimes for Tunisian asylum seekers. In 
particular, it asks how the state imagines the asylum bureaucracy as a 
comprehensive system, and it explores how it defines success in the context of 
so-called voluntary return.  
In contrast to the previous chapter with its attention to representation and 
discourses, chapter 7 focuses on state practices. Drawing on the ethnographic 
material on Switzerland’s programme for assisted voluntary return migration, it 
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focuses on three specific waypoints in the governance of return migration. 
Firstly, it examines the return migration consultation in Switzerland. Secondly, 
it explores how the so-called compulsory business training course of the return 
migration program addresses return migrants as self-responsible and 
economically rational subjects. And finally, it explores how power relations 
emerge in the everyday encounter between return migration bureaucrats and 
return migrants during the realisation of the migrants’ AVR projects.  
The concluding chapter 8 brings these different strands together and comes back 
to the initial contradiction of the liberal nation state that is laid bare in the 
governance of so-called voluntary return migration. It returns to the argument 
that the governance of return migration oscillates between compassion and 
repression as two principles of governance. Drawing on the work of Graeber 
(2012; 2015), it argues that the return migration bureaucracy is a prime example 
of structural violence. In other words, it is not a structure that exercises violence, 
but a structure that is based on violence. With respect to the work of Fassin 
(2005; 2007; 2012) on humanitarianism, the chapter concludes that return 
migration bureaucracies shift the focus from the question of asylum rights to the 
issue of compassion or assistance. This transforms the migratory subject from a 
bearer of rights and obligation to a beneficiary of help on the one hand. At the 
same time, it mobilises the subject as a self-responsible and economically rational 
subject. This substitutes the image of the subject as a bearer of rights with the 
image of the subject as an economically rational subject. 
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As a conclusion, the dissertation suggests reading migration bureaucracies as a 
distinct form of bureaucracy. In contrast to an ordinary bureaucracy, which 
consists in the governance of a public good according to the imagined mutual 
consent, migration bureaucracies govern the boundaries of the commonwealth 
and are therefore adversary vis-à-vis the governed subjects by nature. This leads 
to the diagnoses that in the light of the governance of transnational migration 
and mobility, the contradictions of the promise of the liberal nation state emerge 
in full detail. An anthropology of the state should thus explore the state from a 
standpoint of mobility. Eventually, the question is then not who transgresses 






II. Studying the Governance of Mobility 
This dissertation explores the governance of mobility and return. On a 
theoretical level, it does this with the help of the two concepts of the border 
regime and the thesis of the autonomy of migration AOM. On an empirical 
level, it studies the governance of mobility and return through the analysis of 
Switzerland’s programme for assisted voluntary return migration for Tunisian 
migrants. With the notion of governance of mobility and return I refer to a 
specific aspect of the state bureaucracy. I understand governance “as the 
administration of access to and provision of rights, services and goods that imply 
also the definition of categories of inclusion and entitlements that are explicit or 
implicit in governmental practices” (Eckert et al. 2012: 14). The definition of 
categories of inclusion and entitlement implies at the same time its counterpart; 
the definition of categories of exclusion and denial. This definition of governance 
does not focus on migration bureaucracies in particular. Rather it provides a 
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general definition of state governance. The regulation of the access to rights, 
goods, and services is of particular salience, as migration bureaucracies do not 
administer any kind of rights, goods, and services. Mobility and border crossings 
are particular objects of governance. They hinge on citizenship, which can be 
described as a right of a second order, or, to use the words of Hannah Arendt 
(1951: 267-302), as a “right to have rights”, as she wrote with regard to human 
rights. As such, migration bureaucracies have a particular object of governance. 
It is simultaneously a resource regulated by practices of governance and a mean 
that allows the access to (state-provided) resources. This means that transnational 
mobility is a necessary condition to participate in rights, services and goods, 
which are distributed unequally on a global scale. This global unequal 
distribution is regulated or governed through the unequal distribution of 
possibilities of transnational mobility, more precisely in the attempts to exclude 
some from the possibilities of transnational mobility. Migration bureaucracies 
are the instances that regulate the access to the fundamental right to mobility.  
I use the two concepts of the border regime and the thesis of the autonomy of 
migration AOM to understand the governance of mobility and return. These 
seemingly contradicting concepts have different orientations, as they contain two 
different conceptualisations and ideas of the migratory subject. As I will argue 
throughout this chapter, these two conceptualisations of migratory subjectivity 
are not mutually exclusive, rather they refer to the “totalising and individualising 
dimension” (Foucault 1995, Shore and Wright 2015a, 2015b) of the governance 
of transnational mobility. The combination of these two ideas helps us to 
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understand the production of migratory subjectivity in the governance of return 
migration that is enacted between compassion and repression (Fassin 2005).  
The notion of the border regime and the thesis of the AOM refer to two opposed 
perspectives, echoing one of the fundamental debates in social theory; the 
question how structure and agency are related and constitute each other 
(Bourdieu 1972, Giddens 1979, Callinicos 2004). The notion of the border 
regime refers to the structural aspect and to state institutions. It highlights the 
power and domination of the state. In contrast, the thesis of the AOM refers to 
the migrant as a mobile subject and highlights its agency. I will argue that this 
blunt emphasis of an opposition between the two concept is a dead end. Instead 
of a confrontation of these two approaches, I suggest asking the question in a 
different way. Therefore, this chapter aims at a combination of these two 
approaches in order to grasp at the same time the constraining power of the state 
through its border institutions and practices, and the migratory subjectivity with 
its tendency to escape this state control.  
The first part of this chapter revisits the notion of the border regime, and it 
explains the specific approach to this concept in this dissertation. The second 
part turns its attention to the thesis of the autonomy of migration AOM. Here, 
it stresses out the theoretical value of the autonomy of migration as a heuristic 
approach to study border regimes and clandestine migration practices. At the 
same time, I argue why I reject an all too close conjunction between mobile 
practices and political struggles, which is the tendency in many AOM 
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approaches to the study of migration. In short, while the dissertation 
acknowledges and values the AOM as an analytical lens to explore mobility and 
state (border) practices, it rejects it as a synthetical notion. The third part brings 
the two theoretical concepts together and sketches how they allow to 
conceptualise the migratory subject within the field of (state) power, 
domination, subjugation, resistance, and escape.  
Border Regimes 
Often more a vague point of reference, rather than an analytical concept, the 
term border regime describes a set of institutions that operate in a similar logic. 
In other words, the concept of border regime is the attempt for a broader and 
more inclusive reading of border institutions. It allows to include further 
institutions than those who are in general associated with the border as a 
demarcation line between two states, or the idea of the border as the limits of 
state’s sovereignty (e.g. Sassen 1996; Walters 2002; Rumford 2006; Parker and 
Adler-Nisse 2012; Parker and Vaughan 2012). The border police, customs, 
walls, and barriers are important features of the border regime, but more subtle 
forms of border practices and boundary-making are constitutive for the border 
regime as well.  
In the European context of critical migration studies, the term border regime is 
an answer to the highly criticised metaphor of the fortress Europe (e.g. 
Euskirchen et al. 2007). As Hess and Tsianos (2010) argue, this metaphor is 
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based on the problematic hypothesis of repression and includes a hypnotized 
gaze on the border, where the excess of border violence emerges in its most brutal 
form, while simultaneously ignoring the manifold practices and institutions of 
border practices and border-making that happen in the shadow of the “border 
spectacle” (de Genova 2013). 8  While the fortress Europe metaphor tends 
towards a functionalist reading of borders and border institutions, a border 
regime approach focuses more on the contradictions, inconsistencies, and 
frictions.  
However, the notion of the border regime contains more than a broader focus 
on state institutions that contribute to the making of borders. Rather, the term 
highlights the interplay between institutions, practices, and discourses. At the 
same time, it emphasises the contradictory character of border regimes. Border 
regimes are not the result of a single and unifying logic or strategy. This results 
in an approach that is opposed to a reading of the border one could describe as 
functionalist. The analytical power of the border regime approach is precisely in 
the combination of institutions, practices, and discourses. This follows Giuseppe 
Sciortino’s (2004) definition of a migration regime:  
“[A] country’s migration regime is usually not the outcome 
of consistent planning. It is rather a mix of implicit 
 
8 For a detailed critique of the concept of the fortress Europe, see also Tsianos and Karakayalı (2010). 
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conceptual frames, generations of turf wars among 
bureaucracies and waves after waves of ‘quick fix’ to 
emergencies, triggered by changing political constellations 
of actors. The notion of a regime allows rooms for gaps, 
ambiguities, and outright straints: the life of a regime is the 
result of continuos repair work through practices”  
(Sciortino 2004:32f).  
In this quote, Sciortino highlights three dimensions of the border regime; 
institutions, practices, discourses. The first dimension of border regimes is its 
institutions. Sciortino uses the term bureaucracies, which is slightly misleading 
in two different ways. Bureaucracies are not reducible to institutions, and the 
term institutions includes state entities that lack fundamental characteristics of 
bureaucracies; e.g. border guards. Heyman (1995), for example, argues that a 
state bureaucracy is more than the assemblage of institutions. Rather, it describes 
organised power that is able to orchestrate complex societies and various 
contexts. Heyman’s notion of bureaucracy would include practices as well; a 
separate and distinct aspect in Sciortino’s definition of border regimes.  
Border institutions are not necessarily limited to state institutions, nor are they 
limited to institutions that are directly linked to the geographical border. 
Concerning the first point, it means that non-governmental institutions might 
be considered as border institutions as well. Therefore, in this research I consider 
organisation such as NGOs focusing on aspects of migration, refugee relief 
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organisations, the UNHCR, or the International Organisation of Migration 
IOM – a key actor in the organisation of return migration – as border 
institutions as well, although they are not part of the state apparatus in the 
narrow sense of the term. Furthermore, it also includes state institutions far away 
from the geographical border, for example the cantonal return migration offices, 
as important institutions in the organisation of borders and border-making.  
This disconnection of border institutions from the geographical location at the 
border and from the state, creates the problem of the defining element of border 
institutions. To put it bluntly, we have to find an alternative minimal definition 
of border institutions that overcomes the limitations discussed above. As a 
solution, I suggest defining border institutions from the practices they exercise 
and from the narratives they deploy. Reduced to a short and handy definition; 
they are institutions that attempt to order people’s transnational mobile practices 
in the transnational space of mobility. In this perspective, border institutions are 
identifiable as such only through the effects they produce. This connects them 
directly to the second dimension in Sciortino’s definition of the border regime; 
the border practices.  
Border practices as the second dimension of border regimes organise and shape 
human mobility in the transnational space of migration. Border practices inhibit, 
block, accelerate, or rearrange human mobility. It is important to take into 
account enabling and restricting practices at the same time. In other words, it is 
not a binary question of access and denial, but rather the production of mobility 
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(Bigo and Guild 2005). More general, these differentiations produce inequalities 
of rights, risks, and movements (Pallitto and Heyman 2008:319). Often the 
practices of border regimes do not prevent or stop human mobility in the 
transnational social space of migration entirely. Rather, border regimes delay or 
speed up human mobility. This regime of differentiated mobility is similar to 
the concept of differentiated citizenship (Hindess 1993) with differentiated 
inclusion and exclusion (Bosniak 2006) or differentiated rights (e.g. Wicker 
2004; Holston 2009, 2011).  
This production of differentiated mobility has temporal and spatial effects. 
Concerning the temporal effects, borders do not seal off unwanted immigration 
movements entirely (Tsianos Karakayalı 2010).9 Rather, they delay or speed up 
migration trajectories. The delaying of one’s migration trajectory and the feeling 
of being stuck is one of the most drastic experiences as I learnt during fieldwork 
from my informants. The physical suffering, dire poverty, hunger, or similar 
hardship was rarely mentioned as an issue by the informants when talking about 
their migration trajectories. Instead, all the dead time wasted on the road, the 
phases of waiting and uncertainty were repeatedly identified as one of the most 
exhausting aspects of clandestine mobility. In many cases, waiting becomes some 
sort of a leitmotiv for the clandestine Tunisian migrants during their migration 
 
9 This is a further argument against the fortress Europe metaphor that implies the picture of the border as a 
hermetic and impenetrable wall. 
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trajectories between Tunisia and Europe.10 This waiting has many faces. It is a 
waiting for a next opportunity to continue one’s migration trajectory, it is a 
waiting for a decision of the asylum bureaucracy, or it is a waiting until one has 
collected the necessary means to pay for the next move and cross the next border 
(see also Lucht 2015). Therefore, waiting is experienced as an alienation of the 
time from oneself.  
The spatial dimension of border practices is more obvious than the temporal 
dimension, yet surprisingly in the narrated experience of my interlocutors, it is 
of minor significance. Compared to the temporal effects of border practices, the 
spatial effects may seem less important. With respect to spatiality, the work of 
borders rearranges and orders migration trajectories in the space. Under the 
paradigm of the spatial turn, geographers, and human and social scientists have 
explored how border practices transform and shape space (e.g. Houtum et al 
2004). The border draws a demarcation line between spaces that are allowed and 
spaces that are forbidden.  
The third dimension of border regimes concerns narratives and discourses. They 
play a crucial role in the constitution and organisation of border regimes. The 
mobilising power of discourses allows to orchestrate and align practices in a 
perspective of borders, of inclusion and exclusion. Differentiated mobility or 
 
10 Existential anthropology (e.g. Hage 2009), but also other ethnographies (e.g. Elliot 2016) have explored 
the motive of waiting in the migratory experience.  
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differentiated exclusion requires the establishment of different categories such as 
refugees, labour migrants, expats, and tourists. Some of these categories are legal, 
as they describe a precise legal status, others are more vague and sanction certain 
types of mobility as either welcomed or undesired. Bauman (1996) explored 
these differences with the distinction “tourists” and “vagabonds”, a distinction 
that refers more to the moral evaluation of different types of mobility than to a 
strict legal status. Therefore, this categorisation is not descriptive, but has a 
prescriptive and normative character. The continuum of practices of human 
mobility is divided into discrete categories that allow to treat individuals 
differently according to the different categories. 11  This categorisation might 
change over time. Concerning transnational migration of Tunisians, we will 
discover later through the narrated migration biographies of my interlocutors 
that the very same practices of mobility were once framed as labour migration in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and are now considered as asylum migration, or, in the 
public discourse, as so-called illegal migration.  
In particular the discursive dimension of border regimes brings the concept close 
to an anthropology of policy. This is an alternative concept to approach the 
governance of transnational mobility with a stronger focus on the discursive 
aspect. Shore and Wright (1997, 2011) coined this anthropological approach to 
policy, while Però (2011) applied this concept to the field of migration and 
 
11 See Handelman (2004) on the logics of categorisation and the ordering of a continuum into distinct 
categories. 
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mobility. Shore and Wright (1997: 4) identify three main modes of policy; 
policy as language and power, policy as cultural agent, and policy as political. In 
the context of this dissertation, the focus will be on the mode of policy as 
language and power. This adds particular emphasis to one aspect of the border 
regime approach that is often neglected, because of its strong focus on 
institutions and – to a lesser degree – practices.  
Let me conclude this discussion with the question how the approach to the 
concept of border regime as sketched above shapes the understanding of borders. 
The discussion has highlighted three dimensions of the border regime; 
institutions, practices, and discourses and narratives. The discussion of these 
three dimensions made clear that an encompassing notion of the border has to 
deterritorialise this particular concept. Border can no longer be understood as 
the geopolitical line in the sand that marks and delimits the spatial extension of 
state sovereignty (Rumford 2006, 2012; Balibar 2004, 2009). Instead, border 
occur both beyond and within the geographical borders of a state. Instead of a 
concrete line in space, borders should be understood as a mode of governance 
that structures the texture of the social fabric through differentiated mobility in 
a transnational space of mobility with overlapping state sovereignties. This does 
not imply to reduce borders to its discursive aspect. Rather, it is a reminder to 
look beyond the line and detach our hypnotised gaze from the geographical 
border where the “border spectacle” (de Genova 2010, 2013) emerges in its most 
graphic form in general.  
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Autonomy of Migration as an Analytical Tool 
In this dissertation, I juxtapose the concept of border regimes to the thesis of the 
autonomy of migration AOM. The notion of the border regime focuses on the 
infrastructure of borders, the practices, and the discourses, yet it tends to neglect 
the role of migrants as subjects. With their practices and discourses, migrants 
subvert, enforce, and restructure borders. The AOM thesis provides us with a 
distinct analytical focus on these expressions of migrants’ subjectivity. As such, 
it offers a productive perspective to look on migration, or, more general, on 
mobility and reflect how the mobility of migrants is connected to border 
regimes. Understood as an analytical perspective and not as a synthetic 
proposition, the thesis of the AOM reframes the interdependencies between 
migrants’ border crossing practices and the border regime. Thus, it focuses on 
the sites of struggles over mobility. Furthermore, the thesis of the AOM is an 
emphatic reminder that mobility is an essential condition of human life (de 
Genova 2012).  
In critical migration studies, the thesis of the AOM has become a strong point 
of reference for the study of transnational mobility. In particular the body of 
literature on this topic in German has grown in the second half of the first decade 
of this Century (e.g. Karakayalı and Tsianos 2005; TRANSIT MIGRATION 
Forschungsgruppe 2007; Bojadžijev and Karakayalı 2007; Scheel 2013, 2015; 
cf. Benz and Schwenken 2005; Binder, Ege and Färber 2011). Drawing on the 
idea of autonomy as developed in the Operaismo movement in Italy since the late 
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1950s, the thesis of the AOM emphasises transitional mobile practices of 
migrants as the driving force for shaping and changing border regimes. In this 
sub-chapter I suggest to understand the thesis of the AOM not as a synthetic 
proposition, but rather as an analytical lens or tool to study transnational human 
mobility. This approach allows to de-naturalise borders and show how they are 
constructed and contested. Therefore, I consider the thesis of the AOM a fruitful 
starting point to explore struggles over mobility and the right to the freedom of 
transnational mobility, yet I reject the all too quick explanation of migrants’ 
mobile practices as explicit or implicit expressions of struggles and resistance 
against border regimes that is inherent in many studies based on the thesis of the 
AOM. These studies have the tendency to overemphasise the insurgent potential 
of transnational mobility. It misses to take into account that contested mobility 
is in many cases much more a struggle for recognition and inclusion into the 
border regime, than the resistance against it.  
The following part begins with the characterisation of the thesis of the AOM 
and discusses its main elements. In particular, it acknowledges its analytical 
potential. It then continues with a critique of the notion of resistance that takes 
a (too) prominent place in the application of this concept. It discusses the pitfalls 
and shortcomings of the dichotomy between the oppressive border regime on 
the one hand, and subversive transnational border practices as struggles for the 
freedom of movement, no matter whether they are organised or unorganised, 
implicit or explicit. This discussion shows that the thesis of the AOM tends to 
 47 
overemphasise migration as a per se political practice that questions the social 
and economic status quo.  
In order to save the explanatory power of the concept of the autonomy of 
migration, I suggest reducing it to its core: an analytical lens that allows us to 
describe the interdependencies between migration and border control practices 
from the perspective of migration. As a result, it helps to decentre and de-
naturalise the perspective on borders as given and immutable entities. As a 
conclusion, I suggest using the term appropriation of mobility instead of the 
term struggles.  
Moulier-Boutang describes the thesis of the AOM as „eine Methode, ein 
Ausgangspunkt, ein heuristisches Modell“ (2007:169, a method, a starting 
point, a heuristic model; D.L.). This description captures perfectly the core idea 
of the thesis of the AOM. Firstly, it points out that AOM is rather a method 
than a theory. In other words, it is an analytical tool to study transnational 
mobility. Secondly, AOM takes mobility and mobile practices for granted and 
explores borders and migration control from a standpoint of mobility. This 
change in perspective opens new ways of thinking about border and migration 
control. Borders and border practices are no longer the unquestioned norm that 
is just given, but contingent entities that are always in the making and under 
constant threat. In this perspective, mobility is not the exception from a norm 
based on immobility and stability. Instead of questioning why (transnational) 
mobility exists and searching for explanations, the AOM invites the researcher 
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to turn the perspective, asking why there are borders and border control practices 
at all.  
And as a third aspect in Moulier-Boutang’s definition of the autonomy of 
migration, mobility precedes any attempts of its control. This is not a synthetic 
proposition or a description of a historical or social fact, but rather a heuristic 
model that suggests a particular approach to the study of migration and its 
control. Following Bojadžijev (2011), the thesis of the AOM as a heuristic model 
changes the perspective on migration, as it adopts the perspective of migration 
itself. The study of migrants’ mobile practices – their compliance with and 
subversion of border control practices – helps to understand border regimes, as 
they highlight the conditions of possibilities of mobility and immobility.  
Beyond Moulier-Boutang’s discussion of the AOM, de Genova (2010) 
highlights a further aspect of the thesis of the AOM. He insists that mobility is 
an intrinsic quality of human beings. As such, mobility is the figure par 
excellence of life and its barest essential condition (de Genova 2010:39; see also 
de Genova 2012). This does not qualify mobility as a human right, nor as a 
natural right per se. Instead, it emphasises mobility as a fundamental figure of 
life, preceding its juridification in any form, as de Genova insists. This 
understanding of migration as an intrinsic quality of human life urges for an 
approach that adopts the perspective of mobility as a starting point for any 
investigation of migration and border regimes.  
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Beyond an analytical tool for the investigation of migration and border regimes, 
it has to be reminded that the thesis of the AOM takes a political stance as well. 
Garelli and Tazzioli (2013) diagnose the consolidation of migration studies as 
an interdisciplinary discipline, yet this institutionalisation goes along with a 
depoliticization, as the two authors deplore. In their defence of the thesis of the 
AOM, they locate the origins of the idea of autonomy in the Italian Operaismo 
movement and argue that research based on the paradigm of AOM follows a 
similar impetus; research and militant action build a continuum, and research 
questions emerge from concrete political struggles. The Operaismo movement 
(workerist communism) emerged in the 1950s and 1960 as a social and 
intellectual movement that emphasises the subjectivity of the workers as the 
driving force of history over the productive forces (see also Hardt and Negri 
2001). It is a reversal the Marxian model of progress that considers the 
productive forces as the driving forces of change. Furthermore, the notion of 
autonomy in the Operaismo transforms Marx’s classical bipolar model of the 
antagonism of power between capital and labour into a multi-vocal and de-
centred model of power. This led to a radical different description of domination 
and resistance; widely popularised in the image of the rhizome by Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987). Any form of hegemonic and subversive power has no longer a 
centre, but only “nodes” and “intersections” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). This 
pluralisation of power and resistance is at the core of the notion of autonomy.  
Translated into critical migration studies, the thesis of the AOM insists that 
transnational mobile practices precede any attempts of border control; the latter 
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are always reactions to the former (de Genova 2013a: 11). This heuristic change 
in perspective decentres the well-established assumption of mobility as an 
exception. It leads to a strong research focus on migrants’ struggles 
(Papadopoulos et al. 2008, Tazzioli 2015). Resistance against the European 
border regimes, or more general, the resistance against any form of prevention 
of human mobility is considered as an expression of the autonomy of migration.  
It is not necessary that this resistance against forms of inhibition of human 
mobility becomes a conscious and explicitly political form. Bojadžijev and 
Karakayalı (2007) suggest that the migrants’ struggles against border regimes 
extend beyond the explicit forms of political struggles. Political rallies and 
protests against Frontex or against the conclusion of the EU/ Turkey deal on the 
deportation of refugees arriving on Greek islands back to Turkey in 2016, or the 
famous protest camp against deportations at the Oranienplatz in Berlin between 
2012 and 2014 are only the most visible forms of migration struggles. In the 
perspective of the thesis of the AOM, the simple fact that thousands of migrants 
are crossing borders without asking for permission is also an expression of a 
political movement in the literal sense. Mundane practices that undermine 
border regimes and cross prescribed paths of mobility are part of these struggles 
for human mobility without any conditions.  
Three objections can be brought forward against the thesis of the AOM and this 
particular reading of resistance. This is first the overemphasis of the notions of 
struggles and resistance against the border regime. Second, it is the generalised 
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assumption that migration always and automatically implies a perspective ‘from 
below’, as it implies that the migrant is the figure of the subaltern par excellence 
in global border regimes. And third, while it acknowledges the de-centred and 
multivocal character of human mobility as an insurgent force for the 
transformation of migration control, it tends to transform the border regime into 
a uniform and united system; a hegemonic apparatus opposed to practices of 
mobility as a whole. This eventually contradicts Moulier-Boutang’s notion of 
the border regime with its emphasis on frictions and contradictions as its 
constitutive part. Let me consider these three objections in more detail.  
First, the thesis of the autonomy of migration has the tendency to overemphasise 
migrants’ struggles against the border regime. In this perspective, virtually any 
mundane practice that contradicts or subverts at first glance a certain aspect of 
border and migration control is interpreted as a subversion of the border regime. 
It fails to identify criteria that allow us to distinguish between mobile practices 
as struggles over the freedom of movements from other mobile practices that do 
not belong to this category. As we will see later in the discussion of the empirical 
material, the mere fact of ignoring the explicit rules of mobility is not a sufficient 
indication that this specific practice is a contestation of the border regime. It 
ignores the possibility that practices, which do not comply with the explicit rules 
of mobility and border crossing, might be in complete alignment with the logics 
of the dominant border regime. It should be regarded as an open question, 
whether mobile practices are subversive and have the tendency to destabilise and 
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transform border regime, or – to the contrary – whether they only reaffirm and 
strengthen the dominant mode of control of mobility.  
However, there are attempts for a more nuanced conceptualisation of the 
relationship between mobile practices and struggles against or contestations of 
the border regime. Bojadžijev and Karakayalı (2007) and Bojadžijev (2011) for 
example emphasise that mobile practices are indeed on the one hand an escape 
from oppressive structures in one context. At the same time, these trajectories 
might lead directly into new relationship of dependencies and subjugation under 
the conditions of global capitalism. This approach takes up the dialectics of 
mobility as described by Marx with regard to the Irish agricultural workers in 
the 19th Century (Marx 1972: 726-740). He shows how the rural proletariat of 
Ireland was set free from semi-feudal dependencies in the 19th Century, turning 
them into labour migrants – only to end up in the growing industrialising cities 
in England as the new industrial reserve army. Marx reminds us that this escape 
from semi-feudal agrarian dependencies is not at all a liberation, but only an 
escape from one type of subordination and dependencies into another one. Some 
of the migration biographies I will discuss later in this dissertation show exactly 
this dialectic.  
Second, the thesis of the AOM tends to ignore the fact that under the condition 
of global capitalism in world society, in many cases forms of resistance might be 
rather practices of immobility than practices of mobility. For example, high-
skilled transnational migration of the global elite is perfectly covered and even 
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supported and facilitated by border regimes. It is neither a struggle against the 
border regime, nor within the border regime. To the contrary, it is a strategy of 
mobility that is not only legit, but even desired and required. Overemphasising 
the aspect of struggles neglects that the overwhelming majority of mobile 
practices do not relate to struggles against or within the border regimes in any 
ways – neither as implicit struggles, nor as explicit and politically organised 
struggles. This shows that the research focus on mobile practices does not 
automatically imply a perspective “from below”. The study of the mobile 
practices of the global elite would be far from such an attempt of “studying up” 
(Nader 1972).  
At this point, I would like to take the critique a step further, focusing explicitly 
on the socio-economic aspect of transnational mobility. In their critical 
discussion of the thesis of the AOM, Çağlar and Glick Schiller (2011) 
acknowledge that this particular perspective aims at a position beyond the 
victimisation of migrants on the one hand, and the normalisation of migration 
through the heroisation of migrants and their uncritical integration into a 
dominant migration regime of circular migration on the other hand. However, 
Çağlar and Glick Schiller (2011:149) argue that the thesis of the AOM 
understands migrants as one single and autonomous category. Their critique is 
that it neglects the conditions that create distinctions and similarities among 
migrants and link them sometimes more closely to non-migrants. This 
reductionist tendency is contrary to the initial intention of the thesis of the 
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autonomy of migration that aims to capture the excessive and uncontrollable 
aspect of migration.  
The third objection against the thesis of the AOM is directed against its notion 
of the border regime. Similar to the mobile practices of migrants that are diverse, 
chaotic, and do not follow any single and unified logic, the same is true for the 
border regime. Although the term might be easily misread as a monolithic power 
bloc, the strength of this concept is precisely in its emphasis on the frictions and 
contradictions. These frictions and contradictions should not be read as 
expressions of a dysfunctional system, but rather taken as a starting point to 
analyse their constitutive role and formative power of the border regime. 
Otherwise, we would end up again in the misleading image of the fortress, as 
expressed in the popular image of the “fortress Europe”, often strategically 
mobilised in political discourses. Above, in the discussion of Sciortino’s notion 
of the regime I emphasise the contradicting, and ambivalent character of border 
regimes that includes a whole range of actors, contradicting practices, and 
ideological frames. Border regimes are in constant transformation and adopt to 
changing political and social constellations. The thesis of the AOM with its 
narrow focus on struggles against border regimes tends to transform the regime 
into a system. Sciortino (2007) insists on the sharp distinction between a regime 
and a system. Only the latter is uniform and follows one single logic. Reading 
migration practices exclusively in the perspective of struggles against the border 
regime does not take into account sufficiently the contradicting aspects of a 
regime. Enabling and restricting border practices co-exist, and they are not 
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mutually exclusive. Rather this co-presence is constitutive for border regimes. 
This means that we as researchers should refrain from any attempt to identify a 
master narrative or a main strategy that unifies and includes all practices, 
conceptual frames, and institutions of border regimes.  
As a consequence, it is impossible to define certain migratory practices per se as 
insurgent or subversive. Although they might ignore the explicit rules of 
transnational mobility, such practices might be perfectly compliant with other 
aspects of the border regime. The very same practice of transnational mobility 
can have a destabilising effect and a stabilising effect on the border regime at the 
same time. As a result, the thesis of the AOM that emphasises the aspect of 
resistance and struggles tends to reduce the complexity, inconsistencies, and 
contradictions of the border regime and sketches it as a uniform system following 
one single logic.  
However, although these three points are serious objections against the thesis of 
the AOM, they do not render it expendable. Instead of rejecting it, I value the 
thesis of the AOM as a productive analytical lens to study transnational human 
mobility. Although – based on the ethnographic material – I am critical with 
regard to the subversive potential of transnational mobility, the analytical power 
of the thesis of the AOM allows me to de-centre and denaturalise borders and 
border control practices. As I will show throughout the text, there are many 
moments within the transnational trajectories of my informants, where their 
mobile practices do contain glimpses of autonomy. Their trajectories are not 
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simply responses to incentives, opportunities, or obstacles of mobility. Newly 
emerging border control practices are indeed in many cases reactions to 
autonomous mobile practices; the programme for assisted voluntary return 
migration for Tunisian migrants is just a prime example for such a reaction to 
these autonomous mobile practices, as we will discover later. At the same time, 
it would be misleading to read these transnational trajectories as expressions of 
implicit or explicit struggles over mobilities.  
This last remark is of particular importance with regard to the dissertation’s main 
concern; the governance of return migration. I am sceptical to take it as a given 
fact that migrants’ transnational mobile practices are per se expressions of forms 
of resistance or struggles against border regimes. Some of these strategies do 
indeed undermine and subvert the border regime, yet others convene entirely 
with it, although they do not comply with the explicit rules of transnational 
mobility.  
In their critique of the thesis of the AOM, Benz and Schwenken (2005) suggest 
replacing the term autonomy with Eigensinnigkeit.12 The aim of this suggestion 
is to emphasise that mobility and its control maintain a closer interdependency 
than the thesis of the AOM acknowledges. At the same time, Eigensinnigkeit shall 
be a reminder of the ever-present moment of excess and uncontrollability of 
 
12 The German notion Eigensinnigkeitk can be roughly translated as perseverance.  
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migration. The problem of this approach is that it disconnects mobility and its 
control entirely from the aspect of dominance and power. Instead of replacing 
autonomy with Eigensinnigkeit as Benz and Schwenken suggest on the one hand, 
and instead of jumping to the conclusion that migration means per se a form of 
struggle as the thesis of the AOM does on the other hand, I suggest to read 
migrants’ mobile strategies as forms of appropriation of mobility. In contrast to 
the term struggle, appropriation does not imply the notion of a counterstrategy 
against the border regime. Appropriation preserves the idea of autonomy but 
avoids juxtaposing mobile practices to forms of control of transnational mobility. 
For example, when a Tunisian asylum seeker decides to abandon the asylum 
procedure and continue to live in Switzerland as a so-called sans-papier, his 
practice can be read as “disregarding the rules of obedience” (de Genova 2013b). 
At the same time, as we will see later in more detail, it perfectly aligns with the 
logic of the asylum bureaucracy. This logic consists in the attempt to decrease 
the number of asylum seekers with virtually no chance of a granting of asylum. 
With regard to this perspective, the migrant’s practice does not contest this 
particular logic of the border regime, because he disappears from official statistics 
and does no longer exist in the hegemonic view of the state. The notion of 
appropriation emphasises that even under the conditions of an extreme power 
inequality, transnational mobile practices are self-determined choices. At the 
same time, the notion is a reminder that the structuring forces do not remain 
static but might be transformed through these transnational mobile practices. In 
contrast to the thesis of the AOM, the notion of the appropriation of mobility 
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is more sceptical of the emancipatory potential of migrants’ transnational mobile 
practices.  
As a conclusion of this discussion of the thesis of the AOM, I would like to retain 
the following two points. Firstly, I suggest reading the thesis of the autonomy of 
migration as an analytical tool instead of a synthetic proposition. This means 
that the analysis of border regimes is developed from the perspective of mobility 
and migration. It further includes to take as a starting point of analysis migrants’ 
agency. And secondly, I read migrants’ transnational mobile practices in terms 
of appropriation of mobility. It is an appropriation that might be directed against 
dominant patterns of mobility, or it might be an appropriation that does not 
question dominant border regimes at all.  
Border Regimes, Autonomy, and State Violence 
The last part of this chapter brings together the two conceptual strands of the 
border regime perspective and the thesis of the AOM. It thereby focuses on the 
production of the migratory subject in the context of the border regime. The 
concept of the border regime explains in a Foucauldian perspective how 
migrants’ subjectivity is produced. The thesis of the AOM is a reminder that the 
figure of the migrant as a mobile subject always retains an aspect that exceeds 
and escapes any attempts of control and subjugation and thereby disregards the 
rules of obedience (de Genova 2013b:155).  
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Many critical migration studies take a Foucauldian framework as a point of 
reference for the analysis of the production of subjectivity in the context of 
border regimes (e.g. Tazzioli 2013), although the relationship of state borders 
and governance was never an issue in Foucault’s own work, as Walters (2011) 
reminds. For these critical migration studies, the important point of reference is 
Foucault’s lecture on governmentality (Foucault 2004). I suggest a reading of 
the agency of migrants that does not rely on a Foucauldian framework with its 
emphasis on governmentality. Taking governmentality as a starting point to 
explore the production of migrants’ subjectivity tends to neglect that that the 
whole border regime as such operates on the basis of sheer violence. However, 
with respect to the governance of so-called voluntary return migration, the issue 
of power and state-sanctioned violence is eminently important. The discussion 
of the empirical material will show in detail how the return migration 
bureaucracy is intimately linked to its counterpart; forced deportation. 
Therefore, it is indispensable to take into account the issue of state-sanctioned 
violence and how it constitutes the governance of so-called voluntary return. 
Castañeda (2010), de Genova (2010), Drotbohn (2012) and others show in their 
work how the governance of undocumented migrants operates against the 
backdrop of the threat of deportation.  
As mentioned above, borders, (transnational) mobility, and migration control in 
general are not an explicit issue in Foucault’s work (Walters 2011, de Genova 
2013b). Even in the later period of his work, when Foucault turns to the study 
of governmentality, borders as governmental institutions are not an explicit 
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subject of his discussions. Rather, Foucault’s work focuses on processes of 
governmentality within the modern nation state. This “methodological 
nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) tends to render invisible the 
work of borders. Migration control does not appear as a potential institution of 
governmentality. This seems to be a blind spot in Foucault’s reflection on 
governmentality, as borders and border-making are the necessary conditions for 
the deployment of governmental techniques, but they are themselves not part of 
it. Jessop notes that in the later period of Foucault the complex of “sovereignty-
territory-security moved out to the margins of Foucault’s theoretical concerns” 
(Jessop 2011:61). Disciplinary power becomes an issue of marginal importance, 
although the relationship between the threat of explicit state violence, the use of 
state violence, and techniques of governmentality seems to be of fundamental 
importance. Simultaneously to the disappearance of the issue of disciplinary 
power in Foucault’s work and his exclusive interest in techniques of 
governmentality, we can discover the re-emergence of the state as a leitmotif for 
the study of society. This leads to a surprising result. Foucault’s work returns to 
the state, but without the aspect of disciplinary power that seems to be so 
fundamental for any understanding of the state. This missing aspect of 
disciplinary power –state violence in other words – is a serious problem for the 
study of the governance of so-called voluntary return, as the dialectics between 
voluntariness and the looming threat of state violence is at the very core of the 
operation of the programmes for so-called voluntary return migration.  
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For this reason, I suggest reading so-called voluntary return against the backdrop 
of the threat of concrete physical violence. Although state violence might not 
appear in any form in the picture of so-called voluntary return migration, it is 
the necessary backdrop against which it operates. David Graeber’s (2012) 
distinction between two different notions of structural violence illustrates this 
point very well. He juxtaposes a reading of structural violence that understands 
structures as the outcome of violence and upheld by the threat of violence against 
the classical notion of structural violence as developed by Johan Galtung (1969). 
For Galtung, structural violence describes structures that generate violence. With 
a definition of peace as the absence of violence, with the notion of structural 
violence Galtung captures situations and arrangements that are characterized by 
the absence of violence, but cannot be identified as peace, as they continue to 
generate violent effects. Graeber now suggests adding a second notion of 
structural violence and uses the term “structures of violence” (Graeber 2012: 
113) to distinguish the two. This second notion refers to structures that are 
created and uphold by the concrete threat – and, if necessary, the application – 
of (state) violence.  
This amendment to the notion of structural violence is crucial for the 
understanding of the programmes of so-called voluntary return migration. I thus 
suggest reading border regimes not only as structural violence, but also in the 
more concrete form of structures of violence. This opens the possibility for a 
more nuanced reading of border institutions and border practices that do not 
include the use of direct physical (state) violence, as it allows to explore their 
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relationship to violence and analyse how they rely on (state) violence as the 






Studying border regimes through the lens of the thesis of the AOM requires a 
distinct methodology. It focuses on the conflicts over the right to exercise one’s 
transnational mobility, and it studies how migrants escape border control, 
ignoring the explicit hegemonic rules of border crossings. In an AOM 
perspective, the field of study is structured and tied together by the mobile 
practices and transnational movements of mobile subjects. This chapter lays out 
how this research constructs its field site, drawing mainly on the idea of multi-
sited ethnography, focusing simultaneously on the field and the emerging mobile 
subject. The second part of this chapter discusses how this research makes use of 
documents and artifacts to study the border regime and the governance of so-
called voluntary return migration. The third part explains the use of different 
forms of interviews and conversation in the context of this research. It thereby 
pays particular attention to some ethical issues. This discussion of the ethics of 
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interviews is of particular importance in the context of clandestine transnational 
mobility. Finally, this chapter on methods summarises the approach as a whole 
under the two terms of the extended-case method (Gluckman 1961) and global 
ethnography (Burawoy 2000).  
Constructing the Field: A Multi-sited Ethnography Approach 
In his seminal article on the ethnographic study of contemporary world society, 
George Marcus (1995) advocates for the renewal of the ethnographer’s tool kit 
for fieldwork. He introduces the idea of multi-sited ethnography as a method to 
study social phenomena that are no longer identifiable at one singular 
geographical place. It is the attempt to overcome the confinements of traditional 
ethnographic research, restricted to the observation of a clearly delimited field.13 
According to Marcus, the multi-sited research method is an answer to the 
contemporary social reality, which is embedded in a network of global 
interdependencies. He insists that the multi-sited research method does not aim 
at a comparative study of different sites, rather it aims at the construction of a 
multi-sited field that reflects the reality of contemporary world society more 
accurately and therefore allows to study social phenomena in its connectedness.  
 
13 Arguably, it is no coincidence that many seminal ethnographic studies of the early days of our discipline 
chose an island as field site. The geographic insularity of the island reflects the imagination of a bounded 
and clearly delimited society that can be studied at one place and without any interference from outside.  
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Marcus’s multi-sited research method suggests six different modes of 
construction; “follow the people” (Marcus 1995: 106), “follow the thing” (106), 
“follow the metaphor” (108), “follow the plot, story, or allegory” (109) “follow 
the life or biography” (109), and “follow the conflict” (110). Some of these 
modes of constructions overlap and cannot be clearly distinguished. This 
dissertation uses several of these modes of construction to sketch its field site. 
Beyond the “follow the people” mode of construction, which is at the centre of 
this dissertation, the study also includes elements of the “follow the metaphor”, 
the “follow the life or biography”, and the “follow the conflict” mode of 
construction.  
According to Marcus, multi-sited ethnography is a possibility to overcome the 
shortcomings of traditional ethnography that is locally bound and confined to a 
delimited field. The fragmentation of contemporary society due to processes of 
globalisation requires a fundamental redefinition of the field in ethnographic 
research. This account describes contemporary processes of globalisation as new 
and recent phenomena, and it contrasts them to the past. In other words, the 
multi-sited ethnography as described by Marcus introduces an epistemic break 
between a past defined by local structures and processes, and a presence 
embedded in the global.  
Neveling (2010) criticises this underlying epistemological assumption. The 
separation between a locally bounded past and an interdependent and globally 
embedded presence neglects the fact that global ties are not a recent 
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development. There was a globalisation long before the invention of the word to 
describe this phenomenon. Furthermore, Marcus claims an epistemic break, but 
does not specify the moment of this qualitative change, nor does he provide any 
precise criteria that would allow the identification of this change. Although I 
agree with Neveling’s critique of the epistemological assumption of multi-sited 
ethnography, as a methodological tool kit for the study of processes and 
phenomena in contemporary world society multi-sited ethnography is still a very 
useful method to explore border regimes.14  
Multi-sited ethnography can be used as a method to explore connections 
between different sites. This idea of the connection allows the 
reconceptualisation of borders not as a separator of different worlds and entities, 
but rather as markers of “frictions” (Tsing 2005) and connections. A border 
regime perspective that emphasises “border as method” (Mezzadra and Neilson 
2013) invites the researcher to study the effects of practices of bordering that 
emerge beyond the geographical border and dispersed in a transnational space of 
mobility. The methods of a multi-sited ethnography grasp this specific 
characteristic of the border regime.  
 
14 However, processes of globalisation do not automatically call for a multi-sited ethnography. In his study 
on the economic crisis in Mauritius at the beginning of the 21st century, Neveling (2010) convincingly 
shows how processes of globalisation can be studied at one single place. Global processes and 
discourses cristalise at precisely identifiable places. The discontinuities, frictions, and inequalities provoked 
by processes of globalisation emerge at these places and are not necessarily dispersed. Depending on the 
precise research question, it is thus possible to study these discontinuities at a single place also in the case 
of border regime. 
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The following part explains in detail how this dissertation research constructs its 
field site through the modes of constructions of multi-sited fieldwork. It 
discusses what multi-sited fieldwork means in the context of the theoretical 
framework that relies on the analytical proposition of the thesis of the AOM 
combined with a border regime perspective.  
In order to study the effects of the border regime through the analytical lens of 
the thesis of the AOM in order to explore the contradictions of the liberal nation 
state in the light of “b/ordering space” (van Houtum et al. 2004), the research 
adopts a “follow the people” (Marcus 1995) mode of construction of its field 
site. In doing so, the research focuses on the interdependencies between the 
different actors involved in the construction of border regimes at different 
locations. It thus studies institutions, practices, narratives, and people involved 
in the co-construction of the border regime.  
However, a “follow the people” mode of research creates a series of challenges 
for the fieldwork as it extends the spatial and the temporal extension of the field 
site. Although the research design strongly emphasises a follow-the-people 
perspective, I was not able to follow individual clandestine Tunisian migrants 
over a longer period of time. Such an endeavour – as exciting and insightful this 
would have been – would have collided with the constraints of a research project 
with a rather fixed schedule and my own limitations in short-term 
(transnational) mobility. I therefore chose to trace the migration trajectories of 
my informants mainly through their migration biographies, thus following 
 68 
Marcus’s “follow the biography” mode of construction of a multi-sited 
ethnography. The reconstruction of the six migration biographies of the main 
informants is a means to understand how they shape the transnational social 
space of mobility through their mobile practices. Each of the six migration 
biographies featured in this dissertation sheds light on one particular aspect of 
the migration trajectories between Tunisia and Switzerland. In particular, they 
highlight the frictions within this transnational space of mobility, where 
clandestine mobile practices of the Tunisian migrants come into conflict with 
the migration bureaucracy.  
Following the thesis of the AOM as an analytical lens, this research thus 
constructs the transnational space of mobility between Europe and Tunisia 
through the mobile practices of clandestine Tunisian migrants. This approach 
to the transnational social space of mobility through individual migration 
biographies is completed by ethnographic research along the migration 
trajectories. It consists of three locations; Tunisia as the point of departure, 
Switzerland as the point of return, and Italy as an important transit country for 
many clandestine Tunisian migrants. For the study of the programme of so-
called voluntary return migration, Italy as a transit country is of minor 
importance. However, as the migration biographies of my informants have 
shown, it is an important intermediary step in their transnational trajectory 
between the two shores of the Mediterranean. For this reason, I decided to 
include this site as well, although I was able to cover it in my research only in a 
short field trip to Palermo.  
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This leads to the construction of the field site from four different perspectives. 
As its starting point, the research adopts the perspectives of clandestine Tunisian 
migrants, both in Tunisia before their departure and after their return. It 
combines it with the perspective of them during their trajectory (in Italy), and 
when their journey came to an abrupt halt and reached a preliminary dead-end. 
In a second step, the research confronts the migrants’ experiences with the 
perspective of the migration bureaucracy. Again, it combines both a perspective 
from Switzerland with a perspective from Tunisia. This eventually leads to a 
fragmented and kaleidoscopic transnational space of mobility between Tunisia 
and Switzerland with contradicting and partial views on mobility, departure, and 
return.  
Within this fragmented field site, the ethnographic research focuses on 
two dimensions. First, it analyses the experience of migrants in their encounter 
with border institutions. And second, it looks at narratives of departure and 
return. Both dimensions contribute to answering the question how the 
migratory subject is produced, shaped, and enacted within this transnational 
space of mobility along the trajectories of the mobile subjects. Concerning the 
first dimension, the ethnographic research observes how Switzerland’s and 
Tunisia’s border institutions address and govern clandestine Tunisian migrants 
within the framework of the programmes for so-called assisted voluntary return 
migration. In other words, it is a study of practices and how they are legitimated. 
Simultaneously, it analyses the strategies of Tunisian migrants vis a vis these 
practices of state border institutions. The question is how migrants and actors of 
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the border regime influence and react on each other. Focusing on this 
relationship, it allows to explore how strategies and intentions of clandestine 
migrants change during their migration trajectories between Tunisia and 
Switzerland.  
The second dimension focuses on narratives and the production of the migratory 
subject. I understand these narratives as the result of a co-construction by border 
institutions and migrants as well. This allows to examine how the mobile subject 
is narrated by the different actors. Depending on the precise location in the field, 
the figure of the migratory subject changes its shape and meaning entirely. At 
certain moments during the migration trajectory, the migratory subject emerges 
in the figure of the clandestine migrant and becomes the object of policing and 
securitisation (see Bigo 1998, 2005; Bigo and Guild 2005). At other moments, 
the migratory subject emerges in the figure of the asylum seeker and becomes 
the object of administration and governance. At the same time, through the 
inclusion into the asylum regime the migratory subject might become either the 
bearer of legal rights, or the subject of suffering and therefore the target of 
compassion (see Fassin 2005). As we will discover later in the discussion of the 
empirical material, a further emerging figure is the migrant as the self-
entrepreneurial subject in the governance of so-called assisted voluntary return 
migration.  
As the remarks on multi-sited ethnography and the construction of the field sites 
have demonstrated, the research design follows a constructivist approach. It 
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considers the field site as an example to explore the theoretical question of the 
production of the migratory subject. This eventually allows to explore the 
contradictions of the liberal nation state in the governance of transnational 
mobility. Clandestine Tunisian migration and the governance of return thus 
allow an understanding of the mechanisms that produce and shape the migratory 
subject.  
A constructivist perspective further implies that this research is not an assessment 
of the programmes for so-called assisted voluntary return. I am not interested in 
an answer to the question whether these programmes are a “success” or a 
“failure”. During my field research, I was often confronted with exactly this 
question – especially when I was working with migration bureaucrats. In 
Switzerland, migration bureaucrats asked me about my experience in Tunisia 
and how I would assess the success of the return migration programme, while 
my interlocutors in the migration bureaucracy in Tunisia wanted to know more 
how the individual projects were prepared in Switzerland, as they wondered why 
the overwhelming majority of projects was just not feasible.  
The Transnational Social Fields Perspective  
Adopting a methodological approach of multi-sited ethnography that focuses on 
the mobility of people and their transnational mobile practices has a strong 
affinity to the transnational social fields perspective as developed by Glick 
Schiller, Basch and Blanc (1999; see also Glick Schiller 2010). They have coined 
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the term “transmigrant”; a mobile figure that is characterised by its 
interconnectedness to more than one nation state, and embedded in more than 
one society (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc 1999:73). For the purpose of this 
research, I use their concept less as a theoretical perspective, but rather as a tool 
that allows me to sketch the relevant field for my fieldwork.  
The transnational social field perspective is a response to the critique of the 
methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) and attempts to 
overcome its limitations. In a transnational social field perspective, the nation 
state is no longer the unquestioned frame of reference for the analysis of social 
processes and social structures. However, this does not imply that the nation 
state has become irrelevant for the study of transnational social phenomena such 
as the mobility of the Tunisian migrants in this research. As Nieswand (2006) 
convincingly shows, the nation state remains an important actor. As the instance 
that defines and defends the national borders and defines the rules of entry and 
exit, it remains a decisive factor in the making of transnational social spaces. In 
other words, the nation state is a constitutive force for the creation of a 
transnational social space, in the sense that it is the prerequisite for the formation 
of any kind of transnational social spaces. Nieswand now argues that the 
exclusive focus on transnational processes tends to neglect the ongoing 
importance of the nation state as a structuring force of transnational processes. 
As the discussion of the migration trajectories of the main informants will show 
later in this text, the different nation states shape the transnational space of 
migration and every individual migration trajectory between both shores of the 
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Mediterranean through migration laws, regulations, and border practices. 
Therefore, the transnational space of migration is all but disconnected from the 
nation state and its interventions takes place on different scales in the mobility 
of people.  
While a transnational social field perspective is thus a productive tool for the 
conceptualization of the field site, the related concept of the transmigrant is more 
problematic for the main focus of this research. Although the definition of the 
transmigrant by Glick Schiller et al. (1999) aims at the inclusion of all different 
sorts of mobile people, it implicitly pictures the high-skilled and relatively 
wealthy migrant and ignores the figure of the clandestine migrant. In other 
words, the transmigrant is the migrant recognised by the host state and in 
possession of a more or less permanent residence right, although she might not 
enjoy the full legal and social rights as a citizen. The clandestine Tunisian 
migrants living at the fringes of society and oscillating between a legal residence 
status and clandestinity is not “embedded in more than one society” (Glick 
Schiller, Basch, and Blanc 1999:73) that would qualify him as a transmigrant. 
To the contrary, he his rather disembedded in both societies. The absence of a 
stable legal status renders his presence in society precarious. At best, it can be 
described as an inclusion through exclusion. The danger of a negative asylum 
decision and the subsequent deportation is always lurking around the corner. 
The Tunisian migrants I am focusing on in this study thus belong precisely not 
to the category of transmigrants in the sense of Glick Schiller et al. (1999). They 
are marginalised in both societies in Switzerland and Tunisia alike. As we will 
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discover later, the lack of social recognition in Tunisian society due to their 
precarious socio-economic situation is precisely one of the driving forces for their 
harraga venture. And in Switzerland they are denied of any legal residence status 
and are therefore not only economically and socially excluded, but also with 
regard to their legal status.  
This means that the definition of transmigrants as mobile subjects embedded in 
more than one society emphasises an aspect that is not compatible with the 
situation of clandestine Tunisian migrants. As a – partial – solution, I suggest 
taking the state rather than society as the point of reference for the definition of 
a transmigrant. This avoids one of the major problems of the definition of the 
transmigrant in the sense of Glick Schiller et al. (1999). The image of different 
societies tends to reify the notion of society, as it implies that we can identify 
distinct and clearly delimited societies, while transmigrants cross these container-
like societies. This conceptualization of the transmigrant reintroduces exactly the 
same image of society through the back door as a methodological nationalism 
proliferates. This can be avoided when replacing the society with state. Defining 
the transmigrant as a mobile person that is linked to different states through law, 
administration, and governance, avoids the reification of society. In this context, 
I understand the state not as an entity (as such an approach would reify the state 
itself as well), but as a “bundle of practices and processes in a field of complex 
power relations”, as Bierschenk and de Sardan (2014: 14f) express it.  
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With this reformulation, it is possible to identify as transmigrants the clandestine 
Tunisian migrants living at the margins of society, but at the centre of state 
administration. They are transmigrants in the sense as they do not stand for a 
unidirectional and one-time migratory movement from a state of origin towards 
a host state. Rather, they are mobile subjects that crosse state borders back and 
forth. Similar to the prototypical transmigrant of Glick Schiller et al. (1999), the 
movements of the clandestine Tunisian migrants describe transnational 
trajectories that are not based on single and life-changing decisions, but rather 
on ad-hoc decisions and spontaneous reactions to short-time opportunities, 
when the next door opens on the path into an uncertain and precarious future.  
Looking Through and at Documents 
While the previous part describes the construction of the field in a multi-sited 
ethnography perspective starting from the experience and the transnational 
trajectories of the clandestine Tunisian migrants, the following part focuses on 
documents as a means to reconstruct bureaucratic processes and explore how the 
migration bureaucracy works. Documents as „artifacts of modern knowledge“ 
(Riles 2006) allow to explore the production of meaning. They answer the 
question how the state sees migration, in order to paraphrase Scott’s famous 
dictum (see Scott 1998). I consider documents in the same constructivist 
approach as interviews and conversations. In this perspective, documents are the 
result of social practice. On the one hand, documents allow the reconstruction 
of certain processes within the state bureaucracy that would not be accessible 
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otherwise. On the other hand and more important, documents allow to examine 
how border regimes create meaning of mobility and of border practices. 
However, documents are not only the medium through which institutionalised 
discourses become visible. They develop their own life and their own logic. For 
this reason, the study of the encounters between migrants and actors of the 
border regimes has to include paperwork as a distinct expression of the migration 
bureaucracies.  
Riles (2006) suggests two different approaches to documents as ethnographic 
material for research. She distinguishes between a research that looks at 
documents, and a research that looks through documents. Looking at documents 
focuses on the aspect of paperwork and the effects documents produce. In other 
words, documents are considered as embedded in social practices and part of the 
social field. In contrast, looking through documents allows to study the 
production of meanings. In this case, the content becomes more important. 
Documents contain meaning and they carry knowledge. The difference between 
these two modes of doing research with documents consists in their perspectives: 
the first focuses on practices, the second on meaning. For this reason, it is 
important to refrain from any reduction of documents to their content and to 
study them only as if they would represent a detail of social reality in an 
unmediated and transparent way – furthermore, as they are the artifacts of social 
practices at the same time. In my research, I apply both of Riles’s proposed 
research strategies to examine documents.  
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Studying the production and circulation of documents and their effects might 
be done through participant and non-participant observation as well. I will use 
this approach when studying how the return migration bureaucracy forms the 
self-responsible and self-entrepreneurial migratory subject. Check lists, written 
commitments and contracts are important in the return migration bureaucracy 
and in the administration of the return migration projects of the return migrants. 
The additional analysis of advertising material for the promotion of so-called 
voluntary return migration opens a window on the production of meaning and 
allows to answer the question how the state sees migration.  
At this point, it is important to introduce a further remark on the relationship 
between documents and bureaucracies. As Matthew Hull (2012) argues, 
documents are not only instruments of bureaucracies, but they are constitutive 
for them. In other words, documents are a generic feature of the field of (state) 
bureaucracy. This echoes Max Weber’s theory on bureaucracy. Weber considers 
the written document as the most important artifact for the organisation of 
modern bureaucracies (Weber 1922:655-678). In his account, documents 
organise bureaucratic knowledge. Furthermore, documents even organise and 
structure entire bureaucracies. For Weber, documents do not only contain and 
carry discourses and meanings, and store and represent knowledge about the 
social reality bureaucracy governs, but they have concrete effects in the 
organisation of bureaucracies and beyond. Studying this aspect of documents 
requires an analysis of how bureaucrats produce and make use of documents. 
Chapter 6 will explore this aspect of bureaucracy and documents through the 
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analysis of flowcharts that represent and imagine the governance of asylum 
seekers in Switzerland. The knowledge visualised in these flowcharts is at the 
same time the description and representation of bureaucratic practices, and it is 
prescriptive for bureaucratic practices. Simultaneously, as an idealised 
representation of the governance of asylum seekers, it shows how bureaucracy 
conceptualises migration and the management of migration.  
This description of documents might suggest the conceptualisation of 
documents in a perspective of the actor-network theory (see Latour 2005): the 
document as an actant causes effects, similar to any bureaucrat who causes effects 
with her decisions. The problem with this flat ontology is that the idea of social 
practices as intended and meaningful actions of (human) subjects disappears. For 
the purpose of this research, it is more productive to stick to this distinction and 
insist on the idea of social practices. Documents might indeed cause effects, but 
this causation is of a radically different quality than effects caused by consciously 
acting social actors. The effects of documents cannot be studied in isolation but 
only as embedded in a particular social field.  
As I noticed during my fieldwork with return migrants who are about to realise 
a return migration project in the context of the programme for assisted voluntary 
return migration, documents are important in the interaction between migrants 
and bureaucrats. In order to get one’s project funded, a whole range of 
documents is required; tenancy agreements, professional licenses, or tax 
documents should underline the feasibility of the project. While bureaucrats 
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consider it as essential and indispensable in order to guarantee a proper and fair 
procedure that prevents possible frauds, migrants often complain about these – 
in their perspective pointless – requirements of written documents; in particular 
as the obtaining of a certain official document from the Tunisian administration 
often does not depend from the compliance with certain criteria, but rather from 
personal relationships with bureaucrats in the local administration, or the use of 
bribe money to speed up administrative processes and unlock certain documents 
and certificates.  
Let us now turn to the second aspect of Riles’s methodology of the study of 
documents; looking through documents. Considered as artifacts of knowledge, 
documents carry knowledge and meaning. As such they allow us to study how 
bureaucracies create meaning and how they imagine the world. In the context of 
this research, it means to explore how the state sees the transnational mobility of 
the Tunisian migrants. The second part of this dissertation draws mainly on data 
obtained through this method. The focus on the production of meaning should 
not be confused with discourses. I understand the production of meaning as a 
social practice that refers to a social field. Within this field, the production of 
meaning is contested and permanently reshaped by the different actors. But in a 
similar vein as I described above, the conceptual perspective is directed towards 
the social field, and not towards discourses. 
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Interviews and Conversations 
Beyond observation in a multi-sited ethnography perspective and the study of 
documents, different forms of interviews and conversations build the third 
methodological pillar of this dissertation. In addition to the methodological 
aspect of interviews and conversation, I will also discuss the ethical implications 
of interviews. In this particular field, migrants experience interviews often as a 
powerful and violent tool of the migration bureaucracy that transforms personal 
experience of mobility into knowledge of domination. For this reason, it is 
crucial to discuss thoroughly the implication of using migration biographies as 
data and explain the research ethics at stake.  
During fieldwork, I used all sorts of interviews and conversations: from formal 
interviews to informal conversations and biographical interviews. Interviews and 
conversations with clandestine Tunisian migrants allow me the reconstruction 
of the transnational migration trajectories. Simultaneously, it is a means to 
explore how the informants experience these trajectories. It allows to get an idea 
how clandestine Tunisian migrants make sense of their decisions during their 
trajectories between Tunisia and Switzerland. On the other side, the interviews 
with migration bureaucrats allow to understand motives, intentions, and self-
legitimation strategies of the border bureaucracy. In addition, interviews are a 
tool to gain – at least to a limited extent – insights into processes within the 
return migration bureaucracy that are not accessible through participant 
observation. As the accessibility to return migration bureaucracy was limited, 
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interviews with bureaucrats became an important method to understand the 
mechanisms and structures of the return migration bureaucracy.  
Silverman (2006:119) identifies three versions of interview data; a positivist, an 
emotionalist, and a constructivist version. In practice, these three different 
accounts of interview data are never separated in such a sharp way. While the 
positivist version of interview data is certainly opposed to the emotionalist and 
the constructivist version, especially the second and third version overlap. A 
positivist perspective considers interviews as a means that gives immediate access 
to “facts about the world” (Silverman 2006:119). In this perspective, the data 
obtained is independent from the research setting, from the interviewer and the 
interviewee, as well as they are independent from the specific relationship 
between the two interlocutors who engage in the conversation (Silverman 
2006:121). In contrast, a constructivist approach understands the interview itself 
as part of the world it describes (Silverman 2006:129). This is how most of the 
anthropologists would describe interview data – and so do I. Interviews are thus 
the product of a co-construction between interviewer and interviewee.  
However, there are different degrees of constructivism. Its most radical version 
defends a position that the data of the conversation is restricted to the 
conversation itself and does not connect to a conversation’s topic somewhere in 
the social world. In other words, the content of the interview never gives an 
account of the social world beyond the interview. This radical version of 
constructivism either introduces a questionable dichotomy between data gained 
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from interviews that are strictly constructed, and other data from written 
documents that are considered as objective and referring to a world out there. 
Or this radical version tends to lose itself in an all-embracing constructivism, 
leading eventually to a dead end where no proposition on social reality is possible 
anymore, because this social reality simply is not accessible in any ways. A more 
moderate position retains the possibility of a connection between the 
conversation itself and a subject out there to which the conversation itself refers 
to. 15  I tend towards this later position of constructivism. Although the 
conversation and interviews are indeed the result of a co-construction between 
researcher and informant, they do tell a lot of things about social reality beyond 
the interview context. In order to move methodologically from a subjective 
position into the direction of a more objective one, one can compare different 
interviews and conversations on the same subject that allows the triangulation of 
data in order to achieve a more complete picture of social reality.16 In other 
words, such a comparison creates a certain intersubjectivity that allows to gain 
more reliable data from interviews.  
 
15 For a discussion of this issue on a more fundamental level and not restricted only to interviews, see also 
Meyer and Schareika (2009). Although their argument is based on a series of rather problematic 
dichotomies (e.g. the dualism between reality and representation, and the dichotomy between a theory of 
action and idealism), they highlight an important issue on the epistemological status of ethnographic data. I 
do not enter into this far-reaching methodological discussion. Therefore, in this context I focus on the 
aspect of interviews and conversation. 
16 I thus choose a pragmatic approach that focuses on the methodological issues. I acknowledge that this 
solution does not address the more fundamental epistemological issues that are not addressed here.  
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The problem of subjective versus objective data emerges again in the context of 
the biographical interviews. 17 They occupy a particular place in this research. 
Following the analytical proposition of the thesis of the AOM, biographical 
interviews are prominently featured in chapter 5 as a methodological starting 
point to explore the migration regime in general and the return migration 
bureaucracy in specific. From a pragmatic standpoint and with the limitations 
of the field in mind, biographical interviews with clandestine Tunisian migrants 
balance the shortcomings of the practical restrictions that prevented me of 
following the informants during their migration trajectories over a longer period 
of time. Therefore, the biographical interview is an attempt to widen the 
perspective from a detailed observation of particular situations to the larger 
narrative of migration biographies. These interviews focus in particular on the 
migration trajectories of the informants. They allow the fragmented and partial 
reconstruction of the complicated migration trajectories between Tunisia and 
Switzerland. Typically, these interviews consisted of one longer and mainly 
unstructured conversation that focused on the migration trajectories, and 
additional shorter and more focused interviews to clarify some aspects that 
remained ambiguous or vague in the initial conversation.18 Due to a general 
reluctance of many of the interview partners, most of the interviews were not 
 
17 In their book, Merill and West (2009) provide a detailed discussion of biographical interviews, and, more 
general, of the biographical method. It gives also a compact overview of the history of biographical 
methods in social sciences. 
18 I discuss the methodological challenges of doing interviews in the particular field of asylum seekers in 
more detail in the introduction to the chapter that presents the six individual migration biographies. 
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tape recorded. Instead, I took notes during the conversation and completed this 
information with memos I wrote down right after the proper conversation. 
These interviews allowed me to reconstruct the individual migration trajectories. 
In the context of this dissertation, these biographical interviews provide the 
subjective narratives about mobile practices. On the one hand, they bear witness 
of the personal experiences and how border regimes affect individual mobile 
practices. On the other hand, these interviews inform about individual 
expectations, intentions, and migratory projects.  
Biographical interviews always follow the logics of an ex post construction of 
meaning and legitimation. This “illusion biographique” (Bourdieu 1985) creates 
a particular narrative, which has the tendency to eliminate contradictions, 
frictions, and ruptures. Dealing with biographical interviews therefore requires 
taking into account that they are narratives that legitimate and explain the actual 
situation of the interviewed person. They are less a testimony of how the past 
was, but rather serve as a legitimation of the present through the past. What does 
this mean with regard to the biographical interview featured in this research? 
First, the experiences of mobility these interviews document are necessarily 
subjective. Second, nonetheless, as one can identify topics and patterns that 
emerge repeatedly across the different conversations, they allow to identify in a 
transversal reading a range of issues that are constitutive for the migratory 
experience of these clandestine Tunisian migrants. I consider these experiences 
as a decisive aspect of the construction of the migratory subject. Such a 
transversal reading allows the development of an intersubjective perspective. 
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Third, this comparison shows that individual experiences are not only 
individual. Often, they are inscribed in a larger picture of transnational mobility.  
Biographical interviews also allow to explore meanings, and not only experiences. 
In narrating the individual migration trajectories, the informants create meaning 
and make sense of their experiences. This is precisely the ex-post creation of 
meaning in the above-described sense of Bourdieu. Through this narration, the 
informants fabricate and shape their own migratory self; a subject that is 
conceived differently to the one border regimes create and impose on them. This 
creation of meaning and justification occurs not only in the interview situation 
with me. I observed it in discussions among migrants themselves as well. This 
ex-post creation of the migratory self is of particular importance in the context 
of return migration. As the discussion of the data will show in more detail later, 
assisted return is a delicate issue. Often, the social environment interprets it as a 
defeat. Many return migrants consider it as very important that returning home 
is not interpreted as a defeat, but as a conscious decision. As such, it should 
appear as the logical consequence of their past migration trajectory. Therefore, 
in general migration trajectories are presented as success stories.  
While interviews and conversations with migrants took place in informal settings 
for most of the time and revolved around personal experience, interviews and 
conversations with migration bureaucrats were much more formal and 
impersonal in general. While migrants represented themselves, migration 
bureaucrats aimed at representing their institution or their position. They would 
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rarely consider their statements as expressions of their individual standpoint. 
When personal statements occasionally happened in conversations, they were in 
general flagged explicitly as such in order to strictly distinguish between the office 
and the person. However, I frequently made the experience that the most 
interesting statements were not voiced during the formal interview, but rather 
afterwards when I turned off my recording device. For example, I do remember 
a conversation with a senior staff member of Tunis’s IOM office. We had an 
appointment with his superior who was still busy with phone calls in her office. 
For this reason, we were hanging out in the staircase waiting for the door to open 
and chatted about different things, most of them unrelated to the return 
migration programme. As our conversation unfolded and meandered between 
his employment biography and experiences of living abroad over a long period, 
he suddenly began to talk about his work and compared the actual working 
conditions in non-governmental organisations with his experience from former 
times when he just started working as a junior staff member in the NGO world. 
He deplored that the idealistic engagement characterising the NGO world of 
former times disappeared over the years. “Now, the managers are taking over” 
he told me indulged in nostalgic memories of his former engagement. He 
criticised the younger generation of NGO staff members as only career-oriented 
and not devoted to the content of the work, which consists in “helping people” 
as he expressed it. He would never have made such comments in formal 
interviews. Such statements would collide fundamentally with the position he 
occupies in the organisation.  
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The Extended Case Method 
As a whole, the research follows the idea of the extended case method ECM, as 
first developed by Gluckman (1961) and later refined and reformulated by 
Burawoy (2000a, 200b) for the ethnographic study of global phenomena. While 
Gluckman focuses on the empirical study of single conflicts in particular to 
extract general principles from these detailed and specific observations, Burawoy 
has a broader scope with the ambition to develop an ethnography that is at the 
same time local and global. This part of the chapter thus comes back to the initial 
question that asks how ethnography as the detailed study of local contexts 
contributes to the understanding of global formations, such as transnational 
border regimes. It proposes an answer that is quite similar to the one suggested 
by multi-sited ethnography, yet it develops its answer from a different 
epistemological position. In contrast to multi-sited ethnography, the extended 
case method and global ethnography emphasise the question of power relations. 
ECM raises the question how small-scale – and therefore ethnographically 
observable – contexts are connected to large-scale formation of power and 
inequalities.  
Michael Burawoy (2000a:1) asks how ethnography can be global. He raises this 
question as he is worried whether the ethnographic method can reclaim its 
relevance in global world society with its specific questions. Until today, the 
ethnographic method carries the burden from its founding days, when the 
method was developed with the imagination to study locally bounded and 
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ahistorical societies, although there is indeed a long record of attempts to add 
the dimensions of history and of connectedness to the “traditional” methods of 
ethnographic research. However, Burawoy turns back to the crucial question 
what a method confined to the detailed study of small and local contexts is able 
to contribute to the understanding of global formations. Beyond the 
methodological issue, it contains the question how the local is connected to the 
global, and how the global emerges in the local.19 I consider border regimes as 
such an example of the entanglements of the global and the local. In addition, 
the idea of the border regime, understood as the principle that connects and 
disconnects different local contexts, raises not only the question how the local is 
connected to the global, but also how different locales are connected to each 
other.  
With the extended case method ECM, Burawoy builds on the work of Max 
Gluckman, one of the main figures of the Manchester school. Gluckman applied 
the ECM in particular in the context of different forms of legal conflicts in 
different societies in Southern Africa. The extended case method starts with the 
observation of small social occurrences. It closely observes the interactions 
between the different actors involved. In these interactions, thus far the thesis of 
the ECM, social practices and conflicts become visible and thus observable. The 
 
19 In this context, Tsing (2005) critisises that social theory in general has too readily accepted the claim that 
globalisation entails a process of homogenisation. The dichotomy between the global with its tendency of 
homogenisation and the local which is synonym to heterogeneity is not very helpful. With the term friction, 
Tsing captures the heterogenous elements that converge and come into contact with each other in a 
process that is commonly referred to as globalisation. 
 89 
comments and explanations of the actors involved provide further information 
about the genealogy of these social interactions and conflicts. The aim of the 
extended case method is to connect these small-scale occurrences to an 
explanation of more general social formations.  
Burawoy (1991; 1998; 2000) uses the interdependencies between the micro-
perspective and the macro-level as a starting point to develop his own approach 
to global ethnography. The method of global ethnography aims at locating 
everyday life in its extra-local and historical context (see Burawoy 1998). The 
subsequent question is how it is possible to extract the general from the unique. 
The ECM offers two alternative starting points from where a global ethnography 
is simultaneously developed: theory and empiric data. The ECM relies on a 
strong theoretical framework that provides the tools for the description of the 
connection between the local and the global. Simultaneously, ECM starts from 
the ethnographic data extracted from the field (Burawoy 1998:7). With this 
double starting point, ECM differs itself from the more positivist methods such 
as the grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; cf. Charmaz 2000), although 
it also emphasises the role and importance of ethnographic data as a means to 
construct theory. Grounded theory refrains from any theoretical assumption; at 
least in its ideal – and idealised – version and claims to build theory only from 
the empirical data. In contrast, the ECM starts its empirical enquiry with a 
position informed by theory, and simultaneously with a theoretical position 
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imbued by empirical data. The ECM therefore brings theory and empirical data 
into a dialog. They co-constitute and influence each other simultaneously.20  
As Burawoy (1998:10-13) notes, the ECM does not inscribe itself in the 
tradition of positive science and thus positions itself as an alternative to a 
positivist grounded theory. He is well aware of the researcher’s role in the field. 
As an active participant and without the option to withdraw herself to an 
idealised position of the mere observer, the researcher is part of the field and 
interacts with it. As such, the ECM inscribes itself in the tradition of reflexive 
science.21 As “a legitimating principle to situated practice” (Burawoy 1998:16), 
reflexivity frames ethnographic practice in the context of the ECM. Unlike a 
positivist approach such as grounded theory, it does not seek to minimise 
distortion caused by the observer through her proximity to the field. Rather, it 
embraces these distortions, as social order is revealed precisely in situations when 
this order is questioned. 22  A reflexive approach acknowledges that theory 
constitutes “situated knowledge” (Haraway 1988) and co-structures social 
processes. At the same time, ECM is reflexive in the sense as it resists a simple 
 
20 For a detailed comparison between grounded theory and the extended case method, see also Tavaroy 
and Timmermans (2009). 
21 For a comparison between the tradition of positive science and a reflexive approach, see also Bohnsack 
(2003). 
22 For a detailed discussion of reflexive social sciences, see especially the work of Bourdieu and Wacquant 
(1992). 
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“applicationism” (Walters 2012: 5) of theory, which would reduce the empirical 
material to an illustrative appendix. 
Burawoy (1998: 20) identifies four modes of extensions that characterize the 
ECM and that allow to reach “the global” from “the local”. In each mode of 
extension, the aim is to go beyond the small-scale observation of social 
occurrences. This does not work with a strict positivist understanding of social 
theory and without any theoretical framework that provides a model how the 
local and the global are connected.  
Among these four modes of extension, I consider structuration as the most 
important mode of extension for my own research. Structuration means to locate 
social processes in the context of their external determination (Burawoy 1998: 
23). In the context of return migration and the production of the migratory 
subject, this signifies to locate the individual migration trajectories in the wider 
context of border regimes and their global “pratiques de zonage”, as Achille 
Mbembe (2013: 7) calls it with reference to racism. With this term, Mbembe 
describes the partition and fragmentation of the world into different zones. 
Although he develops his argument with respect to the postcolonial condition, 
it also describes exactly the work of border regimes. The aim of this dissertation 
research is to examine these pratiques de zonage with regard to border regimes 
and to study how questions of domination and subversion of border regimes are 
inscribed in everyday encounters between migrants and the migration 
bureaucracy.  
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Let me conclude this methodological chapter with one final remark. In an ECM 
perspective, what could constitute “a case” with regard to the research on so-
called voluntary return migration? Concerning the ECM, building a case starts 
with the theoretical narrative that provides a general framework (Tavaroy and 
Timmermans 2009:251). The construction of cases and their extensions are 
theory-dependent. This is the main difference to grounded theory that claims to 
construct the case only from empirical data and without any preceding theory. 
ECM claims that without a preceding theory, it is impossible to describe the 
boundaries of a case. With respect to the dissertation research on so-called 
voluntary return migration of Tunisian migrants, this means that I approach the 
issue of return migration and the production of the mobile subject from the 
theoretical standpoint offered by the concept of border regimes and in 
combination with the idea of clandestine migration as a form of appropriation 
of mobility. I interpret the individual migration trajectories within this 
theoretical field that opens a perspective on global formations of inequalities and 
the governance of differentiated mobility. In other words, my reading attempts 
to link the migration biographies of the clandestine Tunisian migrants on the 
one hand and the ethnographic material of the return migration bureaucracy on 
the other hand with a more generalised perspective on the governance of global 





IV. Tracing the Transnational Space of 
Mobility Between Tunisia and Europe 
Chapter Four discusses some key aspects of Tunisia’s migration history that have 
shaped the transnational space of mobility between both shores of the 
Mediterranean; the space of mobility which is today the scene for clandestine 
migration of Tunisians, of departure and return. Starting point is the premise 
that the contemporary patterns of transnational mobility of Tunisian migrants 
is embedded in a long history of departure and return that shaped Tunisian 
society. With a strong emphasis on the Tunisian history of migration under 
colonial rule, the chapter argues that throughout long periods of its history, 
Tunisian society was rather shaped by immigration than emigration. Tunisian 
labour migration that started to become an important phenomenon since the 
country’s independence in 1956 and the contemporary phenomenon of 
clandestine migration did not start in an empty space, but are connected to 
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preceding forms of mobility. The aim of this chapter is thus to examine the 
emergence of the transnational space of migration between Tunisia and the 
Northern shores of the Mediterranean in a historical perspective. This 
perspective is completed in the second part with the discussion of the internal 
urban-rural migration; a process that has started under the colonial rule of France 
and that has continued ever since.  
Migration and the Colonial Encounter 
For a very long time Tunisia was by and large a country of immigration, rather 
than a country of emigration. It has become a country of emigration only for the 
last sixty years. Over centuries, the arrival of immigrants was the dominant 
experience of the population living on the territory of contemporary Tunisia. 
The consecutive arriving of Arab and Sephardic refugees from Spain in the 15th 
century, the French and Italian settlers mainly since the 19th century, or the 
Ottoman rulers between the 16th and the 18th century are constitutive for the 
social structure and the collective memory of Tunisian society. Generally 
speaking, the characteristics of Tunisia as a country of immigration does not 
change until the end of the French protectorate in 1956 (Ressaissi 1984:174ff).  
With respect to the emergence of a trans-Mediterranean social space of migration 
between Tunisia and Europe, there are especially two important periods. The 
first period is the immigration of Sephardic Jews and Arabs after the Spanish 
Alhambra Decree in the 15th century. Although it dates back more than five 
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centuries, it marks the beginning of dense transnational networks of Tunisian 
society that continue to have their effects until today. The second period with 
far reaching and more immediate consequences concerning the shaping of a 
transnational space of Tunisian mobility is the colonial period in the late 19th 
and first half of 20th century. The arrival of mainly French settlers transformed 
not only Tunisian society itself, but established strong transnational 
interdependencies between France and Tunisia that have outlasted the end of 
the French protectorate. This broad overview already shows that migration to 
and from Tunisia is not at all a recent phenomenon. Let me discuss these periods 
in more detail.  
After the fall of Granada in 1492 which marked the end of the Arab rule over 
the Spanish peninsula, the Alhambra Decree led to a massive forced emigration 
of Sephardic Jews and Arabs alike. Many of them settled in North Africa. In 
Tunisia, the newly arrived Sephardic Jews (the so-called Grana) met an 
indigenous Jewish population (the so-called Twensa), present on the territory for 
centuries and with a major presence on the island of Djerba in Southern Tunisia 
(Perkins 2013:25). In contrast to the Arab population of Spanish origin, the 
Sephardic Jews maintained a dense network between both shores of the 
Mediterranean throughout the following centuries. In particular, the Italian 
harbour town of Livorno became an important hub for this trans-Mediterranean 
network. Due to its liberal legislation towards Jews over a certain period, many 
Sephardic Jews settled in Livorno after the expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula 
first (see also Trivellato 2009). Only centuries later, an important part of this 
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population moved further on to Tunisia (Perkins 2013:25). In contrast to the 
Twensas living in both rural and urban areas and who were generally poor, the 
Granas maintained important commercial networks across the Mediterranean as 
merchants. Although it was a remarkably small population – based on the 
statistics provided by Taïeb (1982), Perkins (2013:25) estimates the overall 
number of Granas to only one or two thousand at that time –, they played an 
important role in Tunisian society and some of them successfully joined the 
Tunisian elites as advisors of the court or business representatives due to their 
economic influence as merchants (see Perkins 2013: 25). The transnational 
network they maintained between both shores of the Mediterranean – mainly 
based on kinship relations – was important for the commercial activities.  
As a cosmopolitan elite that connected both shores of the Mediterranean 
through trade, the Granas became the ideal intermediaries for the colonial power 
to negotiate with the local ruling class in Tunisia in the late 19th century. The 
colonial rule of France over the Tunisian territory marked the beginning of an 
intensification of immigration to Tunisia with effects that transformed Tunisian 
society in an unprecedented way. However, in 1881 when the French 
protectorate was formally established and which marked the legal beginning of 
French ruling over Tunisia, there was already a considerable presence of 
foreigners of European origin.23 The arrival of businessmen and speculators since 
 
23 On the history of French presence in Tunisia before the protectorate in the 19th century, see also Planel 
(2015). 
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1857 increased the presence of Europeans of different origin in Tunisia (Perkins 
2013: 25). At that time, Tunisia was already home to an important and 
constantly growing community of Italians, most of them belonging to the 
working-class population and living mainly in Tunis’s suburb La Goulette, and 
in the capital itself. In 1883, the census records a foreign population of already 
twenty thousand people, from which only five percent were of French origin 
(Perkins 2013: 48f). In other words, before the formal beginning of the French 
colonisation of Tunisia, the French formed a small minority among the foreign 
population in Tunisia, while the majority of Tunisia’s foreign population was of 
Italian origin. In addition to the Italians, a high share of the Tunisian working 
class population was formed by Maltese (Sebag 1998:330).  
Most of these immigrants settled in the wider area of the capital; either in 
specifically designated districts of the medina, in the growing residential areas 
adjacent to the old part of the town, or in Tunis’s suburbs. Only few found their 
new home in the hinterland or the South. The colonisation of the rural 
hinterland started only years later and was massively promoted and facilitated by 
the French administration, though with limited success.  
With the beginning of the French protectorate, immigration of French citizens 
was actively promoted and led to a constant influx of French settlers; the so-
called colons. However, it took further decades until the French population 
outnumbered the Italians among the foreign Tunisian population. Only as late 
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as in the 1930s, the French became the largest foreign population in Tunisia, 
according to Ressaissi (1984:83).  
The immigration politics of the colonial power was one aspect leading to this 
change in the composition of the non-Tunisian population on the territory of 
the protectorate. The other decisive factor was the naturalisation politics of the 
colonial administration. In order to change the initial imbalance between French 
and Italian citizens in the protectorate, the administration facilitated and 
promoted the naturalisation of Italians (Bruno 2010: 61; Goussaud-Falgas 2013: 
285-334). 24  This naturalisation politics contributed to the increase of the 
number of French citizens.  
In socioeconomic terms, the French population did not replace the Italian, as 
French and Italians occupied different socio-economic positions in Tunisian 
society under colonial rule. Unlike the Italians, most of the French were not part 
of the urban working class, as Ressaissi (1984:87) highlights. They formed the 
colonial urban bourgeoisie and occupied the higher ranks in the colonial 
administration, while a minority of the French lived as so-called colons (settlers) 
in the countryside. This rural French population of colons was divided between 
large-scale landowners and small-scale family-based farmers. However, the 
colonisation of the rural area took place at slow speed and was never of main 
 
24 In 1956, when the French protectorate came to its end, according to estimations of that time by the 
Italian consulate 60’000 French citizens were of Italian origin in Tunisia (Goussad-Falgas 2013: 334). 
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interest for the colonial power. Therefore, the larger area of Tunis remained the 
place of residence for the majority of the European communities in the country 
(Ressaissi 1984:86; Goussaud-Falgas 2013:133-153). In 1904, as much as 
55’000 foreigners (compared to 80’000 Muslims and 39’000 Jews of Tunisian 
origin) lived in Tunis and its suburbs (Perkins 2013:58).  
The continuing influx of mainly French settlers was interrupted during both 
World Wars only. At the end of the French protectorate, there was a foreign 
population of around 250’000 persons, with French and Italians composing the 
overwhelming majority. 85% of this population lived in urban areas (Ressaissi 
1984:86).  
The European residents in Tunisia never formed a homogeneous interest group, 
as Lewis (2011: 40f) emphasises. In particular with respect to socio-economic 
factors, the European residents in Tunisia were a highly heterogeneous group, as 
the previous discussion showed. There was always a clear distinction between the 
French-dominated colonial bourgeoisie and an Italian- and Maltese- dominated 
labour class; both with different interests, and therefore also with different 
alliances (Clancy-Smith 2011). In other words, the racial segregation between 
Tunisians and Europeans in the colonial logic was completed by a class division 
of the European population itself.  
With Tunisian independence in 1956, the number of Europeans on Tunisian 
territory dropped dramatically within a short period of time. The majority of 
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French settlers left Tunisia immediately in the years following independence. 
The so-called crise de Bizerte – a short and violent military conflict in 1961 
between Tunisia and France over the French naval base of Bizerte, which was 
the last French holding in the former protectorate – increased tensions between 
French settlers and Tunisians and subsequently accelerated the departure of the 
remaining French population.  
From Immigration to Emigration: A Paradigm Shift 
As the previous remarks have shown, Tunisian labour migration did not start in 
an empty space in the second half of the 20th century. There was already a 
transnational space of mobility with a long history, marked by manifold 
networks and ties between both shores of the Mediterranean. The following part 
describes the emergence of labour migration between Tunisia and several 
European countries and concludes with a discussion of the harraga as a new type 
of high-risk clandestine migration emerging in the 1990ies. It compares the case 
of France as the country with the closest links to Tunisia due to the colonial past 
with Germany as an example of a country with an institutionalised labour 
migration agreement. The third case is Switzerland as a country without 
particular historical (due to the colonial past) nor institutional (due to a bilateral 
labour migration agreement) ties with Tunisia.  
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Tunisian Labour Migration to France After Independence 
The end of the French protectorate in 1956 and the foundation of the 
independent Tunisian republic marked a fundamental change in trans-
Mediterranean migration patterns to and from Tunisia. It was the beginning of 
a double migration flow towards mainland France of French settlers “reurning 
home” and Tunisian labourers in search of jobs and an income. Between 1946 
and 1966, the foreign population in Tunisia dropped from 10 percent of the 
total population to only 1 percent (Bruno 2010:10). In 1966, the remaining 
foreign population counted no more than 16’000 French citizens, 10’500 
Italians and less than 6’000 other Europeans (Bruno 2010:10). Roughly two-
third of the European population left Tunisia between 1955 and 1959, mainly 
in the direction of their respective home country France and Italy (Perkins 
2013:147). This means that within very few years, the composition of Tunisian 
society changed dramatically.  
Simultaneously, Tunisian labour migration to mainland France started to grow. 
In contrast to Algerian labour migration to France, an insignificant number of 
Tunisians were already living in France in 1955 (Simon 1974:186; Bruno 
2010:55). The reason for this difference can be explained with the different 
political integration of Tunisia and Algeria into the French colonial state. While 
French Algeria got the status of a department and therefore became an integral 
part of the French administration, Tunisia with its status as a protectorat 
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(protectorate) was never fully integrated into the French political system in the 
same way.25 
The first Tunisian labour migrants arriving at the Northern shores of the 
Mediterranean were Tunisian Jews (Simon 1974: 187). Their departure from 
Tunisia is directly linked to the withdrawal of France as the protecting power of 
the Jewish minority in Tunisia. Many Jewish Tunisians maintained close links 
with the colonial administration, sometimes they even occupied administrative 
positions within the colonial administration. With the independence, they 
found themselves exposed to anti-Semitic attacks by parts of the population who 
blamed them for their collusion with the former colonial power. The Tunisian 
state was not capable – nor particularly willing – to protect them from these 
harassments. As Simon (1974) shows, in addition to this heated anti-colonial 
and anti-Semitic atmosphere that pushed many Jewish Tunisians towards an 
emigration to mainland France, economic reasons were the other driving force 
for this first phase of labour migration. This changed within a few years and soon 
other Tunisians moved temporarily or permanently northwards as labour 
migrants.  
In her study on Tunisian labour migration, Anne-Sophie Bruno (2010) traces 
the individual migration trajectories of Tunisian labour migrants and describes 
 
25 French Algeria was divided into the three departments Alger, Oran, and Constantine under a civilian 
government. This made it an integral part of France and distinguished it in administrative terms from a 
colony (see also Naylor 2000). 
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the changing migration policies that shaped the possibilities and restrictions of 
Tunisian labour migrants towards and within France. Her work shows how a 
very liberal and only loosely regulated labour migration regime for Tunisian 
citizens became more restrictive over the years, closing down more and more 
loopholes that characterised the first liberal phase of French migration policies 
towards Tunisians.  
In a first period of Tunisian labour migration towards France between 1955 and 
1958, Tunisian citizens did not require any visa or labour permit for entering 
France. A simple passport was sufficient (Bruno 2010:54f). In addition, there 
were no restrictions concerning the exercise of a professional activity. Long-term 
residence permits were granted upon entry and without any further constraints. 
In comparison to other (European) states, the French migration regime for the 
governance of the transnational mobility of Tunisian citizens was extremely lax; 
it was – in other words – characterized by the absence of any forms of restrictions.  
This liberal approach to the governance of transnational migration changed only 
with regard to minor details in the following years, as Bruno (2010) shows. 
Although a visa obligation was introduced in 1958 for Tunisian citizens, this 
first step in restricting and regulating migration did not impose a serious 
restriction for Tunisians in the everyday. They continued to move between the 
two countries more or less freely as the now required visa was granted without 
any problem. However, this liberal migration regime for Tunisian migrants was 
rather an exception than the rule for France’s migration policy, and over the 
 104 
years the French administration brought the Tunisian exception in line with the 
general migration policy of France with regard to the regulation of labour 
migration. Since the early 1960s, a series of measures aimed at a stricter control 
of the until that time virtually unregulated Tunisian labour migration towards 
mainland France. The first move was the conclusion of a French-Tunisian 
convention aimed at the stricter control of the unregulated labour migration, yet 
this bilateral agreement remained dead letter. Another attempt was the 
establishment of French recruiting agencies in Tunisia. This project was 
suddenly stopped in the course of a series of diplomatic disputes in 1963, when 
Tunisia nationalised agricultural properties of French colons. However, this 
suspension of the attempt of a more regulated and controlled labour migration 
between Tunisia and France did not signify that labour migration as such came 
to a halt. Rather, it continued on an ad-hoc basis, and was not orchestrated by 
state authorities.26  
As a general rule, setting up legal regulations with respect to Tunisian labour 
migration had little effect on everyday practices of labour migration at that time. 
As long as France de facto pursued its liberal regulation practice for labour 
migrants who did not comply with the migration laws, there was no substantial 
effect on the lives of Tunisian labour migration, as Bruno (2010) shows. In 
theory, the Office national d’immigration (ONI) was the sole responsible instance 
 
26 On a detailed account of labour migration and administrative regulations in the 1960ies, see in particular 
the historical study of Bruno (2010:66-73). 
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for the administration of labour migration to France. In reality, most of the 
labour migrants entered France with a tourist visa and applied for a regularisation 
of their residence and work permit only afterwards. Informal networks of 
acquaintances and relatives played an important role in the recruitment of 
Tunisian labour force for the French labour market. They established and 
maintained links between their region of origin and the places where they lived 
and worked. Bruno (2010) based her observation on historical records of the 
French Ministry of Labour. This connects very well to the case of Abdellah I 
introduced in the introductory vignette. The examination of his migration 
biography in the following chapter will reveal further parallels and details.  
The technically illegal entry to France by Tunisian labour migrants with a tourist 
visa was not only the result of a creative and subversive transnational mobile 
practice, but an effect of an inconsistent border regime too. With the suspension 
of the bilateral agreement on labour migration in 1963, the ONI offices closed 
their doors in Tunisia. This signified that there was no instance that had the 
competence to issue work permits and visa for labour migrants. For this reason, 
Tunisians labour migrants simply had no other option than immigrating to 
France with an ordinary tourist visa, applying only afterwards for its conversion 
into a work visa once reached mainland France. Not surprisingly, a study 
concluded that 99 percent of the Tunisian labour migrants’ work and residence 
permits were regularised only afterwards in the end of the 1960ies (see Tapinos 
1975). As I will discuss later in the reconstruction and analysis of the six 
exemplary migration biographies, the lax regularisation practice regardless of the 
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previous migration status was exactly the common experience of many Tunisian 
labour migrants in the 1960ies.  
In summary, the historically close relationship between Tunisia and France due 
to the colonial legacy, a liberal labour migration policy, and the high demand of 
unskilled labour force by the French economy led to a quickly growing 
population of Tunisian citizens in France in the 1960ies. Among this 
population, a considerable high number of them origin from the Southern 
gouvernorats, especially Médenine (Seklani 1974, see also Taamallah 1976).27  
The liberal practice of France’s labour migration policy and the flexible 
regularisation practices ended in the 1970s with a paradigm shift. Stricter rules 
for immigration, the introduction of residence permits that depend on work 
permits, and restricted possibilities for the regularisation of residency resulted 
not only in a more difficult access to France and the French labour market, but 
this paradigm shift also produced the first so-called sans-papiers (Bruno 
2010:75). Although these sans-papiers – strictly speaking migrants without a 
valid residence permit – technically existed already before, it was a social figure 
that emerged only through this shift in migration policy that produced migrants 
at the margins of the state without any prospective of a regularisation of their 
residence status. Especially for these sans-papiers, informal transnational family 
 
27 For a case study of the transnational labour migration between Tunisia and France, see also Ma Mung’s 
(1986) article on the city of M’saken in Central Tunisia. 
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networks became extremely important, as a study of Dumont (2011) on 
Tunisian sans-papiers in the region of Nantes shows.  
Today, 250’000 Tunisian migrants are living in France, according to the 
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), forming one of 
the major minorities of foreign nationals in France28 
Tunisian Labour Migration Beyond France: The Examples of Germany 
and Switzerland 
With the end of the liberal migration regime of France for Tunisian citizens, the 
migration patterns multiplied, and other destination became important for 
Tunisian labour migrants as well; especially the neighbouring country Libya 
(with its emerging oil industry) and Italy as another country with a long-shared 
history became important destinations. In particular Italy kept a liberal 
migration policy for Tunisian migrants for a much longer period of time than 
France. This resulted in today’s second largest community of Tunisians abroad 
after France. According to the latest available statistics of the Office des tunisiens 
à l’étranger OTE, the community of Tunisians in Italy counts 189’092 people.29 
 
28 http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/FPORSOC15j_FTLo2pop.pdf; last accessed 28.11.2015. The 
Tunisian Office des tunisiens à l’étranger (OTE) counts 668’668 Tunisians in France 
(cf. http://www.ote.nat.tn/fileadmin/user_upload/doc/Repartition_de_la_communaute_tunisienne_a_l_etran
ger__2012.pdf; last accessed 27.11.2015). The different counting of persons with a double nationality 
explain this huge gap. While France counted them as French (therefore they do not emerge in the statistics 
as Tunisians), Tunisia counts them as fellow citizens. 
29 www.ote.nat.tn/fileadmin/user_upload/doc/Repartition_de_la_communaute_tunisienne_a_l_etranger__20
12.pdf; last accessed 04.12.2015 
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Libya as the neighbouring country in North Africa attracted a lot of Tunisian 
labour force for decades. Not only was its oil-based national economy in constant 
demand of labour force, the close familial ties between Tunisians and Libyans in 
some regions of the South – especially in the Médenine gouvernorat that borders 
Libya directly – was another facilitator for Tunisian migration to Libya. 
According to the latest available statistical data from 2012, after France, Italy, 
and Germany, the largest Tunisian community resides in Libya with 68’952 
persons.30 
The following parts briefly present the case of Germany and Switzerland as two 
countries with contrasting histories of (labour) migration relations with Tunisia. 
Germany serves as an exemplary case of a country with a bilateral labour 
agreement, while Switzerland is a contrasting case that shows how a transnational 
community of Tunisians have emerged over the years without any notable pre-
existing historical ties due to the colonial past, nor an institutionalised bilateral 
labour agreement.  
Besides France and Italy – both countries with a long shared history with Tunisia 
and mainly based on the colonial encounter – Germany has been the third 
important destination for Tunisian labour migrants in Europe. In contrast to 
France and Italy, where the presence of Tunisian citizens has historical roots 
 
30 http://www.ote.nat.tn/fileadmin/user_upload/doc/Repartition_de_la_communaute_tunisienne_a_l_etrang
er__2012.pdf; last accessed 29.11.2015 
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dating back to (pre)colonial times, Germany’s labour migration policy that relied 
on the conclusion of bilateral labour agreements was the driving force for the 
growing presence of a Tunisian community in the former Federal Republic of 
Germany FRG (see Rass 2010:167ff). Until the conclusion of the first bilateral 
labour agreement between Tunisia and Germany and the promotion of temporal 
labour migration in 1965, the two countries did not have a particular close 
historical relationship. Although the agreement intended to restrict Tunisian 
labour migration to temporary and circular migration patterns, it marked the 
beginning of a noteworthy permanent presence of Tunisians in Germany. 
Today, the Tunisian community in Germany counts 86’601 people according 
to the latest available numbers from 2012 of the Tunisian OTE. 31  Unlike 
France, a major part of Tunisian labour migration was regulated through the 
1965 bilateral agreement and its follow-up agreements. Entering the country 
with a tourist visa and applying afterwards for a regularisation of residence and 
work permit was never a common practice in Germany for Tunisian migrants.  
In contrast to France and Italy as the two countries with close historical 
connections dating back to the colonial period and Germany with the conclusion 
of a bilateral labour migration agreement in 1965, Switzerland has never 
belonged to the major countries of destination for Tunisian labour migrants. 
Switzerland’s traditional reservoir of labour migration was mainly Italy (d’Amato 
 
31 www.ote.nat.tn/fileadmin/user_upload/doc/Repartition_de_la_communaute_tunisienne_a_l_etranger__20
12.pdf; last accessed 05.12.2015 
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2008). In contrast to Germany, Tunisia and Switzerland never concluded a 
bilateral migration agreement that would have institutionalised and accelerated 
Tunisian labour migration to Switzerland. For this reason, the Tunisan 
community in Switzerland has remained comparatively small, it has been 
growing only slowly, and it has remained a rather heterogenous group consisting 
of political refugees during the two authoritarian regimes of Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali, students, and individuals who were married to Swiss partners. (Tejada and 
Garcia Delahaye 2014).  
A further group – and this will be the main focus for the rest of this study – 
consists of former Tunisian asylum seekers who remained on the territory after 
their asylum application was rejected, living in Switzerland without any 
residence permit as so-called sans-papiers. In short, the Tunisian community in 
Switzerland is small and highly heterogeneous. According to the latest available 
data from the Office des tunisiens à l’étranger OTE, the Tunisian community 
counted 16’667 fellow citizens in Switzerland in 2012.32 Its majority lives in the 
French speaking part of Switzerland, especially in the arc lémanique region 
between Lausanne and Geneva.  
This overview of transnational migration patterns of Tunisians between the two 
shores of the Mediterranean shows the influence of the historical past and the 
 
32 http://www.ote.nat.tn/fileadmin/user_upload/doc/Repartition_de_la_communaute_tunisienne_a_l_etrang
er__2012.pdf; last accessed 01.12.2015 
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different regulatory frameworks. The comparison of Tunisian labour migration 
to France and to Germany respectively shows that the pre-existing colonial ties 
were decisive in shaping transnational migration patterns of Tunisians. For this 
reason, the France has the oldest and largest community of Tunisians. Germany 
on the other hand does not have this colonial history with Tunisia that resulted 
in pre-existing transnational networks. The country chose a different approach. 
Through the conclusion of bilateral labour agreements – Tunisia is just one 
example among others – Germany imported the work force needed for its post-
war economic boom. However, in both cases the economy’s need for an 
abundant reservoir of unskilled labour migration was one of the major driving 
forces that shaped Germany and France’s migration policy respectively. Unlike 
France, Switzerland does not share a colonial past with Tunisia in the same and 
unmediated way than the former occupying colonial force, and unlike Germany, 
the two countries never concluded a bilateral migration agreement for temporal 
labour migration. For this reason, the number of Tunisian citizens with a 
permanent residence status in Switzerland remained comparatively low.  
Tunisia’s Governance of Transnational Mobility 
While the previous parts discussed the governance of labour migration from a 
perspective from the Northern shores of the Mediterranean with an emphasis on 
France, Germany, and Switzerland as three contrasting cases, the following part 
focuses on Tunisia and asks how it governed departure and return of its fellow 
citizens in a historical perspective.  
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Considering Tunisia’s migration policy, it is possible to distinguish three 
predominant strategies throughout the last couple of decades; firstly, facilitating 
and encouraging labour migration in order to cope with high unemployment 
rates, secondly, the strengthening of transnational ties of the Tunisian 
community abroad, and thirdly, the surveillance of the Tunisian communities 
abroad, especially those who escaped the country for political reasons.33  
As of today, around ten percent of Tunisia’s population lives abroad. This 
considerably important and growing population of Tunisians is not only a 
resource of wealth for the country in terms of remittances, but also a population 
that exercises its influence in Tunisian politics. In the long history of Tunisia’s 
autocratic state system during the Bourguiba and the Ben Ali governments, 
many dissidents have left the country and continued their political struggle from 
outside. They belong to different political camps, either of the radical left who 
was especially persecuted under Bourguiba, or to political Islamic groups, who 
were the main opponents of the Ben Ali regime since the late 80ies. For this 
reason, Tunisia’s migration policy was always considered as security policy as 
well: The security policy logic of the authoritarian governments called for the 
 
33 One has to recall that between Tunisia’s independence in 1956 and the popular uprising in 2010/2011 
that resulted in the fall of the Ben Ali regime, the Tunisian republic had only two presidents throughout its 
history as an independent country; Habib Bourguiba and his successor Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Both built 
their political power on autocratic regimes that surveyed and prosecuted any opposition forces with 
determination.  
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tight control of the Tunisian population also abroad and not only in the country, 
as the French political scientist Béatrice Hibou (2006b) recalls.  
This aspect of control and surveillance of the population even abroad is an 
important detail. Its origins date back long before Ben Ali came to power in the 
coup in 1987 against his predecessor Habib Bourguiba. However, the 
authoritarian state system was established under Habib Bourguiba already, the 
first president of independent Tunisia and the only predecessor of Ben Ali. One 
of the most important instruments for monitoring the emigrating population 
was the introduction of an exit permit. As early as in the 1960s, Tunisians were 
required an exit permit in order to leave the country legally (see Bruno 
2010:69f). Depending on the dominant current political conjuncture, there 
were times when it was easier to obtain this permit and other times where the 
authorities applied the rules stricter.  
This attempt to keep a sharp eye on the population abroad was in tension with 
the country’s attempt to promote and facilitate labour migration in order to cope 
with high unemployment rates as a result of the partial de-industrialisation in 
the context of the withdrawal of the former colonial power and the repatriation 
of large parts of the industry back to mainland France. In addition to the 
prospect that labour migration could be a partial solution of high unemployment 
rates, it had the additional benefit of future remittances of the fellow citizens 
working abroad. It was expected that these remittances would help to stimulate 
the domestic economy. Both the securitarian logic and the economic logic relied 
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on the premise that the authoritarian state apparatus knows its citizens even 
abroad (see Hibou 2006b).  
However, only under the Ben Ali regime started the systematic development of 
an administrative structure that develops and maintains close ties to Tunisia’s 
fellow citizens living abroad. The scattered and sparse attempts to address 
Tunisia’s emigrants were merged in the structure of the Office des Tunisiens à 
l’Étranger (OTE), established in 1988.34 According to its statutory mandate, it 
promotes and organises Tunisian emigration in accordance with the bilateral 
treaties that concern especially labour migration and migration for the purpose 
of study. However, the OTE offices – in general integrated into the respective 
embassy of the country – also provided further services to the Tunisian 
community abroad. It offered social assistance services and other services one 
could qualify as tourism promotion. For example, on a regular basis the OTE 
offered and promoted special discounts for flight and ferry tickets of the national 
air carrier Tunisair and the ferry companies respectively during the summer 
holidays. Furthermore, the OTE offices promote cultural programmes, thereby 
reinforcing „l’attachement des enfants des tunisiens résident à l’étranger à leur 
patrie“ (the attachment to their homeland of the children of Tunisians living 
abroad), as the Tunisian law pathetically stipulates on of the OTE’s function.35 
 
34 Art. 14. Loi No 60-88 du 02. juin 1988. (published in JORT No. 39, 10.06.1988) The legislation’s main 
aim is to develop „une politique d’encadrement et d’assistance des tunisiens résident à l’étranger“. 
35 JORT No. 39, 10.06.1988, p. 824 
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In other words, the Tunisian migration policy targets even children of Tunisian 
migrants, who were born in France, Italy, or elsewhere, and who know Tunisia 
only from their parents’ narratives and the usual annual summer holidays in 
Hammamet, Nabeul, Sousse, or Djerba. This is an example that shows how the 
Tunisian state contributes actively to the formation of a transnational space of 
migration – materially and discursively.  
The OTE limits its scope not to the traditional low-skilled labour migration, but 
explicitly targets the Tunisian elites living abroad as well. The office states its 
purpose as follows:  
„Les compétences tunisiennes à l’étranger, opérant dans les 
domaines scientifiques, économiques, culturels et artistiques 
occupent une place centrale dans les programmes et les activités 
destinés aux Tunisiens à l’étranger vu leur rôle de premier plan 
dans l’impulsion de l’économie nationale […].“36 
This quote highlights, how the state considers its fellow citizens living abroad as 
an important factor for the domestic economy. This broad aim of the OTE to 
incorporate Tunisian citizens living abroad in manifold ways is an issue of lively 
and sometimes controversial debates among the Tunisian population abroad, as 
I discovered during fieldwork. Especially political refugees followed the OTE’s 
 
36 http://www.ote.nat.tn/index.php?id=91; last accessed 05.05.2016 
 116 
promotion of cultural activities with suspicion, yet the image seems to be 
changing since 2011, and they no longer consider the OTE as the extension of 
the secret service abroad.  
Beyond this soft governance of transnational mobility by the Tunisian state, 
there are further and more concrete interventions and practices that aim at the 
governance of transnational mobility of Tunisians. An important tool is the 
conclusion of bilateral migration agreements, in particular with several European 
countries. As an interesting detail, Tunisia and the respective other contracting 
states frame the content of these agreements in entirely different ways. While 
Tunisia emphasises the parts of the agreement that stipulates the opportunities 
for – often temporary – migration for work and education purposes, the other 
side in general highlights the aspect of migration control. The following example 
shows the different readings of such agreements.  
In 2013, Tunisia concluded a bilateral mobility partnership with the European 
Union (Déclaration conjointe pour le partenariat de mobilité entre la Tunisie, 
l'Union Européenne et ses etats membres participants). 37  The year before, the 
Tunisian republic concluded a similar bilateral agreement with Switzerland 
 
37 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/international-
affairs/general/docs/declaration_conjointe_tunisia_eu_mobility_fr.pdf; last accessed 11.02.2016 
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concerning migration issues.38 In general these agreements are not more than 
vague declarations of intent; and often the realisation of its content depends on 
political constellations and power relations. However, a closer examination of 
the genealogy of the bilateral agreement between Tunisia and Switzerland reveals 
completely different readings of the same text.39 Parts of the agreement between 
Tunisia and Switzerland have been realised before the Tunisian parliament has 
even ratified the agreement, while other parts have remained dead letter until 
today. Concluded in 2012, the main part of the agreement deals with the issue 
of return migration. According to the text, Tunisia is obliged to take back its 
fellow citizens who were not granted asylum in Switzerland. In return, 
Switzerland establishes a program for assisted voluntary return AVR that grants 
financial help for returning Tunisian asylum seekers. When the Tunisian 
parliament ratified this agreement almost two years later, Tunisian newspapers 
reported about the agreement, echoing the Tunisian government’s enthusiasm 
over the perspective the agreement offers especially for young Tunisians.40 The 
 
38 Protocole d’entente entre le conseil fédéral Suisse et le gouvernement de la République Tunisienne 
concernant l’instauration d’un partenariat migratoire, 
https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/internationales/internat-zusarbeit/bilaterales/keine-sr-
nr/20120611-verstaendigungsprot-TUN-f.pdf; last accessed 14.03.2016. This main agreement is 
completed by two further agreements; one concerns the exchange of young professionals (accord entre la 
Confédération Suisse et la République Tunisisenne relatif à l’échange de jeunes professionels: 
https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/internationales/internat-zusarbeit/bilaterales/keine-sr-
nr/20120611-verstaendigungsprot-TUN-f.pdf; last accessed 14.03.2016) and a migration agreement that 
addresses almost exclusively the issue of clandestine migration of Tunisian citizens and their readmission 
by the Tunisian authorities (Accord de coopération en matière de migration entre la Confédération Suisse et 
la République Tunisienne, https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/internationales/internat-
zusarbeit/bilaterales/keine-sr-nr/20120611-vertrag-mig-zusarbeit-TUN-f.pdf; last accessed 14.03.2016) 
39 For a detailed discussion of the agreement, see also the chapter on the governance of voluntariness. 
40 See JORT No. 32, 22.04.2014, p. 939. La Presse 23.04.2014, p. 1, Le Temps 23.04.2014, p. 1.  
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articles praised the opportunities for young professionals to benefit from the 
possibility of an internship in Swiss companies for a couple of months. However, 
these newspaper reports missed an important detail: While parts of the 
agreement (in particular Tunisia’s obligation for the readmission of Tunisian 
asylum seekers) have been in operation for a long time already, other parts have 
remained dead letter – in particular the exchange programme for young Tunisian 
professionals. Not a single young Tunisian had been to Switzerland on an 
internship with this programme at the time the newspaper reports were 
published.  
From the Figure of the Labour Migrant to the Harraga  
So far, the discussion how the different states govern the transnational space of 
mobility between the two shores of the Mediterranean for Tunisian migrants has 
focused on labour migration. Only the last paragraph gave a brief hint to another 
form of mobility as the target of governance; clandestine migration. The 
following part examines how the governance of labour migration and of 
clandestine migration is intertwined. Furthermore, it discusses how the 
restrictions in the domain of labour migration produced the figure of the 
clandestine migrant. In Tunisan colloquial language, this figure is called harraga.  
The brief discussion of the case of France has already shown how the migration 
policy has successively tightened the rules for labour migration. While in 
particular Italy has maintained a liberal migration policy towards Tunisian 
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migrants for a long time, the ongoing integration of the EU countries towards a 
common space of migration policy under the Dublin and Schengen regulatory 
framework has forced even Italy to restrict the possibilities of labour migration 
for third country nationals. To put it simple, labour migration – with the 
exception of the rare cases of high-skilled labour migration – disappeared and 
gave way to a new form of migration practices of Tunisians; the harraga.41 As a 
particular form of clandestine migration, the harraga has become an issue since 
the second half of the 1990s. In everyday language in Tunisia, but also in the 
other countries in North Africa, harraga refers to the clandestine crossing of the 
Mediterranean by small boats. This practice is intimately linked to the 
externalisation of the European border control. With respect to Algeria, Collyer 
(2012) estimates that the harraga as a high-risk strategy of migration has emerged 
around the year 2000 (see also Ben-Yehoyada 2011). In Tunisia, this type of 
clandestine migration has emerged more or less at the same time. Some authors 
date its origin a bit earlier around the year 1990 (e.g. Boubakri 2004; Mabrouk 
2010). A major impact was the introduction of the visa obligation for Tunisian 
citizens by the Italian state, which marked the end of the Italian exception in 
Europe with regard to the governance of Tunisian migration. Before this change, 
Italy was an important entry point for Tunisian migrants. Either, they remained 
 
41 For the genealogy of the term, see the comments in the introduction.  
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in Italy, or they continued their migration trajectory as clandestine migrants to 
other European countries.  
In his study on clandestine Tunisian migration, Mehdi Mabrouk (2010: 124ff) 
gives an overview of the Tunisian harraga and identifies four main regions of 
departure. From north to south, these regions are the Cap Bon Peninsula with 
Kélibia and El Haouaria as the main villages, the region around Sfax, and the 
South, in general with Zarzis as one of the main points of departure. The 
uprising against the autocratic regime of Ben Ali that started in December 2011 
and the subsequent breakdown of the government on the 14 January 2011 
resulted in a short period of sharp rising numbers of harraga departures 
(Boubakri 2013). According to a Frontex report from 2011, between January 
and March 2011 20’258 Tunisians arrived at Lampedusa by boat; the small 
Italian island, which is the most Southern part of Italy, little more than 100 
kilometers away from the Tunisian shores.42 Although this appeared to be an 
unprecedent situation and depicted as such by mass media, a superficial look 
back in history reveals that there were other moments in the recent history of 
Tunisian migration with sharply rising numbers of harraga-departures over a 
short time. For example in 2008, Lampedusa already witnessed a similar number 
of Tunisian harragas arriving over a short period at its shores. And similar to the 
situation in early 2011, the 2008 clandestine migration was linked to a political 
 
42 Frontex (2011): FRAN Quarterly, Issue 1, January-March 2011; 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q1_2011.pdf; last accessed 15.04.2016 
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event in Tunisia; the popular revolt in the Gafsa mining basin (Boubakri 
2013:2ff). In the aftermath of the crushed uprising, many young Tunisians 
opted for the harraga, escaping political repression and economic depression 
with extremely high unemployment rates especially among the younger 
population. 
Tunisia has reacted in different ways to the emerging phenomenon of the 
harraga. Until the late 1990s, the harraga was rarely an issue for the Tunisian 
government. This changed at the beginning of this century. The government 
introduced a series of laws penalising illegal emigration.43 Law No. 2004/ 6 that 
modifies law No. 1975/ 75-40 from 1975 is the most important regulation 
concerning the illegal emigration from Tunisia.44 It stipulates prison sentences 
and heavy fines for Tunisians and foreigners alike who leave the territory on an 
irregular way, or who assist in the unlawful escape from Tunisian territory. The 
individual articles remain strikingly vague and allow a lot of space for 
interpretation. For example, there is no legal definition of the term migrant, but 
the law evokes at the same time terms as foreigner (étranger), exit (sortie) and 
entry (entrée), as Mabrouk (2010: 114ff) and El Madmad (2004: 109-136) 
highlight. From a legal point of view, the most critical aspect of this law is that 
it conflates human smuggling and the individual act of escaping irregularly 
 
43 Note that the requirement of an exit permit has been existed for a long time already. However, ignoring 
this obligation was rarely punished in practice.  
44 JORT No. 11, 06.02.2004, p. 252ff 
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Tunisian territory. 45  This means that a human smuggler and a clandestine 
migrant are treated under the very same law.  
The vague character of this law is typical for the Tunisian legislation of the Ben 
Ali era. It gives prosecutors ample space for interpretation that might turn into 
arbitrariness quite easily. There is no reliable information concerning the 
application of these laws, especially concerning possible sentences issued against 
clandestine Tunisian migrants. However, according to several legal specialists I 
interviewed on this topic, it does not seem to be a law that is actively applied to 
cases of clandestine Tunisian migrants. Rather, it is applied to cases of so-called 
organised human smuggling, yet even with respect to these cases, it seems to be 
a rather random application of this law.46 
With regard to the shift from the governance of labour migration to the 
emergence of the figure of the harraga and the governance of clandestine 
migration from a perspective of the Tunisian state, let me retain the following 
aspects. Tunisia has actively promoted labour migration in the 1960ies and 
1970ies. It has facilitated labour migration with the conclusion of bilateral 
labour migration agreements, as the discussion of the example of Germany 
 
45 Critical migration studies have formulated a detailed critique of the term human smuggling as it carries a 
normative notion. Instead, these studies suggest the more neutral term facilitator. I follow this line of 
argument and use the term “human smuggling” or “human trafficking” only as an emic term and not as a 
descriptive or analytical term.  
46 With respect to the legal situation in the context of return migration. see also Benjemia (2008).  
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shows. A large population of Tunisian workers abroad signifies high remittances 
that stimulate the domestic economy. At the same time, labour migration is a 
means to export the domestic surplus labour force. The governance of Tunisian 
migration is further driven by security concerns of the Tunisian state as 
highlighted by Hibou (2006b). The surveillance of its population abroad has 
always been accompanied Tunisian migration policies.  
The recent development with the conclusion or the renewal of bilateral 
migration agreements has introduced a shift with regard to this aspect. In this 
case, it combines return migration with the idea of development. It is a way for 
European countries to “export” undesirable and unproductive labour migration 
force back to the country of origin. For the Tunisian state, the promised 
development projects contribute to the development of the rural areas, which is 
a declared objective of any Tunisian government since the 2011 uprising.  
The Governance of Return Migration: Switzerland as a Case Study 
I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the governance of return migration 
as a further structuring element of this space. Launched in 2012 by Switzerland’s 
migration authorities, the programme for assisted voluntary return migration for 
Tunisian asylum seekers (the so-called Länderprogramm Tunesien in German) 
was not the first of its kind. In the years before, Switzerland has already realised 
other country programmes since the year 2000; for example, the programme for 
Sri Lanka between 2000 - 2004, the programme for Angola between 2002 - 
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2007, or the programme for Armenia 2004 - 2008 (Kaser and Schenker 2008). 
The programmes are designed to facilitate the so-called voluntary return for 
asylum seekers from these countries. 
However, the origins of assisted return can be traced back to the end of the 
1950ies (Kaser and Schenker 2008). At that time, it had a completely different 
significance; assisted return was an ad-hoc decision on a case-by-case basis. It was 
not actively promoted, and it aimed at assisting individual migrants who would 
like to return to their country of origin but lack the necessary economic means. 
Neither the idea of governing migration flows through assisted return, nor the 
idea of the nexus between migration and development was linked to assisted 
return. Both became major points of reference for the programmes for assisted 
voluntary return migration only later. In short, in the beginning assisted return 
was nothing more than a simple administrative tool to provide fast and 
unbureaucratic financial assistance to individuals who decided to return to their 
country of origin and who lacked the necessary economic resources.  
It was as late as in the second half of the 1990ies – especially since the launch of 
the specific and temporally limited Länderprogramme (country programmes) – 
when assisted return has turned into a distinct pillar of Switzerland’s migration 
policy. In addition, the issue of rejected asylum seekers has become a highly 
contested and politicised issue at the same time; not only in Switzerland, but in 
Europe in general (see International Organisation of Migration 2004; Broeders 
2010). While forced deportation is an ineffective, expensive, and morally 
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questionable instrument to remove rejected asylum seekers from the national 
territory (see Fekete 2005), so-called assisted voluntary return migration has 
become an appealing alternative for state authorities and heavily promoted by 
the International Organisation for Migration IOM in particular (see Geiger 
2009). This trend has been accompanied by the conclusion of numerous bilateral 
readmission agreement (Cassarino 2010).  
In Switzerland, the “invention” of the programmes for assisted voluntary return 
migration is linked to the end of the Balkan wars in the 1990s. At that time, 
Switzerland granted temporary and collective projection for refugees from the 
Balkans during the war. With the end of the war, the government terminated 
the temporary admission of these war refugees. Suddenly, a significant number 
of people found itself without any protection and residence permit in 
Switzerland. They were obliged to return into their country of origin; a country 
devastated by war and with a weak economy that was only gradually recovering. 
As a consequence, Switzerland designed its first programme for voluntary return 
migration for Bosnian refugees. This marked the beginning of a new era of 
assisted return; away from an ad-hoc and individual instrument of 
unbureaucratic assistance towards a main pillar of Switzerland’s migration policy 
and the attempt to govern transnational mobility. Often, these programmes were 
accompanied by bilateral migration agreements, or – at least – bilateral 
readmission agreements.  
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Two distinct ideas characterise the paradigm shift in the approach to return 
migration through the introduction of the Länderprogramme. First, the creation 
of these Länderprogramme is connected to the emerging idea that migration flows 
can and should be governed not only through the regulation of the admission, 
but also through the management of the departure. And second, with the 
Länderprogramme a novel idea gained traction: the management of migration 
and issues of development should be considered in a coherent and integrated 
approach.  
Especially this second idea has made a remarkable career and became some sort 
of a new paradigm of development policy, in the literature often termed as the 
migration/ development nexus (e.g. Gosh 2000; Kilic et al. 2009; de Haas 2010; 
Glick Schiller and Faist 2010; Kunz 2013). In particular the International 
Orgnisation for Migration IOM has positioned itself as one of the main actors 
in this field and has intensively promoted the idea of the migration/ development 
nexus. The predominant narrative is that programmes that link migration 
management with development issues contribute to the fight against 
undocumented migration. However, this causal link between the decrease of 
undocumented migration and the promotion of regional development in the 
country of origin has been proofed wrong in several studies (e.g. de Haas 2010).  
Switzerland distinguishes two types of so-called assisted voluntary return 
migration. Typically, the already-mentioned Länderprogramme are limited in 
time and scope and run for three to four years in general. Often, they are more 
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or less immediate responses to fast increasing numbers of asylum seekers of a 
country or region, as it was the case for the programme for assisted voluntary 
return migration for Tunisians in 2012. Or they are designed to accompany 
other changes in migration policies, such as the termination of a collective 
temporal admission of asylum seekers, as it was the case with the return of war 
refugees after the Balkan wars in the 1990s. Länderprogramme are actively 
promoted among asylum seekers. Sometimes, specific structures are established 
in the country of origin for the duration of these programs to accompany the 
migrants after their return. In general, country programmes benefit of higher 
budgets and are able to finance larger projects.  
The individual return migration assistance is the second form of assisted return. 
It is not restricted to certain countries and open to any asylum seeker. Even 
recognised refugees are eligible for individual return migration assistance. The 
different forms of return migration assistance are regulated in article 90 of 
Switzerland’s Asylum Act from 1998 (SR 142.31), and in article 69 of the 
Foreign Nationals Law from 2005 (SR 142.20).47 Subordinated ordinances, 
conduct orders, and regulations expatiate the two articles.  
As any other country program, the Tunisian programme for assisted voluntary 
return is further regulated in a series of circulars (so-called Rundschreiben), issued 
 
47 Art. 90 Asylgesetz (SR 142.31) and Art. 60 Bundesgesetz über die Ausländerinnen und Ausländer (SR. 
142.20). Both articles stipulate that the government is responsible for the implementation of assisted 
return. 
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by the State Secretariat of Migration SEM.48 These Rundschreiben specify the 
details of the programmes, as they vary from each Länderprogramm to the other. 
The Rundschreiben are binding regulations for the return migration bureaucrats 




48 The first Rundschreiben Nr. 8 zu Weisung III / 4.2., dating from 10.07.2013 explains in detail the 
procedures for the programme. See 
www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/rechtsgrundlagen/weisungen/asyl/rueckkehr-
_und_wiedereingliederungshilfe/rs/20120710-rs-rkh-TUN-d.pdf; last accessed 22.05.2016). The 
subsequent circulars provide information on smaller adjustments of the programme, or they just announce 
the extension of the programme.  
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V. Border as Experience 
Chapter Five explores the border regime from the perspective of six Tunisian 
migrants. The focus of this chapter is the question how border is experienced 
through the narratives of Tunisian harragas. The migration biographies represent 
in an exemplarily way the manifold experiences of the harraga and return. 
Through their biographies, this chapter traces the transnational space of mobility 
of clandestine Tunisian migrants. The chapter starts with some preliminary 
remarks on the ethics of interviews in the specific context of the experience of 
Tunisian migrants in their encounter with state authorities. These remarks 
connect to the comments on the method of biographical interviews in Chapter 
3. The second part is devoted to the voices of six Tunisian migrants and their 
individual migration biographies. The presentation and discussion of the 
interviews follows a similar structure for each case. It starts with the 
reconstruction of the migration biography where the voice and the perspective 
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of the informant is a key element. It then aims at placing this individual 
experience of transnational mobility in its wider context. The ambition is to find 
a balance between giving credit to the individual and existential experience of 
transnational mobility, and simultaneously highlighting that these experiences 
are effects of larger social formations.  
Although this dissertation focuses on the governance of return migration 
through its study of Switzerland’s programme for assisted voluntary return 
migration for Tunisian migrants, the sample of biographies deliberately exceeds 
this narrow focus. In order to capture the experience of departure and return and 
to explore how this experience is structured through the governance of 
transnational mobility, I decided to include the biography of one informant, 
who used similar migration strategies already in the 1960s and can therefore be 
considered as a harraga avant la lettre. This allows a historical comparison and 
shows that it is less the migration strategies that have changed, but rather the 
regime that governs transnational mobility. For similar reasons the following 
sample of migration biographies includes also the case of a young Tunisian, who 
actually never managed to leave the country. For him, the harraga is as much an 
obsession than it is an imagination.  
The first case is the migration biography of Fathi. He is an unmarried man 
around 35 years old, living with his retired parents. Born in a family of 
fishermen, Fathi has become a fisherman too. He has a long experience as a 
clandestine migrant. His first harraga dates back to the year 2000. After applying 
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for asylum in Switzerland, he decided to apply for a return migration project, 
and returned to his natal village in 2014, where he has started to work as an 
independent fisherman. The second case is Amine, an independent vegetable 
farmer, who owns a small plot of land. He is another return migrant I came to 
know via the local return migration office in Tunisia. In contrast to Fathi, he 
migrated only once in 2011, when he seized the opportunity to escape the 
country in the 2010/2011 uprising. After his return, he has started to grow 
vegetables on his father’s land with the financial assistance of the return 
migration project he applied for. Amine can be considered as the prototype of a 
clandestine migrant as imagined in the AVR programmes and by the return 
migration bureaucrats. The third case is Yassine, a young man in his twenties. 
He is a waiter in a modest café near La Marsa. My acquaintance with him is pure 
serendipity: I first met him in a café I used to visit when I was living in the 
neighbourhood. Till now, his harraga is only an imagination – rather a faint idea 
than a concrete plan. Yassine's story highlights how the narratives of the harraga 
and the European border regime have effects on those who are not able to claim 
their right to transnational mobility successfully. The fourth case of the sample 
is Kaïs, a young Tunisian who never reached Europe. Obsessed by the idea of 
going to Europe, he made several attempts to escape Tunisia. Trapped between 
several low paid jobs as a day labourer, the harraga is an attempt to realise upward 
social mobility through horizontal transnational mobility. The fifth case is 
Foued, whom I met in Switzerland. He was living in a small town not far away 
from my home town. As a former asylum seeker, he decided to remain in 
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Switzerland and escaped the asylum system – at least for the moment. He 
rejected the offer of the AVR programme for an assisted return to Tunisia. His 
case highlights what happens to those who escape the return migration 
bureaucracy. And finally, as the sixth case there is the migration biography of 
Abdellah, who I introduced already briefly in the preliminary vignette. In the 
1960s and 1970s, he was working as a labour migrant on French construction 
sites. His case contrasts the migration experiences of the younger generation. It 
highlights how the very same migration practices have completely different 
effects today. His case underlines my argument that it is rather the 
administration of transnational mobility that has changed and less the migration 
practices.  
Interviewing Clandestine Migrants: Ethical Considerations 
Placing the migration biographies and experiences centre stage has two reasons: 
an analytical and an ethical one. The second chapter discussed the thesis of the 
autonomy of migration AOM and concluded that it is an approach that allows 
to capture at the same time the migrants’ agency and the effects of the border 
regime on individual migration trajectories. Using the subjective narratives of 
transnational mobility of clandestine migrants is the attempt to transfer the 
theoretical claim of the thesis of the AOM to a methodological approach. This 
is not without pitfalls.  
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In “La misère du monde”, Pierre Bourdieu argues that interviews always establish 
a very delicate and problematic relationship between the interviewer and his or 
her informant (Bourdieu 1993). It is the interviewer who defines the topic and 
who leads the conversation. Although Bourdieu acknowledges that the interview 
itself is always a co-construction between interviewer and informant, it is the 
former who keeps the interpretative power over the material after the 
conversation. He or she interprets the material, draws connections between 
different statements, and, most important, gives sense to what has been said. It 
is a second-order interpretation in the sense as it explores meanings of meanings.  
According to Bourdieu, it is impossible to eliminate the unequal relationship 
between interviewer and informant.49 The researcher’s task is to control this 
inequality and reflect it. This reflexivity distinguishes the researcher from a 
journalist. Bourdieu calls his method straightforward “comprendre” 
(comprehension). “Ne pas déplorer, ne pas rire, ne pas détester, mais comprendre” 
(Bourdieu 1993: 7) is the guideline for research in “La misère du monde.”  
This is not only a methodological standpoint but takes also a political and 
normative stance. Guided by an empathic attitude towards the informants, it 
gives a voice to the voiceless without simply adopting their perspective. In 
 
49 In anthropology, there is a lively debate how to overcome this unequal relationship and level the field of 
power over interpretations. Ideas such as co-research or even co-authorship aim at going beyond the 
acknowledgment of the unequal relationship and the particular ethical responsibility of the researcher, 
suggesting concrete tools to create new and equal relationships between researcher and informant (i.e. 
Scheper-Hughes 1995; Lassiter 2005; Hale 2006). For a broader review of this discussion, see Holmes 
and Marcus (2008).  
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response to this methodological (and political) requirement, Bourdieu suggests 
a strategy of proximity to bridge the differences between interviewer and 
informant. What he has in mind with the term proximity is the distance in social 
space. The prototypical academic researcher with his or her middle-class 
background is far from the informant’s socio-economic situation, who witness 
the social suffering in contemporary society (thus far the book’s subtitle). For 
“La misère du monde”, Bourdieu put together a team of interviewer and co-
authors who occupy a similar place than the informants in the social space. Due 
to a comparable socialisation of the interviewer and the informant, and as a 
consequence an assumed similar habitus of the two, this arrangement contributes 
to a better understanding of the informant’s lived experiences, thus far 
Bourdieu’s (1993) argument in a nutshell.  
However, Bourdieu did not provide a proper argument, why proximity in the 
social field would solve the epistemological problem of understanding the other’s 
standpoint. Proximity does not automatically guarantee a more accurate 
understanding of the informant’s positioning in the social field, neither does it 
guarantee more empathy towards the lived experiences of the informant. This 
assumption relies on the false premise that individual and shared experience 
implies a better and more nuanced understanding of the informant’s situation.  
An appropriate interpretation of a social situation does not rely necessarily on 
shared experiences in the past. Furthermore, Bourdieu’s approach of creating 
proximity between interviewer and informant does not address the symbolic 
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violence at stake in the interview situation per se. In addition, there are further 
aspects that have to be taken into account. For example, conducting an interview 
with someone who shares a similar socio-economic background and similar 
experiences may indeed operate as a facilitator to gain the informant’s confidence 
for a first period. However, it might create other blind spots, as shared experience 
tends to render too many things as self-evident facts not worth talking about or 
reflecting upon.  
Shaping the Relationship Between Interviewer and Informant 
My own approach to conduct biographical interviews with clandestine Tunisian 
migrants violates Bourdieu’s imperative of proximity in several ways. I do not 
share many common experiences with my informants and we occupy radically 
different places in the social field; especially with regard to the possibilities of 
exercising the right of transnational mobility. Conducting interviews with 
clandestine Tunisian migrants as a researcher with a residence permit in a 
European country and a Swiss passport in the pocket, I am immediately 
confronted with the socio-economic inequalities.50  Practices of mobility and 
immobility were at the heart of the conversations between me as a researcher and 
the informants. We were talking about transnational migration trajectories and 
 
50 In this context, Torpey (2000) argues that the passport is an indispensable tool to exercise one’s 
freedom of movement. At the same time, it is essential to the state’s monopolisation of the legitimate 
means of movement, and thereby contributes to the state control of movements. 
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the experiences of crossing borders. At the same time, the conditions that made 
this very encounter possible, depended on a high degree of mobility from my 
side as a researcher: The subject of the conversation and the particular conditions 
that make that very conversation possible at all were highly entangled. The 
driving force for these encounters were not a shared socio-economic background 
and similar experiences made in the past, but rather the completely different 
experience of the same situation.  
However, the socio-economic conditions for mobile practices were just one 
aspect that structured these encounters. In addition to the socio-economic 
conditions, nationality itself was of similar importance that structured the 
experience of transnational mobility. Let me explain this aspect with the 
following episode: During my fieldwork in Tunisia, I met a young Tunisian who 
had just started working for a small international NGO active in the field of 
refugee assistance. Before his stint in the refugee NGO, he had worked as a 
trainee for another organisation aiming at the “strengthening of civil society”, as 
it is often called in the jargon of international and local NGOs working in 
Tunisia. As many fellow citizens of middle-class origin and with a degree in 
higher education, starting a career in the international NGO world opens the 
prospect of building a network of transnational contacts with colleagues all over 
the world. Meetings and trainings in different part of the world allow a high 
degree of transnational mobility. He enjoyed this cosmopolitan lifestyle 
(probably much more than I do). With his age, his educational and socio-
economic background, he shared many similarities with me, and in this regard, 
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he was much closer to me than to his fellow citizen who, as a harraga, lacked of 
the socio-economic means that would allow him to travel the world. In short, 
we occupied a similar place in the social field and at first sight, our patterns of 
mobility were quite comparable. Despite these similarities, our experiences of 
transnational mobility differed in fundamental ways, as a result of our respective 
nationalities. Although he traveled the world as a young NGO worker, he faced 
much more difficulties, when he wanted to travel on his own. At this moment, 
he was no longer the cosmopolitan NGO worker, but a young Tunisian citizen, 
suspected of entering a country in the Global North illegally or overstaying and 
abusing the issued work or study visa.  
This example shows that the socio-economic background and the regimes of 
transnational mobility that are shaped by the respective nationality of the border-
crosser both entrench a fundamental distance between the researcher and the 
informant. Do we thus have to conclude with Bourdieu that a mutual 
understanding of the other’s position in the social field is impossible?  
Against Bourdieu’s principle of social proximity, I would like to argue that an 
understanding is indeed possible across different positions in the social field. 
Social distance is an aspect that might complicate a mutual understanding, but 
it is not a categorical hindrance. Instead, I suggest an epistemology that can be 
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extracted from extended case method.51 Any understanding of an individual and 
specific case does indeed rely on the detailed reconstruction of the individual case 
– which might be complicated by the different positions of researcher and 
informant –, but it relies at the same time also on the detailed reconstruction of 
the relationship between the individual case and the broader structure of society. 
Both the reconstruction of the micro- and the macro-level might be partial and 
incomplete, but the fact that they co-constitute each other gives the researcher a 
certain limited legitimacy of interpretation even of individual biographies. The 
informants are the experts of their own lives (much more than the researcher), 
but the researcher has certain analytical tools at its disposal to embed the 
individual case into the broader picture.  
However, some anthropologists have pointed out a more general issue with 
representations. Especially the writing culture debate questioned the idea of 
representation in the spirit of classical ethnography (e.g. Clifford 1980, 1983). 
Discussing authority and representation in classical anthropology, Renato 
Rosaldo (2008) argued for example that information gathered under 
asymmetrical conditions has always and necessarily disciplining effects. Leaving 
aside for the moment the question whether this disciplining effect is inherently 
inscribed in any kind of ethnographic representation, let me translate Rosaldo’s 
observation to the situation I am studying in this dissertation; the governance of 
 
51 See Chapter 3.  
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clandestine transnational mobility. 52 In the context of the asylum bureaucracy, 
the interview is one of the main techniques to gain information about the life of 
asylum seekers. These information serve indeed a disciplinary end, as they form 
the basis of the way the asylum bureaucracy processes the case. Or, to put it more 
drastically; the integration of migrants as asylum seekers in an asylum regime as 
part of the broader regime of the governance of mobility with its exclusionary 
logic is essentially based on interviews, as this is often the only available 
information, as there are no further documents that allow the reconstruction of 
the case.  
However, there is at least one fundamental difference between the most 
empathic asylum bureaucrat and the worst ethnographer when they interview 
migrants. For the asylum bureaucrat, the interview is a technique to gather 
information and discover “the truth” about the asylum case brought forward by 
the asylum seeker. The interview is embedded in a migration bureaucracy and it 
does not serve to understand the asylum seeker’s standpoint, but rather as a tool 
to gather the necessary information to process the case. All informants I 
encountered made the experience of being interviewed by state authorities; the 
police, border guards, or asylum bureaucrats. For the ethnographer, these 
circumstances turn the biographical interview as a means to gather ethnographic 
 
52 For a critique of the idea that representation always and inherently signifies domination, see Graeber 
(2012:122).  
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data and insights into the informants’ trajectories and understand their 
perspective into a very delicate issue.  
Asylum Interviews and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion  
The interview, or rather the interrogation, is a very important step in the asylum 
procedure (see also Lawrence and Ruffer 2015: 2). Switzerland's asylum 
procedure serves as an example to illustrate this point. In general, during the 
asylum procedure asylum seekers have little written evidence to support their 
case. Identity papers, police summons, medical certificates, or other papers that 
would help to support an asylum application giving further evidence for the 
persecution of the asylum seeker by the state, are often missing. In the cases this 
dissertation follows, the young clandestine Tunisian migrants who arrived in 
2011 in Switzerland claiming for asylum did even not submit any identity papers 
or other written means of evidence when they filed their cases. Either they have 
never had any identity papers at all (which is uncommon in the case of Tunisia), 
or they simply decided not to present them during the asylum procedure. In a 
situation with lacking identity documents and other written means of evidence 
such as legal judgements or arrest warrants, the only way to examine the asylum 
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application is the interview.53 And as in any part of the administration, the 
interview has to take the form of a written document.  
This principle of the written form follows Max Weber's Aktenmässigkeit 
(1922:651ff). Written evidence is the key to any decision-making process in the 
administration. In this case, this written evidence is created through the asylum 
interview: Through the hearing, the asylum seeker’s oral testimony is 
transformed into a written document and becomes written evidence. However, 
it is never a verbatim transcript of what is said during the interview. The standard 
procedure does not include tape recording of the interview with a subsequent 
verbatim transcription. Rather, the written record is created right away during 
the interview by a minute-taker who assists at the hearing. The transcript is thus 
the co-product of the interviewer, the asylum seeker, the minute-taker, and a 
translator, who is in general present at the hearing as well. In certain cases, there 
is no minute-taker, and it is the interviewer’s job to take care of the transcript. 
This multiple translation chain is one of the black boxes in the asylum procedure, 
and it is unavoidable that this multiple translation chain produces mistakes, or 
shifts in meanings. This specific setting and the administration’s need to produce 
 
53 Fassin and d’Halluin (2005, 2007) show how medical proves and psychiatric expertise have become 
important in the French asylum procedure. They replace the lacking documents. At the same time, it 
indicates also a shift in the meaning of asylum as a right for politically persecuted persons to persons who 
are suffering. This means that suffering has become an important aspect in asylum policies, as Fassin and 
d’Halluin argue. 
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written evidence is one of the reasons why asylum interviews often turn into 
interrogations.  
A further element contributes to the transformation of the asylum interview into 
an interrogation: According to the UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, which is the 
internationally recognized guideline for asylum applications, the burden of proof 
lies on the person submitting an asylum application.54 This principle leaves a 
permanent shadow of doubt on the asylum seeker’s narrative. Building on 
Ricoeur (1999), Lawrence and Ruffer call this “the hermeneutics of suspicion” 
(2015: 5; see also Stewart 1989). This hermeneutic of suspicion which is at the 
heart of the asylum procedure is in sharp contrast to Bourdieu’s principle of 
„comprendre“ (understanding). In contrast to the interview in an ethnographic 
setting, the virtue of an asylum interview is not empathy, but the establishment 
of facts, and the production of a written document that represents evidence for 
the decision-making process. Under the logics of the asylum procedure, 
narrating one’s own biography changes its meaning entirely; the asylum seeker’s 
biographical narrative is under permanent suspicion. Narrating one’s biography 
is no longer a mean of self-affirmation, or the fashioning of a personal identity, 
but rather an administrative tool of subjugation and repression.  
 
54 UNHCR 2011: Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. 
Geneva: UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html; last accessed 09.12.2015 
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Asylum seekers are well aware of the importance of the asylum interview and 
what is at stake at that very moment. Among migrant communities, there is a 
rich record of knowledge, hearsay, and gossip around the question how a 
successful migration biography should look like in order to be recognised as a 
refugee. For this reason, it is a common and more or less deliberate strategy to 
shape narrated asylum biographies in order to fit presumed categories that 
qualify the asylum seeker as in need of protection. At the same time, this need 
to shape one’s own migration biography according to the presumed categories 
imposed by the asylum apparatus contributes to the experience that the 
migration biography does no longer belong to the person. In short, many asylum 
seekers experience the asylum procedure as a form of alienation in the sense that 
one’s very own biography has to be subjected to the asylum procedure and 
shaped in a specific way.  
Narrating Migration Trajectories: Between Empowerment and Subjugation 
The particular experience of clandestine migrants and their need to narrate and 
justify their migration biography in front of the asylum bureaucracy again and 
again has a major impact on ethnographic research in this context. The 
omnipresent hermeneutics of suspicion as an everyday experience of many of my 
informants had two opposite effects on my own research, when I was talking 
with my informants about their migration trajectories and their experiences. 
Either I was confronted with a situation of mistrust and reluctance to share one’s 
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migration biography with a stranger. Given their experience made with the 
asylum bureaucracy, this is a highly understandable reaction. In such situations, 
trust building between the ethnographer and informants was a long, delicate, 
and often tedious endeavour. In certain cases, it failed completely: The narratives 
remained thin and superficial, when the interlocutors were willing to share their 
stories at all. In other cases, we managed to build an atmosphere of mutual 
understanding and trust that allowed informants to share intimate details of their 
migration biography, sometimes facts and experiences they even hide before their 
families.  
At least in the very beginning, I often experienced a general mistrust against 
formal interviews. “I am tired of these repeated interviews. I told my stories to 
different asylum officers so many times. It is no longer my story, and it is no longer 
my life”, an informant justified his refusal to share his migration biography with 
me. For many clandestine migrants, the formal interview is closely associated 
with the often humiliating experience of the encounter with the asylum 
bureaucracy as described above. For this reason, I rather used informal 
conversations and meetings in groups to avoid this highly problematic 
association.  
However, in other cases the past experience of the hermeneutics of suspicion in 
the context of the asylum bureaucracy resulted in precisely the opposite effect. 
In these cases, I was approached in a surprisingly open and direct way. I 
remember numerous situations when I barely knew an informant, and he already 
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started to share his migration experience with me. I often had the impression 
that sharing one’s own migration biography with a stranger (i.e. the 
ethnographer) had some kind of a therapeutic effect: It was the attempt to regain 
authority over one’s own migration biography after numerous asylum interviews 
in front of the asylum bureaucracy. The construction and narration of one’s 
migration biography becomes a strategic and deliberate act, where the narrator 
is in full control of the narrative again, after many humiliating experiences, where 
an asylum bureaucrat listen to your story only to detect any inconsistencies and 
contradictions. In the open setting of an unstructured biographical interview 
that resembles more an informal conversation than an interview, it is the 
interviewee who decides what to disclose and what to keep secret; a possibility 
he is denied during the asylum interview where he has to subjugate not the 
narrative and himself to the logics of the asylum bureaucracy. Considered by 
some interlocutors as an outsider, they saw it as a chance to tell their migration 
biography again and without the constraints imposed on them as in the formal 
interview situation during the asylum procedure.  
With these preliminary remarks on the ethics and politics of migration 
biographies of clandestine migrants, this chapter now gives voice to six Tunisians 
who tell their stories of departure and return, and share their experiences of 
crossing the transnational space of mobility between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean.   
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First Vignette: “You Are Completely Surrounded by the Sea” 
Fathi’s fishing boat laid in the bay, about hundred meters away from the beach.55 
His father’s house could be found just behind the shore. Fathi was living there 
since his birth with both of his parents, sisters, and brothers. We took off our 
shoes and socks, rolled up our trousers and stepped into the water. It was a sunny 
day in September 2015, the water still pretty warm. A thick algae slick covered 
the sandy ground and gave the impression of wading through mud. Fathi quickly 
checked his watch and warned us that we have to return to the beach in an hour: 
High tide is arriving soon.  
Wading through the water, Fathi explained that the actual fishing grounds were 
quite far away, beyond the Kerkennah islands, halfway to Lampedusa. “Seven 
hours … at least”, he estimated. As the captain and owner of the fishing boat, 
Fathi was responsible for finding the relevant spots with rich fishing grounds. 
He learnt the profession from scratch from his father, who was also a fisherman. 
Later, he accompanied his uncle and worked as a crew member under his 
supervision.  
 
55 I came in touch with Fathi through the local branch of the return migration office in 2014. Entering the 
field in this way structured the relationship between us. For him, I was associated with the return migration 
bureaucracy, and it took some time to establish a relationship of trust. As he was in a struggle with the 
local return migration officer over the financing of his return project, he was first reluctant to share many 
details of his migration trajectory with me. The relationship suddenly changed when he developed the idea 
that I could back his argumentation and strengthen his position in a dispute with the return migration 
officer.  
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Finally, we reached Fathi’s boat. He helped me to climb on the vessel. The boat 
was small, not more than four or five meters long as I estimated, with a simple 
open deck and without a cabin. On one side of the deck, nets in different sizes 
were piled up, on the other side there were different polystyrene boxes to sort 
the fish and prepare it for sale on land. Fathi lit a cigarette and explained me in 
detail how he refurbished the vessel.  
Initially, it was his uncle’s boat and he bought it with the return assistance 
provided by the IOM. For this purpose, the organisation granted him 15’000 
Swiss Francs. His uncle had retired from the fishery some years ago in 2011. At 
that time, he was already 64 years old and went to sea only occasionally. These 
occasional trips did not generate enough revenues to cover the expenses to pay 
the other crew members, taxes, the fuel, and the maintenance of the boat. 
Therefore, the uncle decided to give up his profession. Since then, Fathi’s uncle 
was living on his pension and the fishing boat laid on the beach for several years, 
unused and slowly decaying.  
When Fathi decided to buy the boat, a fresh coat of painting was overdue and 
the engine had to be replaced. “A boat has to be maintained. When you don’t 
use it, it dries out and you can no longer use it,” he explained. Throughout spring 
2014, Fathi was working on the boat for over a month with a colleague. Before 
painting, they sanded off the old coating and replaced some planks, as he 
explained to me in great detail. But Fathi’s whole pride was the new engine. “40 
chevaux!” (40 horsepower), he exclaimed and opened the hatch to show me the 
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brand-new engine, when we sat on the boat and talked about his recently found 
profession as a fisherman.  
It depends heavily on the weather conditions how many times Fathi could go to 
sea, he explained to me. The reason is simple. Costs for each journey are high 
and the revenues have to cover these costs. An exact calculation is needed: 
“As the captain, I have to make a very precise calculation. For 
each journey, I pay 50 Dinars for the fuel. Then there are two 
crew members. Each one is paid 20 Dinars. Then I pay ten 
percent of the revenues to the carrier who brings the fishes to the 
main port. On an average, I can sell the catch for about 250 
Dinars. At the end of the day, there are about 100 Dinars 
remaining. And then I have to calculate around 800 Dinars for 
fees and taxes, as well as for the maintenance of the vessel.” 
Fathi earned about 500 Dinars a month on the average, he estimated. This was 
much more than he earned before when he was working as an ordinary crew 
member on his uncle’s boat. “It was never more than 100 or 150 Dinars, …and 
less in bad months”, he remembered.  
Even though Fathi comes from a family of fishermen, it is more by chance that 
he is now a boat owner and goes to sea as a captain. In 2000, Fathi left Tunisia 
for the first time, shortly after he finished school at the age of 18. He was looking 
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for a job and knew other young men from Jebiniana, the village a bit in the 
North of Sfax where he grew up, who were living in Italy already.  
“In Jebiniana, there was never much work. There was the 
possibility for an ‚Initiation à la vie professionelle‘; a work 
experience paid by the state. You work for 15 days on a 
construction site and you earn 60 Dinars. You can figure out by 
yourself how much they pay per day; 4 Dinars! Therefore, I 
decided to join my friends who were working in Italy.” 
At that time, it was not very difficult to find an opportunity to leave Tunisia, as 
Fathi recalled. Departures from the region where he was living were facilitated 
by the geographical proximity to Lampedusa and by the abundant availability of 
no-longer used fishing vessels. The small-scale, family-based coast fishing 
industry – a former backbone of the local economy – was in decline since years. 
Fathi’s uncle was just one fisherman among many others who decided to 
abandon the fishing activity. While some boats were sold for their last one-way 
trip to Lampedusa as harraga boats, the boat of Fathi’s uncle remained unused 
on the beach – slowly decaying.  
Fathi left Tunisia by boat, as many others did in these days. He disembarked in 
Lampedusa and was transferred to Catania a few days later, the second largest 
city in Sicily and its economic centre.  
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For the majority of his travel companions, it was the first time they were on the 
open sea he remembered. Not so Fathi. As a fisherman, he was used to go to sea. 
Nonetheless, he experienced this passage completely different than an ordinary 
fishing expedition. “It was an exciting moment to see Lampedusa coming into view 
on the horizon”, he explained. “Like a dream comes true.”  
This exciting feeling of a departure into a new adventure did not last for a long 
time. Quickly, he became aware that it was hard to find a job. Without an 
extensive network in Sicily, it took him a long time to enter the local labour 
market, as he recalled. Throughout the year 2000, Fathi worked as a day labourer 
on different construction sites and in the agricultural sector, most of the time in 
the region around Catania.56 He did not remember how much he earned at that 
time, “All I know is that I was paid in Lira these days”, he explained. But it was 
enough to make some small savings.  
During our repeated conversations it was impossible to clarify the details and 
exact timing of his first return. He decided not to share these details with me. 
All I was able to know is that eventually Fathi went back to Jebiniana the year 
after. The return was eagerly awaited from the family:  
 
56 Bracciante is the common Italian term for day labourers in the agricultural industry. Fathi used the same 
tern.  
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“My father was very happy that I brought back some money. 
And I was very proud! But after my return, I realised that it 
was not easy in Jebiniana neither. And all in all, I was more or 
less at the same point than before.”  
Upon his return, Fathi began to work on his uncle’s fishing boat. It allowed him 
to generate a modest income, although it was unstable. Due to this precarious 
economic situation, he continued to live in the father’s house with the other 
brothers and sisters. The whole family, Fathi’s paternal grandparents included, 
was living on the incomes of Fathi’s father who worked as a fisherman too. In 
addition, there were the revenues of Fathi’s own income, and the meagre 
pensions of the grandparents. In short, it was enough to make a living, but not 
much more.  
Yet Fathi’s plans were more ambitious. He dreamed to live in Sfax or Tunis some 
days. This was impossible not only because of the higher living costs in the city, 
but also because he would have been cut off from the income of the extended 
family economy. In addition, Fathi admitted that he did not have any closer 
relatives living in Sfax or even Tunis who would have been able to support him 
for a first period. Therefore he concluded:  
“I did not have a choice. I was somewhat stuck in Jebiniana. 
To be precise, we do not even live in Jebiniana, but quite far 
away at the sea. My only possibility was to continue living and 
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working here, and to hope for a better future. This is not much, 
you see?” 
Three years later, Fathi made another attempt to find a job in Italy. The 
procedure was quite the same as when he left Tunisia for the first time. As he 
told me, he knew most of the other harragas on the boat. It was a group of around 
25 young Tunisians. This time, Fathi decided to try his luck elsewhere than in 
Sicily. He travelled northward to Parma straight away, where a distant cousin 
was living for years already. Before the departure, Fathi was already in contact 
with him and the cousin promised him a job in the same company.  
But the start in Parma turned out to be tough. The company where his cousin 
was working did not have any job vacancies at that moment. Therefore, Fathi 
tried to find work on construction sites. But it turned out that it was a difficult 
endeavour due to the lack of contacts to persons working in this specific industry 
– at least in the beginning. According to Fathi, there were virtually no Tunisians 
working on construction sites around Parma. All of his compatriots were 
working in the logistics, and at that time there was simply no need for additional 
workers in this industry. With his cousin, he shared a small one-piece apartment. 
In the first weeks, Fathi’s cousin also provided him with some money. It took 
Fathi more than two month to find a job for more than just a few days. His 
cousin heard the rumour that the company was possibly hiring labourers in 
another division. He organised the contact to the shift leader who was himself a 
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Tunisian. Eventually, the shift leader agreed to hire him, although he did not 
want to give Fathi a proper contract and hire him only on a daily basis.  
“I’ve never worked in a real company. It was completely new to 
me. I had to load and unload the lorries. It was a hard work, 
and you never have time to relax for a minute. You run the 
whole day. But it was ok. In my shift, there were three other 
Tunisian. All of us were working there without any labour 
contract. The only exception was the shift leader, who had a 
proper contract. But as the shift leader was a fellow citizen, I 
trusted him. We were paid at the end of the week and per 
hour.”  
Fathi continued to live in his cousin’s apartment. His salary did not allow him 
to rent his own. Despite these economic constraints, he considered that time as 
a successful period of his migration trajectory in retrospective. He had a regular 
income and there were only few days a month when he showed up at the factory 
gate and there was no job for him. He stayed in Parma for more than two years 
until 2006.  
From time to time, he sent some money back to his family. In the meantime, his 
younger brother enrolled for a technical college in Sfax. Therefore, the money 
Fathi sent to the family was highly welcomed and badly needed.  
 154 
Fathi’s cousin was in possession of a so-called permesso IVA. This is a residence 
permit for independent workers.57 A year after his arrival in Parma in 2005, Fathi 
tried to obtain the same residence permit too: “I thought that this would give me 
some security and freedom. But it eventually turned out that it was impossible to get 
a permesso in Parma at that time”, he explained. Despite the lack of a regular 
residence status or a work permit, he remembered that in case of a police control, 
it was sufficient to show his Tunisian passport and no further questions were 
asked by the authorities at that time.  
This light-hearted time in retrospect came to an abrupt end towards the end of 
2006, when Fathi lost his job. The shift leader who hired him quitted his job 
and the company had to save costs and reduced its workforce. Fathi’s group was 
dissolved and he and his colleagues lost their jobs.  
“I knew immediately that this was a moment where I had to 
take a difficult decision. I knew that it would become harder to 
find a job. Many of my fellow citizens had already left Parma 
at that time. Some of them travelled northwards towards 
Germany. But to be honest, I didn’t have the slightest wish to 
continue the journey northwards with very insecure perspectives. 
Therefore, I decided to return for the second time.” 
 
57 With respect to the residence permit for independent workers in Italy, see also Tuckett (2015). 
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Once again, Fathi considered it as a very good choice in retrospective. Upon his 
arrival in his hometown and on short notice, he found a job in a company that 
distributed fertilizers in the region of Sfax. He assumed that it would have been 
much more complicated to find a job two years later in 2008, when the economic 
crisis hit Italy with full force and many more Tunisians from the region who 
were working in Italy lost their jobs and came back. In addition to this job, Fathi 
continued to work on his uncle’s fishing boat on an occasional basis.  
Things changed again in early 2011. During the Tunisian uprising in 2010/2011 
Fathi lost his job again. The company went bankrupt, salaries remained unpaid. 
His former boss would still owe him one monthly salary, as Fathi used to 
highlight every time we met and our conversation revolved around the protests 
in late 2010 and early 2011. Nonetheless, he remembered these days of turmoil 
during the uprising with excitement:  
“But don’t forget, it was an exciting time! All the sudden, the 
subtle pressure and surveillance you previously felt all the time 
was gone away. And around Jebiniana there were so many 
departures of boats towards Italy. In the night, you could see the 
small lights on the sea. All these lights were harraga boats! And 
many fishermen sold their boat to make some money. My idea 
was to try it once again.” 
Eventually, he left Jebiniana again in the late summer 2011. Fathi travelled more 
or less straight away to Parma, where his cousin was still living. However, 
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compared to his former stay in Parma, Fathi was confronted with a very different 
economic situation and found work only occasionally and on a daily basis. This 
made his situation much more precarious, as he explained. It was virtually 
impossible for him to save any money, and he remembered the subtle pressures 
from his family who asked him time and again when they could expect the next 
transfer of money. Nonetheless, he decided to remain in Parma for the moment. 
Sometimes he received some money from his cousin:  
“Often I met with other Tunisians in Parma who faced the 
same difficulties. There were a lot of rumours. Some claimed 
that it would be much easier in France to find any work. But I 
was not convinced and remained in Parma.” 
In summer 2012 – almost a year later – a new rumour spread in the community 
of undocumented Tunisians in Parma. Some had heard that Switzerland 
distributed money among Tunisians who would accept a return to their country 
of origin. Together with two friends, Fathi decided to give it a try. He had never 
applied for asylum in Italy, and the Italian authorities had never registered him. 
Therefore, the risk was predictable. He applied for asylum in Chiasso, 
Switzerland’s border town to Italy. Shortly afterwards, he was transferred to 
Altstätten, where he stayed for a couple of months. Already at his first interview 
with an official in Chiasso, he declared his intention to return, as Fathi told me. 
However, it turned out that it was not so easy to access the program as the 
rumours told. Fathi had imagined he would receive the money immediately and 
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in cash upon his return. This was at least the way how the programme for assisted 
return was presented in the rumours among the community of Tunisian harragas 
in Parma. However, from the return migration counsellor Fathi learnt that he 
would receive only a small amount in cash at the airport. In order to obtain the 
full amount, he would have to apply for a return project:  
“For me, the major problem was that they did not distribute 
money. It is very complicated, and I had to figure out how to 
solve this problem. The solution was a community project with 
my uncle and a neighbour.” 
Community projects were joint projects that included the return migrant as the 
applicant and further community members. Fathi’s plan was to buy his uncle’s 
fishing boat. This would allow him to keep the money to a great extent in the 
extended family, despite the official rule that return assistance is not granted in 
cash. He eventually returned to Tunisia towards the end of 2013, yet it took him 
another half a year until he was able to buy the boat.  
He experienced these extended periods of waiting as rather frustrating: There 
was much paperwork to do in order to get the project approved. And some of 
the papers – in particular the certificat professional and a certificate for the vessel 
approval – were only available against payment of bribe, as Fathi disclosed to me 
once. In short, the long waiting periods were not only frustrating, but 
characterised by uncertainty and significant pre-investments without a guarantee 
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that it will ever pay off. For these pre-investments, Fathi borrowed some money 
from his cousin in Parma, who in turn expected a quick repayment.  
Considered as a whole, the story of Fathi shows that the harraga is a mundane 
practice of mobility and not a one-time and life-changing decision. He took the 
decision to escape the country rather light-hearted and without weighing all the 
advantages and disadvantages. In the same vein, the decision to return back to 
Jebiniana was a very pragmatic deliberation. Certainly, as a fisherman his 
situation was particular. He was used to go to sea. Therefore, being on board of 
a fishing boat was not a new experience for him. It is a scenery and a socio-
economic milieu he knew very well. More broadly speaking, it was no 
coincidence that the region around Jebiniana was notorious for its high number 
of departures during the 2010/2011 uprising. Pre-existing networks, the 
expertise of going to sea, and the material resources in the form of fishing boats 
no longer in use made the costs of organising one’s harraga predictable. Being 
himself part of this socio-economic environment, Fathi knew the relevant 
persons who ran the harraga business.  
Fathi’s migration biography shows that the harraga was only one option among 
others to improve his precarious economic situation. As a fisherman employed 
on a daily basis, he was not able to generate a sufficient and stable income in the 
long run. Therefore, he sought to improve his economic situation in different 
ways. Working in a different industry than the fishery was one strategy; think of 
his time in the company that sold and distributed fertilizer in the region. Viewed 
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in this context, the harraga was just a further option. Fathi’s deliberation was 
simple. With regard to the expected expenditures of his harraga venture, he 
expected a favourable return-on-investment to employ an economistic language. 
He had clear expectations about a potential future as a temporal labour migrant 
in Europe. In order to meet his socio-economic aspirations of building a house, 
marrying, and raising a family, he first needed a sufficient economic basis. And 
this economic basis was neither provided by his meagre income as an employed 
fisherman on his uncle’s boat, nor was there a serious chance for a secure job in 
another industry or in the local administration. Without personal connections 
into the local administration and without being a RCD party member, it was 
virtually impossible to get a position there.58  
There is further important aspect that makes his harraga a rather mundane 
practice of mobility. The small-scale fishing industry had been in decline for 
many years. This meant that unused vessels were abundantly available – as well 
as boat owners, more than willing to sell their vessels for good money in order 
to cease their economic activity that did not generate enough revenues for a long 
time (see Mabrouk 2010): The generation of Fathi’s father and uncle retired and 
gradually abandoned the fishing industry, while the younger generation was 
 
58 See also Hibou (2006) on this aspect. 
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reluctant to take the business over, as they were well aware of the dire prospects 
of this industry.  
Even though he was used to going to sea, Fathi was talking about the harraga 
experience in terms of an adventure, when describing the crossing of the 
Mediterranean. Despite his routine and his extensive knowledge and experience 
as a seafarer, the harraga remained something exceptional. He framed his 
crossing of the Mediterranean almost in the language and symbols of a “rite de 
passage” (van Gennep 2005): The temporary escape from ordinary life in the 
form of the harraga led towards new adventures yet unknown. The rigid socio-
economic structures of Tunisian society did not offer him the prospective of 
(upward) social mobility and the harraga was the attempted escape. However, 
Fathi did not break with his past, but maintained close contact with his family, 
friends, and relatives. Furthermore, he always felt a strong commitment to 
contribute to the family income – in particular supporting his brother who was 
studying in Sfax. Eventually, Fathi’s harraga was much less a genuine escape than 
imagined in the first place, and his socio-economic aspirations clearly did not 
fulfil – even if he was now the proud owner of a refurbished fishing boat with a 
brand-new engine.  
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Second Vignette: “I Decided to Join Some of My Friends and Continue 
with Them” 
Amine was living on a small farm with his parents, not far from the sea. It was 
easy to miss the small road leading to his house. It was one of the innumerable 
dusty paths leading away from the recently paved main road connecting the 
village of el-Amra to the sea. The path led to a field with three greenhouses. 
Here, Amine was growing green and red peppers, as well as zucchini for the local 
market. The plot was approximately 50 meters long and 30 meters wide. On the 
plot, three brand new greenhouses built with sturdy metal arches, covered by 
transparent plastic sheets. In contrast to the many other greenhouses you could 
discover from the main road when travelling through the region, the plastic 
sheets of Amine’s greenhouses were in perfect condition. Today, Amine 
uncovered the sides, as the weather was fine and there was no need to protect the 
plants from the cold, although it was already in the early autumn. The ground 
was covered with a labyrinth of small black tubes; the irrigation system for the 
dry season as he would explain to me later. Proud of his greenhouses, Amine 
explained every detail of the irrigation system and how it helped increasing the 
harvest. Walking through his fields, he explained to me:  
“Whenever possible, I prefer to grow peppers. You can sell them 
at a higher price on the local markets than zucchini or 
eggplants. But it is also riskier. Sometimes, the peppers do not 
grow well, and then you lose almost half of the harvest. 
Throughout a year, I can harvest three, maybe four times… 
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And when one harvest fails, then it becomes really, really 
tough…”59 
The three greenhouses are the result of Amine’s migration trajectory between 
Tunisia, Italy, and Switzerland.  
He narrated his journey as follows: When Amine decided to leave Tunisia in 
April 2011, he did not plan anything much in advance. It was rather by chance 
that he joined a group of other harragas from the region. From the group he 
eventually joined, he knew one guy from school. According to Amine, the group 
organised the transit to Lampedusa more or less on their own.60 The boat was 
bought from a fisherman through an intermediary who was paid for this service 
by the group. Amine joined the group at the last minute. He took over the place 
from another person, who was unable to leave with the others – for a reason 
Amine was not able or willing to tell me. Anyway, he remained vague and 
imprecise with some details on the organisation and departure of this crossing. 
This is a pity, as it is highly unusual that a group of harragas organise their 
crossing on their own and I would have liked to know more about it.  
When the group set sail towards Lampedusa, it was the high time of Tunisian 
harraga in the aftermath of the uprising against the authoritarian Ben Ali regime. 
 
59 All direct quotes I use in this part are from a formal interview I conducted with him in September 2014.  
60 This is rather untypical and I was not able to verify this information; so the circumstance of his departure 
rely solely on Amine’s own narration.  
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Each night, several boats took off somewhere from the coast north of Sousse. 
The coast guard or the usual police controls in the hinterland were virtually 
absent. As a local told me once, it was a time where you could spot several tiny 
lights dancing on the water each night; the lights from the departing harraga 
boats. Apparently, there was no need to hide their departure.  
After Amine’s arrival on Lampedusa, he was immediately transferred to a 
reception centre on Sicily, together with the other members of the group. He 
described this moment as follows:  
“We remained only for two nights in the centre. It was 
overcrowded and everybody had some plans how to continue. 
After the crossing of the Mediterranean and realising that you 
reached Europe, it was a feeling of great excitement. Imagine, 
you really made it to Europe! I mean… you dream for years of 
leaving Tunisia, and then… one day… it becomes true. In this 
mood, you don’t care any longer about a reception centre 
somewhere in the hinterland of Sicily. Then you just want to 
move on: Rome, Milan, maybe Paris. But in contrast to most of 
the others, I did not have any pre-established contacts, neither 
in Italy nor in France. Look, I just have no family members 
who are living abroad. This makes it tough. Therefore, I 
decided to join some of my friends with whom I made the 
crossing.” 
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The group travelled northwards, most of the time by train or in buses, as Amine 
disclosed. Their initial plan was to go to France via Ventimiglia. But at that time, 
the French border was closed, and it was not easy to find a way to circumvent 
the border control at the French-Italian border. After a couple of days at the 
French border and some unsuccessful attempts to cross it – Amine remained 
rather superficial with regard to this period in his accounts – he travelled to 
Milan with two other Tunisians. They have heard of an abandoned factory in 
the outskirts of the city and decided to try their luck there: 
“Thanks God it was summer! The factory was nothing more 
than a humble shelter; a roof that protects you from the rain, 
and that’s it. It was really in the no man’s land somewhere on 
the outskirts of Milan. I was depressed, and I did not really 
have an idea how to move on. Overall, it was a desperate 
situation: I thought that I could find a job somewhere. But 
without any connection; no way… You really get mad, when 
you are thinking the whole day how to get a job, or how to 
move on.” 
This experience pushed Amine to rethink his plans. He did not have an idea how 
to continue his journey and even began to think about a possible return. 
However, without any money put aside, it was impossible to plan the next move. 
Finally, he got to know another Tunisian who owned a small phone shop in 
Milan. The guy had been living in Milan for years. It was one of the meeting 
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points of clandestine Tunisian migrants in Milan to exchange information or 
simply calling the family back home, reassuring them that everything was going 
well. In Amine’s explanations, the phone shop owner appeared to be a kind of a 
broker for clandestine Tunisian migrants in Milan. He brought Amine into 
contact with the owner of a small transport company – another fellow citizen – 
and Amine was hired on a daily basis to load and unload trucks. He earned a 
couple of Euros a day, enough to cover the daily expenses, but not enough to 
save anything for the future; no matter if the next move would be a return back 
home or a step forward in his migration trajectory within Europe. He was never 
talking much about his work with me. He only mentioned a few incidents. But 
these stories were enough to give the impression of a job with high risks and little 
protection:  
“Well, it was not the police I feared the most because I did not 
have any work permit, when I did this job. It was simply 
dangerous work… Once we were dismantling an old metal roof 
with corrugated sheet iron. I climbed on the construction in 
order to remove the screws. It was maybe three to four meters 
above the ground, and I was not secured at all. Suddenly, I 
slipped, and it was pure luck that I did not fall down. But I 
was injured at my left arm where I suffered a deep cut. This 
injury kept me away from work for at least three weeks. Look… 
[and he rolled up his sleeve to show me his bare arm; D.L.] 
Here, you can still see the scar.” 
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This incident made Amine think about his future more than ever before. He did 
not want to continue the same job for a long time. And he became aware that 
the prospective of getting a better job in Italy were not good either. In addition, 
Amine explained that the situation in the occupied factory began to deteriorate 
with the arrival of another group of clandestine Tunisians. Tensions between 
several inhabitants of the factory rose and one evening, Amine himself was 
involved in a brawl. An always calm, rather timid, and slender young man in his 
early twenties; I could barely imagine him as an aggressor. He himself was 
appalled by the general rather hostile atmosphere and decided to move on. 
Again, it was the phone shop owner who helped him:  
“He [the phone shop owner] explained me how to get to Chiasso 
by train, and he gave me the address of his friend who lives 
nearby. I thought it was worth a try. But the first attempt 
failed. I was caught by the Swiss border guard in the train and 
sent back immediately. I tried it a second time in the same night 
with the same outcome. Maybe, I was just a bit too naïve. After 
this experience, I decided to return to the factory for a moment, 
despite all the problems.” 
A couple of weeks later, Amine risked a further attempt to cross the border and 
reach Switzerland. His account of the exact circumstances remained vague. 
Eventually, he succeeded and immediately applied for asylum in Switzerland 
once he reached the reception centre in Chiasso. He also called the contact he 
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had received from the Tunisian phone shop keeper, yet it turned out that this 
was a dead end. While Amine preferred to stay in Switzerland, the contact urged 
him to continue his journey to Germany straight away.  
Now more or less on his own, Amine contacted several of his colleagues with 
whom he escaped from Tunisia as harragas via Facebook. And from time to time, 
he called his family in Tunisia to reassure them. These were the only remaining 
contacts for him in this situation.  
“When they [my family, D.L.] heard about my situation, 
especially my mother urged me to return back home. At the 
same time, I knew that my family expected that I send them 
money back home. Not an easy situation, as you can see…” 
A month after having submitted his asylum application, Amine still had not 
received any news regarding his pending application. However, he was realistic 
enough and his expectations were low, as he knew that there was virtually no 
chance for a positive decision for Tunisian asylum seekers in Switzerland. In the 
asylum application, he argued that his father was an RCD party member and 
therefore feared the prosecution of the police now, though he was very well aware 
that this reason would not qualify him for asylum in Switzerland. “Look, my 
only intention was to have some rest for a couple of weeks, and to think about 
my future”, he explained to me. Without an established pre-existing network in 
Europe, it was difficult to continue in any ways. He felt isolated and lacked the 
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necessary economic resources, as well as the social capital to successfully continue 
his migration trajectory.  
When he heard about the return migration programme for Tunisian asylum 
seekers a bit later at an information event in the reception centre, he made his 
mind immediately; a return home as soon as possible, and with the aid provided 
by the AVR programme he imagined starting a business as a vegetable grower. 
For this plan, he could rely on his father’s land, and with the AVR assistance, he 
would be able to buy some greenhouses and an irrigation system to increase the 
productivity.  
However, becoming a vegetable grower was not exactly what he imagined when 
he left Tunisia a couple of months earlier. To the contrary, “for me it was even 
a reason to leave Tunisia. To be honest, I did not want to end as a farmer as my 
father did. But it is ok now,” he explained to me. The way he explained his 
decision to return back home expressed the pragmatic nature of his choice: The 
realisation of a return migration project was a way to avoid returning home with 
empty hands, as he was not able to save some money during his stay in Italy and 
Switzerland.  
Amine did not disclose many details about his return. To a large extend, it 
remained a black box for me. Here and there he mentioned some episodes and 
complained how lengthy the realisation of the return migration project was. But 
these were rather scarce and hidden remarks. He also did not want to talk 
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extensively on the relationship with the return migration bureaucrats, although 
I once asked him openly regarding this topic, as I gained the impression of a 
rather complicated relationship with a lot of mistrust from both sides.61  
In contrast to these often vague remarks on his trajectory between Tunisia, Italy, 
and Switzerland, he talked extensively what returning back home to his father’s 
land meant to him. On the one hand, he considered his return as a failure. He 
ended as a farmer like his father (to use Amine’s own words); something he 
wanted to avoid at any price when he escaped Tunisia in 2011. On the other 
hand, he never planned to stay abroad for a very long time. As a rather 
spontaneous decision and the fact that he just seized the moment, his migration 
trajectory is arguably prototypical for the kind of transnational mobility of young 
male Tunisians at that time. The fall of the Ben Ali regime was a unique chance 
to try one’s luck abroad. The way Amine was reflecting his own migration 
trajectory supports such an interpretation. Especially with respect to his time in 
Italy, Amine referred to it as if it was an adventure where he tried to build a 
future with a lot of imagined possibilities, yet few real options. At the same time, 
it is striking to see how his memories of the time in Italy differed from the time 
in Switzerland. Caught in Switzerland’s asylum bureaucracy and with no real 
change to escape it, he complained many times during our different 
 
61 I also interviewed the local return migration official responsible for Amine’s project. The impression I got 
was that he did not really trusted him, although it remained my gut feeling, and I was unable to substantiate 
my vague impression with any direct observations.  
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conversations that “there were just so many rules and restrictions imposed upon 
me.” As a consequence, the topic of freedom – or rather the lack thereof – was 
some kind of a leitmotiv when he described the asylum procedure and the 
assisted voluntary return.   
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Third Vignette: “With 3’000 Dinars, I’m Off… to Europe” 
I first met Yassine (24) when I went to a café one evening in my neighbourhood 
to watch a football match.62 Barcelona was playing the AC Milan in the group 
stage of the Champions League. I went there on my own, sat down on a shaky 
white plastic chair, and ordered a mint tea and a Shisha. Yassine was one of 
several waiters in the cafe. He took my order and returned a couple of minutes 
later with the tea and the Shisha. There were only few other customers in the 
café, and he had not much work to do. So, he grabbed a chair and sat down near 
me and started to talk. Tired from an exhausting day, I was not in the mood to 
engage in a proper conversation and remained short in my answers. But he 
insisted and there were no other customers who would have saved me with their 
orders from a lengthy conversation. I realised that I would have no other choice 
than joining in. We first exchanged some observations about the match and the 
performance of one of Barcelona’s midfielders who was especially bad this day. 
Our conversation meandered here and there – until all the sudden and rather 
unexpected for me, Yassine changed the topic and started to talk about his work 
as a waiter. He told me how much he hated this low paid job, but that it was 
also almost impossible for find another job in Tunis. “With 3’000 Dinars, I’m 
off… to Europe,” he concluded. I was taken by surprise by this unexpected 
statement, but it caught my attention and I asked him if he would agree to tell 
 
62 The first meeting with Yassine dates back to November 2013. From that moment, we met regularly until 
my departure in May 2014. When I returned back to Tunisia in September 2014, I met Yassine again for a 
final interview. 
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me more about his biography. In the following weeks, I paid several visits in the 
café and we met several times; sometimes just to hang out, but very often, our 
conversations revolved around his dreams to leave Tunisia.  
Yassine was born in Sbeitla, a small town near Kasserine; the town that became 
one of the hotspots of the protests against Ben Ali in the first phase of the 
uprising in the last days of the year 2010. His father possessed a tiny plot of land, 
where the family raised cattle and grew vegetables. In order to improve the family 
income, Yassine’s father worked on a daily basis as an unskilled worker on 
different road construction sites in the gouvernorat Kasserine. Yassine had two 
sisters and two brothers. After graduating from the lycée in Sbeitla, Yassine was 
19 years old and decided to move to Tunis, where his elder sister was already 
enrolled in the faculty of medicine.63 She lived with her aunt who moved to the 
capital several years ago. Yassine joined them and lived with them in the same 
house in the run-down neighbourhood of Jebel al-Ahmar (the Red Hill) not far 
away from the city centre. He explained how his sister was able to go to university 
as follows:  
“In contrast to my sister, I didn’t join the university. Well, you 
know, she is so smart; always on top of her class. Therefore, she 
was able to study… In contrast to her, I didn’t receive a bourse 
 
63 Even today, it is quite exceptional that a woman with a working-class background, in addition from the 
rural parts of Tunisia, studies medicine.  
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d’étude (scholarship). But even with a bourse, it is not easy. A 
bourse is about 800 Dinar… per year! Therefore, I decided to 
look for a job rather than studying at the university.” 
In the first time, Yassine gave his uncle a hand, who worked as a subcontractor 
for a recycling company and collected scrap metal in the neighbourhood. But he 
considered this occupation “not really a job. I did not earn anything.” Rather it 
was a compensation for the accommodation he was given by his aunt’s family. 
During his free time, he was hanging around in the cafés in the neighbourhood.  
“Well, I sometimes spent the whole morning in the café… just 
one glass of tea and maybe two cigarettes. This was my strategy 
to survive. Sometimes, one of the chibanis gave me another 
cigarette.64 But I didn’t have the means to spend more money… 
You know, from time to time, there was the possibility to get a 
job for a couple of days. Then I helped on a construction site, 
hauling cement bags and bricks for example. I knew that the 
bosses were looking here for labourers. Therefore, I was quite 
early in the café.” 
But the income remained meagre. The wages from this casual labour did not 
make a living. Yassine once mentioned the sum of 10 to 15 Tunisian Dinars per 
day. His situation was precarious, not only because of the poorly paid job. It was 
 
64 Chibanis is a colloquial and slightly pejorative term for older, retired men.  
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also unpredictable whether there would be any work at all the next day – and 
therefore also any income. In short, this was Yassine’s situation before the 
2010/2011 uprising. However, after the crumbling of the Ben Ali regime and 
the looming economic crisis, it became even harder to find a jobs, as he admitted.  
“For the first time, I was thinking about the harraga at that 
time. It was my cousin who proposed it to me first.65 He told me 
that his brother was living in Northern Italy and he would help 
us. But I didn’t have enough money. 3’000 Dinars… at least… 
was required. It was a time when many others from the 
neighbourhood tried the harraga. I kept contact to some of them 
through Facebook.” 
While he knew of a couple of friends and acquaintances who had left the 
neighbourhood and tried their luck, Yassine decided to stay in Jebel al-Ahmar 
for the moment and the harraga remained a dream. It was in the beginning of 
2012 when he finally found a more or less stable job in a café in La Marsa. 
Although La Marsa is the posh suburb where Tunis’s upper middle class and 
large parts of the international expat community is living, his café was a rather 
modest place, not far from the terminal station of the so-called TGM, the 
 
65 It was not entirely clear, whether he referred to a cousin in the proper sense of the term, i.e. a son of the 
siblings of his father or mother. Often, the term cousin is used to designate further rather distant relative of 
the same age group.  
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suburban railway that links La Marsa to Tunis through La Goulette. He 
summarised his situation as follows:  
“Look, the situation is better now, but still it is not quite what I 
have been looking for… You have to know, I now earn 20 
Dinars a day. My shift begins at noon and ends in the evening 
around ten. When there is a football match on TV, the evening 
shift ends even later, as you know… And 20 Dinars for a whole 
day of work… It’s definitively not that much.” 
All in all, Yassine was usually working around fifteen days a month, for which 
he earned between 200 and 300 Tunisian Dinars in total. When there was some 
money left at the end of the month, he sent part of it to his father and saved the 
rest for himself. “I save for the harraga!” he laughed, and it was not clear whether 
it was a joke or not. Probably, it was both. In addition to his job in the café, he 
sometimes gave a hand at the Bouselsa market where a friend of him was working 
at a so-called fripe stand, selling second hand clothes. Another statements shows 
how he continued to think about an escape from Tunisia:  
“You know, the harraga is always in my mind. Give me 2’000, 
3’000 Dinars … and I’m off! What can I do here in Tunisia? 
Yes I know… I have a job. I have my friends here… But I do 
not only want to make a decent living abroad. This is not the 
only point. I don’t want to stay my entire life here in this damn 
café, preparing shishas and mint tea all day long. I want to 
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travel, to see the European cities, to meet my friends who are 
over there. This is just an ordinary desire, isn’t it? But the first 
step is to rent a room on my own.” 
However, for Yassine the harraga did not remain a pure imagination of a better 
future. In spring 2013, he finally made a half-hearted and ill-prepared attempt 
with three other friends of the neighbourhood. They made an advance payment 
to someone who was presented to them as a facilitator. But the promised contact 
in the region of Nabeul was a dead end. So, they decided to try it on their own, 
as they feared losing the advance payment, yet they made it only to Grombalia, 
where the national guard took them up, as Yassine recalled.  
His experience overlaps with the general security situation in 2013 that changed 
entirely compared to the months after the fall of the Ben Ali regime. In 2013 the 
security apparatus was already fully operational again, and it was too late for 
attempts to leave the country clandestinely by boat – at least in the northern 
parts of Tunisia and without the help of facilitators. Yassine spent a couple of 
days in prison, before he was released. After this half-hearted attempt, Yassine 
returned to his job in the cafe. “I didn’t have the courage to tell my boss that I 
tried the harraga”, he explained. “He wouldn’t be very happy to hear about it.” 
Yassine continued his ordinary life between his job in La Marsa and his aunt’s 
house. He supported his family with his small income, especially his sister who 
was studying medicine.  
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He made a second attempt of escaping Tunisia a few months later. In October 
2013, Yassine applied for a visa in France. But again, the whole endeavour was 
ill-prepared. Yassine’s idea was to apply for a study visa in France. “I thought 
about business administration or so”, he explained. After he showed up at the 
embassy for the first time, he became aware that there was virtually no possibility 
of obtaining a visa for France for young men like him: 
“You have to imagine… In order to apply for a visa, you have 
to fulfil so many criteria. Without a guaranteed place at a 
university – just forget it. Then you have to proof that you’ll 
have enough money to make a living in France – just impossible 
for me… But my point is anyway not to study in France. My 
motivation is just to leave Tunisia. I don’t know if you can 
imagine… but I live in the same house with my aunt and her 
husband. My sister lives there too. I am fed up with all this 
family stuff. You can’t breathe.” 
After this second “half-attempt” of leaving Tunisia, Yassine abandoned his 
concrete migration plans at all. At least for the moment, he did not see any way 
to change his situation. He admitted that he was always thinking about the 
harraga but did not undertake further concrete steps to realise it.  
In our discussions, Yassine often compared his life trajectory with his boss’s 
biography: In the 1960ies, at the age of 17, he emigrated to France in order to 
work in the construction sector in the suburbs of Lyon. He spent almost ten 
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years in France, as he explained when the three of us met once. When he lost his 
job in the end of the 70ies, he decided to return to Tunisia. With the savings he 
made from his job in France, it was possible to buy a house and open the café 
where Yassine was working now. In contrast to his boss who had the possibility 
of working abroad for a certain time in Europe even as an unskilled labourer in 
the 1960s, Yassine’s own generation does no longer have this opportunity, as he 
explained:  
“Show me one single young man of my age who is able to save 
any money; it is impossible here in Tunisia! Either you come 
from an important family, or you make your money abroad. 
And this is no longer possible. But I swear you, I won’t give up. 
And I will make it to Europe one day!” 
In Yassine’s biography, the harraga is much more imagination than real practice. 
Stuck between low paid and unstable jobs on the one hand, and with no 
prospects for a better future on the other hand, the harraga becomes a vanishing 
point that bundles wishes, imaginations, and desires. This is further fuelled by 
his colleagues’ experiences abroad, with whom he remained in contact via social 
media on a regular basis. Migration is not a distant phantasy, but a concrete 
practice in Yassine’s social environment, despite the fact that in his close and 
extended family, there is no one with any experience of transnational mobility 
and labour migration. This lack of a transnational social networks is probably 
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one of the major reasons that Yassine’s harraga attempts appear as half-hearted 
to outsiders. He acted naïvely and got cheated repeatedly.  
As a substitute, Yassine cultivated the harraga as an imagination with his friends 
and colleagues. When they met in the cafés, they often used to exchange stories 
of acquaintances who were living in Italy, France, or Germany. In particular 
through these colleagues, Yassine remained connected to this transnational social 
space of harragas to a certain extend. In this context, the term social space 
emphasises the loose connection between the individual harragas. Many of them 
do not know each other personally, but only via some other friends. It is the 
sharing of a common idea that connects the different individuals, rather than 
direct and personal interactions.   
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Fourth Vignette: “I Tried the Harraga at Least Twenty Times” 
Like his father, Kaïs was working as an unskilled day labourer for truck drivers, 
who distributed hay among the farmers in the whole North of Tunisia. It was a 
hard and physical work. You work from dusk till dawn, and it depended on the 
orders whether you are hired for the next day or not. Most of the time, Kaïs was 
working together with his friend. Both went to school only for a couple of years. 
His friend was de facto an illiterate. When Kaïs was talking about his work – 
whether it was with me alone or together with his friend – it was tangible how 
much he hated his job. “But I have no other choice,” he used to say.  
Usually, Kaïs and his friend knew only the day before if there was some work for 
the next day. The usual working day began very early in the morning. Around 
five o’clock the truck driver picked them up in M’hamdia, a working-class 
suburb of Tunis. Together with the driver, who was in general the owner of the 
truck, they would drive to the warehouse, where the hay was stored. They loaded 
the trucks, before they left and drove around the whole day, in order to sell the 
hay to the farmers. Sometimes, they loaded the truck in the evening before in 
order to start their itinerary earlier. The daily wage for these working days that 
last sometimes more than ten hours was as meagre as 5 Dinar.  
In his narratives, Kaïs often linked the descriptions of his daily work with 
descriptions how he tried to escape Tunisia since years; always without success:  
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“I tried the harraga at least twenty times. But I never managed 
to make it to the boat. Once, I was already on the beach, but 
then the police discovered us. Each time, you risk a couple of 
days in prison. But… it is worth a try.” 
M’hamdia, where Kaïs was living, is close to the capital, but nonetheless a world 
on its own – especially for the youth. Unemployment rates were high among the 
younger generation; and those who had a job, were usually working in the 
informal labour market. This signified unstable jobs, a low income, and no social 
protection, as Kaïs’s biography exemplarily illustrates: He went to school until 
the age of 14, before he began to work on the hay trucks. He had never a formal 
labour contract. Rather he would have to look for work every day at a specific 
place in the town where the hay trucks were passing by and the drivers were 
looking for labourers to hire them for this day. All in all, Kaïs was living a 
precarious live at the edge of society.  
The days without work were long and never-ending. Then, he used to meet with 
friends in the café, where they drank coffee and smoked cigarettes. To forget 
these days of inactivity, sometimes he would gather with his friends in the 
evening a bit outside of M’hamdia towards the ruins of the palace of the former 
ruler Ahmed I. On this hill with a perfect view over M’hamdia and Tunis, they 
would gather for drinking beer, laughing and joking, and listening to music. It 
was virtually the only place, where Kaïs felt unobserved; both from the state 
authorities and the (extended) family. When Kaïs was talking about the harraga, 
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it appeared as an imagined escape from this control and surveillance by the state 
and the family. As expressed in the quote above, he claimed having tried the 
harraga “more than twenty times.” It was a permanent topic in his conversations 
with me and with his friends alike.  
However, in contrast to Yassine, Kaïs’s numerous attempts to leave the country 
were more serious, and he tried it again and again over a long period. One of the 
first serious attempts was in 2008, as Kaïs remembered. He made it until Sfax, 
where he was stopped at a check point by the police. The checkpoints were 
omnipresent on the main roads between the major cities. At that time, this 
explicit display of state authority in the public was the immediate response to 
the 2007 incident, when a shoot-out occurred between security forces and 
alleged terrorists. It was then also common practice to intercept and return 
ordinary travellers as well, though there was no legal basis for this practice for 
police and national guard. In particular young males traveling in groups attracted 
the attention of the security forces for the two reasons as potential “terrorists” 
and potential harragas alike. Kaïs remembered how he was stopped at one of 
these check points and forced to return to M’hamdia. However, he was rather 
lucky, as he was neither arrested nor sentenced.  
Another incident happened a bit later, as Kaïs told me. His group was 
intercepted when they were already on the road to the beach in order to embark 
on a fishing boat. This time, he had less luck. He was arrested and imprisoned 
for fifteen days.  
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As much as Kaïs mentioned these and other incidents, he remained rather vague 
in his descriptions. On the one hand, I had the impression that it was important 
to him to testify these incidents. It was his way to tell his truth to the world. At 
the same time, he also felt embarrassed to talk about it, as every single attempt 
was a failure.  
As I learnt only later, his reluctance to talk more extensively about these incidents 
was probably also linked to the fact that he owed money to his cousin; money 
he borrowed from him in order to make advance payments to a facilitator for 
the organisation of the harraga. When I came to know Kaïs, he was thus in a 
delicate situation. He was indebted and his cousin urged him to pay back the 
borrowed amount of money in the near future. At the same time, he was very 
well aware that with his job as a day labourer on the hay truck, he would never 
be able to pay back the debt in the foreseeable future. He was very realistic that 
the harraga would remain and imagined project, yet he stuck firmly to the idea 
that one day or another he will “escape all that shit”, as he used to expresses it.  
In contrast to other cases – for example the fisherman Fathi we encountered in 
the first vignette – Kaïs did not see the harraga as an adventure, rather it was a 
mix between the expectation to improve his economic condition and simply to 
escape the weight of the double control from state and family. The gatherings 
on the hill overlooking M’hamdia can be read as a substitute for the “real escape” 
in the form of the harraga; gathering with friends and drinking alcohol away 
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from the eyes of state and family was thus an explicit and conscious breach of 
social norms.  
An interesting detail in Kaïs’s migration biography are his encounters with state 
authorities in the form of border guards and the police.66 He was stopped at 
checkpoints and he spent time in Tunisian prisons without even having crossed 
the border. His biography thus shows how the European border regime is 
externalised and how Tunisian legislation – through the law that prohibits the 
“illegal departure” as it stipulates – and state authorities who monitor and 
control the access to the notorious points of departure along the Tunisian shores.   
 
66 As Kaïs was relating himself so much to the community of harragas, I suggest considering his biography 
also as a migration biography, although it consists of failed attempts and imagined escapes only.  
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Fifth Vignette: “Forget It, I Will Never Go Back” 
With the next vignette of Foued’s migration trajectory, we change sides and 
travel from Tunisia to Switzerland, where he got stuck. In his narrative, he 
explained why he refused to return back to Tunisia and why he decided to 
remain in Switzerland, despite the difficult circumstances.  
Foued arrived in Switzerland at a time when the number of Tunisian asylum 
seekers in Switzerland was at its peak. In April 2011 he applied for asylum and 
was living in Switzerland since then. Foued told me that he even did not attend 
the outcome of the asylum procedure after having filed his case. After a couple 
of weeks in the reception centre in Chiasso, Foued decided to leave the centre 
and moved to a relative who was living near Biel, a small town close to 
Switzerland’s capital city Bern.67  
“Forget it, I will never go back!” This was Foued’s comment when I first met him 
and we were talking about his experience with the return assistance programme. 
Before his time in Switzerland, Foued was living in Italy with a so-called permesso 
IVA for independent labour between 2009 and 2011. This type of residence 
permit can be granted to persons who are planning to work independently in 
Italy. It was a well-known migration strategy among Tunisians at that time.68 
 
67 The reception centres in Switzerland are open and it is possible to leave them without any control.  
68 In her work on an advisory centre in Northern Italy, Tuckett (2015) mentions the permesso IVA as a 
popular migration strategy for North African migrants to obtain a regular status for a certain period. See 
also the first migration biography of Fathi. 
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He was not the only informant I met who used this type of residence permit as 
an entry point to Italy. Depending on the local administration, it was quite easy 
to obtain this residence permit, as I learnt from numerous stories. It allows to 
exercise an independent activity, yet for its renewal one has to proof one’s 
economic activity for the previous period. As Foued did not exercise an 
independent economic activity as the permesso would require, but was rather 
working in the informal labour market, it was impossible for him to renew it.  
However, this temporary residence permit gave him a rather secure status in Italy 
for a certain period of time. “It was great, I did not have to fear police controls”, he 
explained. After his arrival in Italy, Foued first worked as a bricklayer in Sicily. 
In Mazara del Vallo, he knew a paternal uncle and was living with his family for 
a couple of months.69 However, the longer he stayed with his uncle’s family, the 
more he came into conflicts with his uncle, who accused him of being lazy, as he 
described the rather tense personal situation in Sicily. “This was not true! It was 
simply impossible to find any work”, Foued insisted. Eventually, he decided to 
leave Sicily and looking for work elsewhere in Italy. With his permesso, he was 
safe to travel around and did not have to fear police controls.  
In Foued’s own account, the following months remained vague; I never really 
found out how he made a living during this period. In his story, he always 
 
69 Mazara del Vallo is known for its high share of Tunisians among its population. Many of them are living in 
a part of the old town, called la Kasbah. It dates back to the period when Mazara del Vallo was under Arab 
domination.  
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jumped directly from his time in Mazara del Vallo to his arrival in Chiasso: In 
the narrative, almost a year was missing between Mazaro and the arrival in 
Switzerland. All he told me was that he was working as a street vendor in different 
Italian cities.  
Eventually in April 2011, Foued arrived in Chiasso in order to apply for asylum 
in Switzerland. When he arrived in Switzerland, he had already the clear 
intention to later join a distant relative who was living in Biel at that time. 70 
This decision was accelerated by the experience of control and surveillance at the 
reception centre – a new experience he had never made before:  
“After spending years in Italy without any restrictions, it was 
hard for me to submit to the strict rules in the reception centre. 
Confined in a camp and with the strict rules when it is allowed 
to leave the camp and so on… No, this is nothing for me! 
Therefore, I decided to abandon the asylum procedure. I 
yearned for freedom, not to be bothered by some social assistant, 
or responding to these stupid questions about my life during the 
asylum interviews.” 
Therefore, the decision was made quickly: Foued quit the reception centre and 
moved to his relative in Biel. In possession of a permanent residence permit, his 
 
70 Foued himself refers to this person as a cousin. However, from the conversations it does not come out 
whether it is a cousin in the strict sense of the term, or if he refers with this term to any sort of distant 
relative in his own generation. 
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relative was living in a small two-room apartment. He agreed to accommodate 
Foued for a couple of months. But soon, Foued realised that the situation in 
Switzerland was not comparable to Italy. Without a residence permit on his own, 
it was very difficult to find a job in Switzerland.  
He remembered how he often thought about returning to Italy during his first 
months in Biel. However, this was easier said than done:  
“But you know… I was trapped in Switzerland. Once you are 
in the asylum [system], then you can no longer go back, because 
of the fingerprints. So, I had no other choice than to continue in 
Switzerland.” 
This quote refers to the Eurodac database for the identification of asylum seekers 
in Europe. As long as you are not registered in the database, there is no first 
country that would be responsible for your asylum application under the Dublin 
rules.  
During the first couple of months, his relative supported him financially. At the 
same time, Foued started to work on an informal basis and only a couple of 
hours a week in a small grocery store, owned by a Moroccan he came across in 
his first weeks in town. However, the revenue from this activity was insufficient 
to cover the costs of living. Therefore, it was inconceivable to send money back 
home, as he intended to do.  
 189 
Foued was one of the few clandestine Tunisian migrants I met during my 
research who was from the South. He grew up in Zarzis, graduated from school 
and faced the same situation as so many other young Tunisians: extremely high 
youth unemployment rates and thus a very difficult situation to find a job. 
Sometimes, he worked here and there for a couple of days or weeks, but without 
the prospect of a more or less secure job. With respect to this situation, Foued is 
another typical case for the group of Tunisian harragas. High youth 
unemployment rates make it impossible to secure one’s economic basis and the 
harraga becomes a very rational economic strategy, although it is a risky bet.  
However, there is one aspect that makes Foued’s migration trajectory unique: 
He categorically excluded the prospect of a return despite the lack of well-
established social ties to other relatives living with a secure residence permit in a 
European country (except his one relative in Biel). Although he was barely able 
to make a living with his meagre and unstable income, he was determined to stay 
in Switzerland. His transnational migration trajectory was therefore more than a 
mere economic strategy. It rather touched his own identity, as he was absolutely 
determined to conduct a successful live abroad.  
Foued’s migration trajectory contained an epilogue. I had barely met him since 
the second half of 2015. Only recently in April 2016, I all the sudden received a 
message from an unknown number. „Now in France" it read. I tried to contact 
the number, but no one answered. After several attempts I gave it up. A few days 
later Foued called back from this number. He told me that he ran into a police 
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control in Biel. He was lucky that they released him and did not put him into 
custody straight forward. But he received an order of punishment for “illegal 
residence,” as he called it. Foued had the suspicion that he was now on the radar 
of the police. Due to this incident, he decided to move on. He was anyway 
considering continuing his migration journey to France, joining two other 
young Tunisians he knew from Zarzis, he justified his hastily departure on the 
phone to me. They lived in the suburbs of Paris and Foued staid with them, as 
he told. Till then, he had not found any work. Here and then, he helped one of 
the two friends with his deliveries for a logistics company. But these were rather 
rare occasions. I asked him why he called me at this particular moment. He 
replied that he was thinking again about returning to Switzerland and he wanted 
to know my personal opinion concerning the risks of being picked up by the 
border guards or later by the police. My rather pessimistic assessment did not 
satisfy him. Since then, I have not heard any news from him and my occasional 
attempts to reach him never succeeded.   
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Sixth Vignette: “I Am a Businessman, Just Like Everyone Else…” 
The last vignette of these migration biographies takes us back to Abdellah, the 
intermediary we briefly encountered already in the opening scene of this 
dissertation. His migration experiences date back to the 1970ies. After spending 
years abroad on construction sites in France, he returned back to Tunisia. He 
now lives in the capital’s suburb of Jebel Jelloud, where he grew up.  
“I am a businessman. Just like everyone else…” Abdellah laughed, and his sonorous 
voice carried the words over the street. Although he was reluctant to explain in 
full detail what type of business he exercised, he explained that he was active in 
the commerce de valise, as it is usually called in the Tunisian dialect. This means 
he imported and exported small quantities of goods between Tunisia and Algeria, 
not more than one person can carry in his suitcases, hence the name. Declared 
as goods for personal use at the customs, one does not have to pay taxes. With 
this activity, he was operating in a legal grey zone. However, the commerce de 
valise is a socially respected economic activity, and not at all considered as 
smuggling. Therefore, it is a barely hidden activity. Abdellah even used to cross 
the official border posts between Algeria and Tunisia.  
He carefully maintained the image of a successful businessman, although his 
worn-out suit told a different story. Always pretending to be very busy, he rarely 
showed up on time at a meeting. During our conversations, his mobile phone 
rested on the table, ready to answer a phone call or making one at any time.  
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Abdellah was 21 years old, when he left Tunisia for the first time in order to 
work on French construction sites. He joined his elder brother who was living 
in France already for a couple of years. At that period, a lot of young Tunisians 
left the country looking for work. The vast majority went to France or Italy. It 
was a time when the economies of these countries were in need of cheap and 
unskilled labour force, and both countries had quite liberal immigration 
policies.71 As he recalled, it was no problem for Abdellah to enter France without 
a visa. He was even working for extended periods without any working permits, 
never encountering any problems.  
Abdellah described to me the moment when he arrived for the very first time at 
Marseille’s seaport, carrying along with him all his belongings in a small suitcase. 
His brother picked him up and brought him to Paris. Abdellah’s brother was 
well connected to different employers in the construction industry, and he 
helped his brother to find a job. Curious why it was so easy to find work even 
without any residence permit, Abdellah replied:  
“Papers you ask? No, I can’t remember exactly. But what I 
know for sure; I applied for a residence permit after I started 
working on my first construction site. I know it, because I went 
to the administration applying for a residence permit with my 
 
71 See also Chapter 4. For a detailed discussion of the changing labour migration regime for Tunisian labour 
migrants in France, see Anne-Sophie Bruno’s instructive book „Les chemins de la mobilité: migrants de 
Tunisie et marché de travail parisien depuis 1956“ (2010). 
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work contract. And then the public employee who processed my 
application told me that my employer cheats me and does not 
pay the minimum wage.” 
The legalisation of his residence status was an informal and unbureaucratic 
process, as Abdellah remembered. He received his long-term residence permit 
without major obstacles. The permit allowed him to change the job more easily. 
In the following years, he worked for many different employers, always in the 
construction industry and for most of the time in the wider region of Paris. He 
continued to live with his elder brother. Very often, they were even working on 
the same construction sites. Abdellah earned enough money to save “a 
considerable amount,” as he used to say.  
Each summer, he returned back to Tunisia for six weeks, paying visits to his 
family. With the remittances, he supported the family. Later he bought his own 
small plot of land near to his father’s house in order to build his own.  
Things changed when Abdellah’s residence permit expired. A few months before, 
he had lost his job. All the sudden, this became a problem for the renewal of his 
residence permit. Nonetheless, Abdellah decided against a return to Tunisia and 
continued to live in France for the next couple of years. Despite the lack of any 
residence permit, he was always able to find a job for a couple of weeks, for most 
of the time somewhere in the construction industry, as he acquired a broad 
knowledge over the years. Due to his large network from numerous previous 
jobs, there was always a colleague who informed him about short-term job 
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opportunities. However, the typical duration of the average employment had 
changed, as Abdellah remembered. Before, he had been hired with an ordinary 
labour contract which gave him some security for the foreseeable future. Now, 
most of the time he was working without any written contract, and only on the 
basis of provisional oral agreements. Most of the time, his salary was below the 
official minimum wage in the construction industry.  
Later, Abdellah benefited from a legalisation campaign of the French 
government, and he was able to secure a residence permit again:  
“I was happy. It was now possible again going back to Tunisia. 
When I lost my residence permit, I had to remain in France 
and was not able to leave the country. This was annoying. I 
really wanted to go back, but it was simply impossible.” 
In the middle of the 1980s, Abdellah decided to return back to Tunisia 
permanently. The economic situation in France had become increasingly 
difficult. In addition, he realised that companies began to prefer younger people. 
In Tunisia, he made enough progress with his project of constructing his own 
house. It was now possible to move in, although it was not finished yet. “I made 
enough savings to live a decent life here”, he summarised the decision to return 
permanently.  
However, once back in Tunis, soon he realised that it was not that easy to 
continue as before. Although he had put some money aside, he needed a job. 
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For a first period, Abdellah lived from his savings and finished the house. Later, 
he tried to establish his own small construction company –with little success:  
“I began to help out some relatives renewing their houses. I had 
some equipment for masonry work. And with the henchmen I 
hired for my own house, I started to do some masonry for my 
relatives.” 
In the beginning, this plan was quite successful. But with the time, Abdellah 
realised that the business would not generate enough revenues. All in all, it 
seemed as if Abdellah never settled down in Tunisia with regard to his socio-
economic situation. He was constantly struggling to find an economic activity 
that corresponded to the life he conducted before in Tunis. With his working-
class wages from France, he was able to conduct a middle-class life in Tunis. 
Without his permanent return, it was a permanent struggle to maintain this 
middle-class lifestyle without the French wages.  
Eventually, Abdellah became a commerce de valise trader. With this activity, he 
just earned enough to make a living. When I asked him if he regretted the 
decision to return back to Tunisia permanently, he answered: 
“Not at all. I always preferred the life in Tunisia. Paris was 
tough: hard work, living in a small apartment, and all that 
stuff. It drives you mad. Here, I have my own house. I can live 
in peace.” 
 196 
In his research on Ghanaian migrants in Germany, Boris Niewsand (2011) 
describes a similar pattern how a working-class existence in the country of 
destination enables a middle-class life in the country of origin with the term of 
the status paradox. In their country of origin, the Ghanaian migrants conduct a 
middle-class life with all the material insignia representing the successful 
achievement of upward social mobility. More than this, it is not only a display 
of a successful and decent middle-class life. In Ghana, they are indeed part of the 
middle class in term of their socio-economic position. However, this successful 
achievement of upward social mobility, is inextricably linked to a working-class 
existence in Germany, as Nieswand describes (2011). Low-paid jobs in sectors 
with little prestige are the economic basis for a decent middle-class existence in 
the country of origin. It is the precarious life as a labour migrant at the fringes 
of society in the Global North that opens the path for upward social mobility in 
the Global South.  
We can observe a similar pattern in the case of Abdellah. In France, he was 
working on construction sites as an unskilled labourer. He tried to save as much 
money as possible with his meagre salary, sharing most of the time the apartment 
with his brother or other fellow citizens he had encountered on the construction 
sites. Returning back to Jebel Jelloud during the long summer vacations, 
Abdellah pursued his aspirations of upward social mobility; he bought land and 
built a house. Once, he even imported a brand-new car from France, as he 
recalled in one conversation. Therefore, it is more than mere nostalgia or 
affection for his friends and relatives when he complained that he was inhibited 
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from returning temporarily to Tunisia at the time he was lacking a residence 
permit in France and thus unable to leave the country: It was also the middle-
class life during the summer he was missing, and which formed part of his 
identity.  
Abdellah’s case highlights how complicate it is to secure this upward social 
mobility in the long run. Working for more than ten years abroad on 
construction sites in France, it allowed him to have a decent life for a certain 
period of time once back in Jebel Jelloud, yet he failed to secure this 
transformation of his social status and make it permanent.   
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Conclusion: Individual Experiences, General Patterns 
The six migration biographies highlight the diversity of individual migration 
trajectories. They are shaped by individual decisions, as well as by external 
constraints and opportunities of the border regime. The concluding part of this 
chapter suggests a transversal reading of the migration biographies in order to 
compare the individual experiences of transnational mobility, departure, and 
return. Such a comparison shows that these experiences – as different and 
individual as they might be – are embedded in a broader logic. This logic is 
structured by the border regimes and the governance of mobility that produces 
differentiated mobility. It allows transnational mobility for some and denies it 
for others. Certain patterns of mobility and certain experiences emerge 
repeatedly throughout all biographies, suggesting that there are some common 
elements that are shaped by a structuring force. In this context, two aspects are 
of particular importance: the fragmentation of time and space, and the 
appropriation of mobility against the explicit rules of the border regime. Both 
aspects contribute to the constitution of the transnational mobile subject.  
Fragmentation of Space and Time 
The first aspect of border regimes as lived experience is the fragmentation of time 
and space. While the spatial dimension is obvious, the temporal dimension 
might be more surprising. In the following paragraphs, I argue that the 
regulation of mobility is always connected to the temporal dimension as well. It 
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cannot be understood only through an analysis of the administration of space. 
The aspect of temporality in the context of border regimes has been discussed by 
Papadopoulos et al. (2008:194ff). They use the figure of the camp as a 
“decompression chamber”.72 Based on the argument of Mezzadra (2001) who 
rejects an Agambian reading of the camp as a state of exception (see Agamben 
1998), they show that refugee camps are rather a regulative instance to govern 
mobility than a permanent site of a state of exception.73  
With respect to deportation and retention practices of the state, Andersson 
(2014a: 212-214; 2014b) describes the governance of clandestine mobile 
practices as an active usurpation of time by state authorities. In the cases I am 
dealing with, this usurpation of time does not emerge in its violent and direct 
form, as for example detention camps represent. But the lengthy asylum 
procedure or the extended periods of waiting during the realisation of one’s 
return migration projects, described for example by Fathi or Amine, highlight 
how the usurpation of time is a ubiquitous effect in the administration of 
transnational mobility. It is not at all restricted to the most explicit forms of 
control exercised over the lives and bodies of the asylum seekers. As Hans Lucht 
(2012: 72) argues from the perspective of an existential anthropology, this aspect 
 
72 See also Panagiotidis and Tsianos (2007) 
73 In her anthropological research with detainees at a detention centre in the United Kingdom, Griffith 
explores the aspect of temporality and uncertainty as experience in a situation of constraints (Griffith 2013). 
She argues that the detention centre is a place of uncertainty, despite its character of a total institution 
(Goffman 1961). One of the main aspects of this uncertainty is the detainees are no longer in a position to 
dispose of one’s time autonomously. 
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of forced waiting is a form of state power that is experienced in a very existential 
way.  
However, this immediate form of state intervention in the form of the camp to 
regulate transnational mobility is not the focus of this dissertation, and it is 
absent in the migration biographies. Moreover, the programme for assisted 
voluntary return migration AVR even juxtapose the idea of voluntariness to 
constraint and confinement as expressed and materialised in the institution of 
the camp.74 To put it plainly, even the reception and procession centres do not 
qualify for camps in the Agambian sense. Fathi, Amine, and Foued did 
experience these centres as places of surveillance and constraint, yet their 
biographies also show how easy it was for them to ignore the rules and simply 
leave the camp.  
More important with regard to the administration and fragmentation of time 
and space is the asylum procedure itself. In particular, the analysis shows how 
the time of the transnational mobile subjects is a target of administration and 
eventually fragmentation: Decisions are either delayed or speeded up, depending 
on the priority list of the asylum bureaucracy. It is a state that can almost be 
described in terms of liminality (see Turner 1991), marked by the uncertainty 
about one’s own future: One is caught in a limbo, departed but not yet arrived.  
 
74 See also Chapter Six and Seven.  
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Temporality as a decisive aspect emerges in each of the six migration biographies, 
although it is experienced in entirely different ways. Yassine’s case for example is 
very instructive with regard to the aspect that temporality is regulated in a very 
subtle and indirect way and not experienced in form of direct coercion through 
state authorities. Trapped in a low-paid job as a waiter in the suburbs of Tunis 
and without the prospect of any change of this situation, the harraga becomes 
an imagined escape that is postponed into a far future. He simply did not dispose 
of the necessary means to claim and execute his right to transnational mobility; 
neither in a way that complies with the explicit rules of the border regime 
(through a student visa), nor in a way that undermine these rules (through the 
harraga).  
The case of Fathi tells a different story of temporality and how this is inscribed 
in individual migration trajectories. He had been working for a long time in Italy 
already. But he had the feeling of being stuck in Parma, where he did not manage 
to get a more or less secure job. Without a residence or working permit, his 
migration trajectory came to a halt. It was neither possible to continue his 
journey, nor did he see a possibility to return home. He described the situation 
in Parma as a waiting for a window of opportunity to continue his journey. All 
the sudden, this opportunity to do a next step emerged, when the Ben Ali regime 
crumbled and thousands of young Tunisians decided to try their luck abroad. It 
brought the European border regime under pressure and it allowed also Fathi to 
take his migration project a step further.  
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On the Appropriation of Transnational Mobility  
This leads to the second aspect that runs through all six migration biographies 
as a leitmotif: the dialectics between the alienation and appropriation of 
transnational mobility.  
In Abdellah’s case, we can discover how his migration trajectory oscillates 
between carefully planned decisions in advance and rather spontaneous reactions 
to given situations. When he was in possession of a French carte de séjour, it was 
easy to move back and forth between Tunisia and France. At other moments, he 
was formally denied this possibility of transnational mobility. However, at a 
certain point he ignored the imposed rules of mobility and moved to France 
anyway as a clandestine migrant. Reading this pattern of mobility through the 
analytical lens of the thesis of the autonomy of migration AOM, it can be 
understood as a moment of appropriation of mobility. Ignoring the rules of 
transnational mobility that are imposed upon him, he decided to enter France 
without a residence and labour permit.  
A similar case can be made for Foued’s migration trajectory. He did not follow 
the rules of the game that were imposed upon him and simply refused to return 
“voluntarily” back home. In his case, it was an appropriation of transnational 
mobility within Europe, and his refusal to comply with the imposed rules can be 
read as the expression of a self-determination of his own mobility.  
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However, both cases illustrate how the refusal of subjugation to the dominant 
rules of mobility and the claiming of one’s own right of transnational mobility 
simultaneously imply the subjugation to another regime of mobility. In the case 
of Foued, it means to muddle through in Switzerland as a clandestine migrant, 
living from day to day and remaining trapped in insecure low-paid jobs due to 
the lack of any residence permit. Furthermore, it signifies to live with the 
permanent fear of being discovered by police forces.75  His decision to leave 
Switzerland and move on to France can be read as an appropriation of mobility 
that ignores the explicit rules of the European border regimes. At the same time, 
one should not forget that it is a pattern of mobility that is more or less imposed 
on him, due to the lacking residence permit in Switzerland and the recent arrest 
by the police.  
The same applies to the case of Abdellah. Reading his ignorance of the legal 
framework that shaped his possibilities of transnational mobility only in terms 
of appropriation of mobility is too simplistic. Ignoring one set of – explicit or 
implicit – rules is as much a moment of autonomy as it is a moment of 
subjugation to another set of rules. The choice to continue living in France 
without a residence permit meant at the same time that Abdellah was deprived 
of the possibility of a temporal return back to Tunisia as long as he was lacking 
 
75 Lucht uses the term “hustle” to describe this marginal life at the fringes of society (see Lucht 2015).  
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this document. The escape from one logic of the migration regime leads to other 
constraints and subjugations.  
The Emergence of the Migratory Subject 
This brings me to the third and last remark with regard to the six migration 
biographies: the emergence of the migratory subject. Some migration studies 
describe how this type of precarious migration practices at the margins of the 
state create new ties of solidarity between the excluded (e.g. Lucht 2012). With 
respect to the migration trajectories this chapter presented, the narratives of the 
six informants tell a different story. The unpredictability of the migration 
trajectories and the fragmented biographies as a result of the imponderanility of 
the everyday life as a clandestine migrant lead to highly unstable and volatile 
social ties. Amine’s time in Milan when he was living with a group of fellow 
citizens in an abandoned factory or Foued who was supported by a friend during 
his time in Biel both tell us rather stories how fragile the networks and social ties 
are of those who are on the road. Solidarity is a fragile and marginal good. The 
common experience of clandestine migration at the margins of the state does not 
forge bonds of solidarity, but rather fragments them. Uncertainty, 
unpredictability, and the imposed permanent mobility are elements that 
undermine solidarity and connectedness.  
As a result, the mobile subject – subjugated to precarious mobile practices at the 
margins of the European border regimes – is characterised by isolation and 
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solitude. I am aware that this conclusion is influenced by the research method 
used here that relies on individual migration biographies, thus emphasising the 
individual over the group. As a consequence, this particular approach tends to 
underestimate the role of social networks, and in the context of the migration 
biographies of clandestine Tunisian migrants, social networks are indeed 
important during the clandestine trajectory through Europe. Especially relatives 
who are in possession of a legal residence permit can serve as an important anchor 
point. Nonetheless, it is striking to discover through these six migration 
biographies how the European border regimes create precarious mobile practices 
and how these practices often lead to isolation.  
In order to link these last remarks back to the theoretical discussion of the 
appropriation of mobility, de Certeau's distinction between strategies and tactics 
is a helpful tool to describe the agency of the dominant and the subaltern (de 
Certeau 1990). As tactics, he describes actions of those who are not in power to 
set the rules of the game in society. Rather, they have to navigate through, trying 
to find some loopholes in the pursuit of their own intentions and plans. The 
migration trajectories described above contain exactly this type of agency. It is 
an agency that can be read as an appropriation of mobility in the vein of the 
thesis of the autonomy of migration AOM, yet it is a heavily pre-structured 
agency. All six interlocutors are always on the search for opportunities that allow 
them to claim transnational mobility, pursue their goals, and claim at least 
partially their freedom of movement.  
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VI. Seeing Migration Like a State 
The previous chapter explored the experience of the border regime through six 
different migration biographies. More precisely, it examined how transnational 
mobility, departure, and return are experienced and navigated in the everyday. 
It thus adopted the perspective of the thesis of the autonomy of migration AOM 
as an analytical lens for the study of transnational mobility, though it slightly 
reformulated it, highlighting the dialectics of transnational mobility between 
appropriation and subjugation instead of a straight-forward reading solely in 
terms of autonomy.  
The following chapter explores the governance of transnational mobility from 
the perspective of the state. It narrows down the focus to one particular aspect: 
the governance of return. It thereby focuses in particular on Switzerland’s 
programme for assisted voluntary return migration AVR for Tunisian asylum 
seekers. This explicit narrowing-down of the focus on the AVR programme 
 207 
prepares the ground for the concluding discussion in Chapter Eight that answers 
the dissertation’s overall question of the contradictions of the liberal nation state 
that emerge in the administration of transnational migration.  
This chapter explores how the state “sees” migration and return through the 
detailed study of two elements that allow me to compare the migrant perspective 
with the state perspective. It first studies how return migration bureaucrats use 
the flowchart to imagine the ideal type of a return migration bureaucracy and 
how this influences the way they see migration. As a symbol for the flawless and 
uncontested administration of asylum cases, the flowchart is not only the 
expression of this imagination but deploys a prescriptive power over the social 
reality. The second part of this chapter scrutinises the notion of the successful 
return. In contrast to what the six migration biographies from the previous 
chapter have shown, a successful return in the administrative logics of the return 
migration bureaucracy is stripped from all its ambiguities and contradictions and 
reduces it to a single and straightforward narrative. Again, I argue that this 
imagination of a successful return by the return migration bureaucracy does not 
remain without effects. It deploys a normative power on social reality and the 
way the AVR programmes are designed and realised. Overall, this chapter 
demonstrates how the return migration bureaucracy aims at making governable 
and predictable the ambiguous and contradicting social reality that we 
encountered through the migration biographies in the previous.  
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In order to study how the state “sees” migration, as the title of this chapter 
suggests with reference to James Scott (1998), I rely on the practices and self-
legitimisation strategies of institutions and individual bureaucrats. Discussing 
with return migration bureaucrats their work, they often place it in the broader 
perspective of the overall asylum bureaucracy. I will use the notion of 
legitimisation strategy to describe how they reflect on their work and their own 
position. I use this notion without a normative twist. Legitimisation strategy as 
it is used in this chapter is simply the description how return migration 
bureaucrats make and give sense to their individual work, and to the way how 
they see their institution.  
Max Weber distinguishes two different ideal types of bureaucratic work; the 
“Subsumtion unter Normen” (subsumption under norms) and the “Abwägung 
von Zwecken und Mitteln” (balancing ends and means), as he writes (Weber 
1922: 664).76 The first ideal type imagines the work of the bureaucrat in the 
form of a “cog-in-the-machine”. It evokes precision, efficiency, replicability, and 
ignores differences and ambiguities. The bureaucrat’s work is considered as a 
quasi-mechanical activity, the bureaucrat itself an infallible machine. In their 
daily work, bureaucrats follow strict general rules and apply them to individual 
cases. This idea of the application of general rules to individual cases is what 
 
76 Weber introduces the second principle, as he rejects the idea of a comprehensive law. Whenever the 
bureaucrat is faced with a case that is not entirely covered by the existing law, he has to apply the second 
principle of bureaucratic work and carefully balances ends against means (Weber 1922:664). 
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arguably comes close to a common-sense notion of bureaucracy – especially 
when it is used in its pejorative meaning. The second ideal type concedes more 
discretionary power to the individual bureaucrat. Here, the general principle is 
not the compliance with the explicit bureaucratic rules and procedures. Instead, 
the guiding principle is “the appropriate procession of cases”. As the discussion 
of the empirical material in the two main parts of this chapter will highlight, the 
self-legitimisation strategies of the return migration bureaucrats oscillate 
between these two ideal-types of bureaucratic work.  
The World is a Flowchart 
The flowchart is a way to describe and represent the relationship between single 
bureaucratic actions and the bureaucracy as a comprehensive principle and 
institution. I take the artifact of the flowchart as a way to explore how the return 
migration bureaucracy imagines itself. It attracted my interest during my 
research, as a particular flowchart was used repeatedly by my interlocutors to 
explain and legitimate their work. In this part, I approach the flowchart from 
two different angles. First, I explore the images proliferated through the 
flowchart. I thus understand the flowchart as a form that carries specific images 
about the governance of migration and the migratory subject. And second, I 
explore the narratives that emerge around and with the flowchart; I thus examine 
how bureaucrats use the flowchart to explain and legitimate their work.  
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I begin this subchapter with a short description of an interview situation with 
two return migration bureaucrats and how they made use of a flowchart to 
explain to me how the migration procedure works. I then continue to ask what 
a flowchart is in general and explore the ideas it contains about the social world. 
More specifically, I examine what the flowchart of Switzerland's asylum 
bureaucracy tells us about the question how the state sees migration. This 
discussion will lead to the conclusion that the flowchart can be considered as an 
important aspect of the totalising dimension of border regimes; it turns 
individuals into cases to be governed. The flowchart expresses a world view where 
an asylum case appears as a mere technical problem to be solved.  
Generally speaking, the flowchart takes up two fundamental principles of 
bureaucracy: categorisation and hierarchisation (Handelman 2004). 77 
Handelman traces the bureaucratic logic of classification and categorisation back 
to Aristotle’s book on Categories from the Organon (Aristotle 1994). It was the 
first attempt to describe systematically the principle of categorisation. For the 
practice of classification, the critical question is not “how accurately this 
classification reflects the world it is made to act upon” (Handelman 2004:20), 
but rather the principle of precision that distinguishes better classifications from 
worse.  
 
77 Interestingly, Handelman does not refer to another principle the flowchart is often associated with: the 
algorithm. In computer sciences, the flowchart is a widely used visualisation technique of computer 
algorithms.  
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In contemporary everyday managerial language, a flowchart is the illustration of 
a path-dependent procedure that prescribes how to solve a given problem. The 
flowchart visualises the solution, subdivided into single steps and decisions. With 
this characterisation, the flowchart is a tool for bureaucratic organisation par 
excellence. In the case of the flowchart, the categorisation and hierarchisation 
concerns bureaucratic action and the way these single actions succeed each other. 
There is no space for negotiation or ambiguities; every decision is broken down 
into a simple and binary Yes/ No decision. As such, it is a representation of the 
ideal of bureaucratic work in the first sense of Weber. Cases are processed 
through the subsumption under norms.  
In conversations and interviews with different return migration bureaucrats, 
regularly it occurred that my informant pulled out a flowchart at a certain point 
of our conversation in order to explain and illustrate the asylum procedure. 
Often, it was my – deliberately – “naïve” introductory question that provoked 
this reaction. In my interviews with return migration bureaucrats, I used to begin 
the conversation with the question what my informant’s work was all about. But 
instead of an account of the self-perception of one’s own tasks (what I intended 
to provoke with my question), several of my interlocutors elaborated the general 
framework of the asylum procedure. The return migration bureaucrats started 
with an explanation of Switzerland’s asylum procedure, beginning with the 
asylum application in one of the reception centres at the border or at the airport, 
continuing with the processing of the case at the State Secretariat for Migration 
SEM on the one hand (which is the task of the federal administration), and the 
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accommodation of the asylum seeker, which is a cantonal task. Typically, the 
whole explanation of the procedure ended with the description how the final 
decision is taken. If the final decision is contested by the asylum seeker, it takes 
an additional detour and is revised by the Federal Administrative Court. Often, 
the bureaucrats emphasised the different levels of responsibilities. In particular, 
they highlighted the responsibilities of the federal administration consisting in 
taking decisions, while the cantonal authorities are responsible for the execution 
of these decision.  
After the third presentation of the very same flow chart, which is made public 
on the SEM’s internet site anyway, I was tempted to interrupt my informant, 
because I felt bored to become explained the same procedure once again. 
However, I became aware that this insistence on the flowchart is significant for 
the way migration bureaucrats see and conceptualise migration. It is a way of 
framing their own action and reflecting their position in the bureaucratic 
apparatus. Therefore, I became more and more interested in the way the 
bureaucrats used the flowchart to make an argument on the administration of 
migration.  
The flowchart in question itself is very simple and describes along general lines 
the asylum procedure in Switzerland. It uses pictograms and few explanatory text 
to visualise the procedure from the initial deposition of the asylum application 
until the final decision. It begins with the submission of the asylum application 
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at the border or at the airport and describes the possible paths for the asylum 
seeker and the application, visualised with arrows in different shapes.  
The flowchart combines two different issues: On the one hand, it describes the 
waypoints the asylum seeker passes, starting at the border and the transfer to the 
reception and procession centre, and further to the cantonal transit centre. 
Depending on the outcome of the asylum decision, the trajectory continues 
either with the transfer of the asylum seeker into his own apartment in the case 
of a positive decision. In contrast, a negative decision leads to the obligation to 
leave the country – either voluntarily or in the form of forced deportation. On 
the other hand, the flowchart not only describes the paths of the people, but also 
the bureaucratic paths of the asylum application itself, represented in the artifact 
of the file. It visualises who processes the application and who takes the critical 
decisions. The flowchart shows also the different possible outcomes of the 
asylum decision procedure, as well as the possibilities of appeal against a decision. 
It is obvious that the target audience of the flowchart is not the experts, but 
rather the broader public, thus the simplified visualisation leaving out some 
important details.  
In its reductionist and schematic representation, the flowchart develops a 
particular narrative. Each waypoint is the logic consequence of the former 
decision. Every path is predefined. All in all, the flowchart describes a consistent 
system that follows one single logic. However, the following case from my 
fieldwork shows how the flowchart, used as a tool of self-legitimisation of 
 214 
bureaucrats, conceals with its neat and tidy picture the different competing logics 
that contradict and undermine each other in social reality.  
The Flowchart as a Tool for Self-Legitimisation  
It was in summer 2015, when I was on my way to an interview with a return 
migration official of a mid-sized canton in Switzerland. I crossed the town by 
foot in order to reach the public administration at the other end of the city 
centre. The return migration office was located in an annex of the foreigner’s 
police office; a beautiful baroque building in the old town. 78 As it is a rather 
small canton, the individual administrative departments are small as well. One 
knows each other in the administration. The physical proximity of the different 
parts of the administration contributes to this impression. This ensemble of 
buildings unites different part of the administration. The return migration office 
itself was located in the same building as the foreigner’s police. This spatial 
proximity is no coincidence. In contrast to other cantons where the return 
migration office is part of the social and welfare department, it is a subdivision 
of the foreigner’s police in this case. As we will discover, the two return migration 
bureaucrats with whom I conducted the interview emphasised precisely this 
 
78 The following ethnographic observations are from August 2015. I agreed with all of my interlocutors to 
anonymise the observations. Therefore, some details that would allow to identify this particular office have 
been modified. The direct quotes were tape-recorded, indirect quotes and the other observations are 
reconstructions from the fieldnotes.  
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aspect as a virtue of the return migration bureaucracy. The proximity facilitates 
their work, they will argue.  
I had an appointment with the responsible return migration counsellor. To my 
surprise, when I showed up in the office, his superior was also present for the 
interviews. The return migration counsellor was an elder man, a few years before 
his retirement. When he introduced himself, he mentioned that he had been 
living in Tunisia too. As a young man he was working in a hotel for a certain 
time where he was responsible for the foreign tourists. Recalling this episode in 
his life, he emphasised that through this work, he had acquired “intercultural 
skills”, as he labelled it, that he considered as particularly useful for his actual 
work as a return migration counsellor.  
The other interlocutor was much younger – I estimated him in his late thirties – 
and introduced himself as the head of the department. In the following 
conversation, he would remain silent for most of the time. Only here and there 
he would underline the explanations of the return migration counsellor. When 
he expressed his own position, he was eager to highlight the efficiency of his unit 
in contrast to other cantons and highlighted this with reference to the high 
number of so-called voluntary returns his office was able to proceed.  
After a first round of introduction, the return migration counsellor opened the 
conversation with an explanation of how the return migration office works. I 
knew already what would follow next. He pulled out the already mentioned 
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flowchart, handed it over to me, and pointed with his pencil to the bottom of 
the diagram: “Our task is that those with a negative decision leave Switzerland” 
he explained to me and tapped with his pencil on the part of the flowchart that 
visualises the departure from Switzerland. His superior took over and continued:  
“We do not like forced deportation. Our aim is that every 
rejected asylum seeker returns voluntarily to his home country. 
The best thing we can do to achieve the voluntary return of 
every rejected asylum seeker is to cooperate closely with the 
foreigner’s police. Close cooperation with the other divisions who 
are involved in the asylum decision process is crucial. 
Sometimes, this is challenging. As you know, I am just here to 
implement the negative decision. But I do not belong to the 
police. So, I try to convince the migrants that it is for their own 
sake to return to their country of origin.” 
Apparently, the head of the department made a difference between the 
foreigner’s police and his own office, although in reality, his office was a 
subdivision of the foreigner’s police.  
After this explanation, it was again the return migration counsellor’s turn. He 
continued his explanations and emphasised once again the particular role of the 
return migration office. As his superior, he did not consider himself and his office 
as part of the police. This insistence of both of my interlocutors was all the more 
surprising with respect to the fact that the foreigner’s police is located in the very 
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same compound just over the courtyard. In contrast to the police that enforces 
negative asylum decisions also with the use of physical violence as ultimo ratio, 
both interlocutors considered the role of their own office rather as an 
intermediary who navigates between the desires and wishes of the migrants and 
the requirements of the asylum procedure.  
In contradiction to this self-representation, both officials considered themselves 
as responsible for the enforcement of the negative decisions as well and not only 
as service providers who offer services to asylum seekers. This enforcement would 
guarantee the “credibility of the system”, as the head of the department argued. 
Linked to this aspect, they both considered the enforcement of a negative 
decision as a matter of fairness towards all asylum seekers. Fairness consisted in 
the application of the same rules to everybody, as the return migration counsellor 
explained. Simultaneously, both emphasised that the enforcement of a negative 
decision should preferably take “the human way” without the use of physical 
violence.  
In these rather contradictory statements, we can discover at least two conflicting 
principles. Both of them are captured in some ways in the flowchart. Using the 
flowchart to explain their work, both interlocutors emphasised on the one hand 
that they are part of the asylum bureaucracy. They considered the enforcement 
of the decisions of the previous instances as the major aim of their work. But at 
the same time, they insisted on the separation between the return migration 
office and the rest of the foreigner’s police.  
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To an outsider like me, this contradiction seems obvious, yet they completely 
glossed over it in their accounts. How can we interpret this apparent 
contradiction? A closer examination of the logics of the flowchart provides a hint 
and reveals two different modes of operation.  
The simple enforcement of the decision of the previous (and higher) instance is 
one mode of operation of the return migration bureaucracy expressed in the 
flowchart. It is the narrative put forward by both of my interlocutors to highlight 
the consistency of their work. This narrative supports the logic of the flowchart 
that merges the different actors of the asylum bureaucracy with their competing 
logics and interests into a single system under one single logic and with one single 
purpose: to process asylum cases in a consistent way. The flowchart connects the 
different steps of the asylum bureaucracy into a coherent and all-encompassing 
system. It leaves no space for frictions or contradictions, and it imagines the 
asylum system as a smooth and flawless system. Following this logic, the asylum 
bureaucracy has one single task: processing the individual case according to the 
prescribed rules and paths as visualized in the flowchart.  
This is a very particular view on asylum and mobility, far away from the way it 
is experienced and expressed through the narrated migration trajectories in the 
previous chapter. Here, processing cases is transformed into a mere technical 
issue. The only critical question is whether the system runs smoothly and 
without frictions. The return migration office and its bureaucrats contribute to 
the smooth operation of the asylum bureaucracy. This is considered as a virtue 
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that contributes to the “credibility” of the asylum bureaucracy, as one of the 
bureaucrats expressed it.  
This machine-like imagination of the asylum bureaucracy brings up the question 
of responsibility: How do the return migration bureaucrats describe their own 
responsibility? As they do not only refrain from questioning the decisions of the 
previous instance but would consider this as a violation of the principles of their 
job, they maintain a particular idea of responsibility that is not directed towards 
the individual case, but rather towards the system as such. In other words, the 
return migration bureaucrats are committed to follow the rules and enforce the 
decisions of the previous instance. They do not question or challenge the 
decisions. The powerful idea of being part of an encompassing system and being 
responsible to contribute to its flawless operation expresses a type of individual 
responsibility that is geared towards structures and forms, rather than the 
individual case. In Max Weber’s (1922) terminology, this type of responsibility 
can be described as the bureaucratic ethos. He distinguishes between “formale, 
rationale Sachlichkeit” (Weber 1922: 664) of the bureaucracy that is geared 
towards the compliance with the rules on the one hand, and the “materielle 
Gerechtigkeit” that is geared towards the individual case (Weber 1922: 664). 
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The bureaucratic ethos follows the first principle of the formale rationale 
Sachlichkeit.79  
However, this neat picture of the asylum bureaucracy as an all-encompassing 
system without frictions and contradictions becomes cracks when one of the 
involved protagonists does not comply with the rules: the asylum seeker. 
Assumed that he receives a negative decision and not willing to cooperate with 
the asylum bureaucracy, frictions emerge in the aseptic picture of a bureaucracy 
that simply applies general rules to individual cases. It is at this particular 
moment when the dark side of the asylum bureaucracy emerges in the form of 
forced deportation, looming as a threat in the background.  
In the interview, the return migration counsellor identified the voluntary return 
migration programme as “the human way” of processing cases and “solving” the 
issue of rejected asylum applications. In contrast, he described the alternative – 
forced deportation – as “undesirable and unpleasant for everyone involved” in 
the asylum bureaucracy. This side remark contains a moral judgement and gives 
a hint that there are further principles at work that go beyond the mere 
procession of cases and the goal to keep the system running as smoothly as 
possible. The following subchapters examine these further principles. Besides the 
moral principle, it is the principle of the division of labour.  
 
79 See also Paul du Gay (2000) for a detailed discussion of this distinction.  
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Beyond Mere Rule-Orientation 
The flowchart visualises the division of labour in a neat way. It breaks the whole 
asylum procedure into individual tasks and assigs them to individual actors. 
Migration bureaucrats mobilise the principle of the division of labour as a 
legitimisation strategy of their work that contradicts the principle of pure rule-
orientation. It introduces a different notion of responsibility and engagement 
than rule-orientation, as it insists on a certain degree of autonomy and 
discretionary power of the individual organisational units within the asylum 
bureaucracy, just as it concedes a certain degree of autonomy to the individual 
bureaucrat. In other words, the emphasis of the division of labour and autonomy 
shifts the focus of responsibility away from processes and structures towards the 
content of bureaucratic action. This allows to introduce the idea of a procession 
of cases „in the human way“, as my interlocutor expressed it in the interview. 
This can be better explained with the example of the return migration offices 
that are – in contrast to the example above – independent from the foreigner’s 
police.  
Consultation, Not Enforcement  
Most of the return migration bureaucrats who do not work in a return migration 
office attached to the foreigner’s police department consider themselves more as 
social workers than anything else. In this context, a return migration counsellor 
explained to me that she “does not care” whether the migrant seeking for advice 
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in her office agrees in a voluntary return or not. She considers her role not as 
enforcing the rule of law, but rather as a holistic individual consultation on the 
migrant’s future plans in general. Doing her job properly implies to support her 
clients in the best possible way and according to their wishes, as she explained.  
This self-perception contrasts Bauman’s argument on bureaucracy as pure 
instrumental reason (Bauman 1988). He argues that the division of labour 
within a bureaucracy leads to the fragmentation of responsibility, and eventually 
to the disinterest of the bureaucrat in the overall aim of bureaucratic action. 
Instrumental reason is the necessary condition that prepared the ground for the 
Holocaust, as Bauman argues, and it is a defining principle of modernity.80  
The case of the bureaucrats in the return migration offices I studied, however, 
tell a different and more nuanced story. The bureaucratic organisation may not 
inevitably lead to the disinterest of the bureaucrat and to pure instrumental 
reason, although it is indeed one possible outcome. Furthermore, the division of 
tasks and the division of responsibility does not necessarily lead to its dissolving 
in diffuse structures with eventually no responsibility at all for the individual. As 
the second example shows, the division of labour might also lead to a certain 
autonomy of the actors involved – institutional and individuals alike. And this 
in turn may lead to a responsibility that is concerned much more with content 
 
80 Similar arguments have been brougth forward by other authors as well, se for example Arendt (1995) or 
Horkheimer (1947).  
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than with bureaucratic processes and forms, as the quotes of the second example 
show.  
We can see here two different ideas of responsibility. I suggest differentiating 
these two positions as a functionalist responsibility on the one hand and a human 
responsibility on the other hand. The way bureaucrats use the flowcharts to 
legitimate their own work may lead to either position. As encountered in the 
first case, the functionalist position focuses on the overall system. It emphasises 
that the asylum procedure follows a single and encompassing logic. This stands 
in contrast to the second case that contains a human perspective. It develops a 
different narrative, emphasising the autonomy of the different actors involved in 
the asylum procedure. In this second case, the interdependence between 
responsibility and disinterest is symmetrically opposed to the interdependence 
in the case of the functionalist perspective. 
Assessing Success 
For the remainder of this chapter on how the state “sees” migration, I introduce 
a further ethnographic vignette that allows us to study the state’s view on 
transnational mobility. It discusses how success is conceptualised and measured 
in the context of the return migration programmes.  
The notion of success is an important point of reference, when bureaucrats talk 
about their work. The asylum bureaucracy in general is under the permanent 
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pressure from the politics to legitimate that the return migration programmes 
are a success, though it is never made explicit what success actually means. Often, 
the notion of success is not more than a vague point of reference. As an empty 
signifier (Lévi-Strauss 1987: 63-64), success is a vague and omnipresent point of 
reference. In the context of the return migration bureaucracy, the notion of 
success has two completely different meanings – at least. Either it refers to the 
successful return of the individual migrant, or it refers to the success of the return 
migration programme as a whole. The following ethnographic vignette 
exemplifies how success is an important point of reference of return migration 
bureaucrats and they are talking about it all the time.  
“We don’t know what a successful return means” 
“Actually, we don’t know what a successful return means.” This was the 
surprisingly frank statement of a return migration bureaucrat who was 
responsible for the realisation of Switzerland’s return migration programme for 
Tunisian asylum seekers.81 I met her in her office in Switzerland, because I was 
looking for someone, who could provide me with detailed background 
information about the division of labour between the State Secretariat for 
Migration SEM and the International Office for Migration IOM before leaving 
for fieldwork in Tunisia. She was not directly involved in the consultation of 
 
81 This interview was conducted in August 2013.  
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potential return migrants and the development of the individual projects. 
Instead, as the head of the department, she was responsible for the 
implementation of the return migration programme. She had started to work in 
this position only recently before the interview took place. Her main task 
consisted in the monitoring of the programme, writing reports, maintaining the 
contact with the local staff in Tunisia and with the return migration offices in 
Switzerland. This meant she was never in direct contact with any return migrants 
in her daily work in contrast to the return migration officers, whose main task 
consists in the consultation of potential return migrants and the promotion of 
the programme.  
At the beginning of our conversation, she remembered a recent meeting with her 
colleagues of the Tunis-based office. She praised the work of her colleagues and 
how they managed to make the individual return migration projects a success. 
Identifying the “poor education of most return migrants” as one of the main 
challenges of the return migration programme, she explained how her colleagues 
deal with this problem. As our conversation unfolded, at a certain point she 
passed me a booklet with brief summaries of a couple of return migration 
projects. The booklet was entitled “Success Stories”. I skimmed the booklet and 
asked her how she and her organisation define as a successful return: “Actually, 
we don’t know what a successful return means”, she acknowledged. Neither had 
her organisation a definition of a successful return, nor were there any predefined 
criteria that would allow to measure it. She continued and explained to me:  
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“Hm, it is hard to define [a successful return; D.L.]. We 
evaluate each individual project after six months. So… 
basically, the criteria is whether the project still exists after that 
time, whether it survived economically. And maybe… most 
importantly, whether the return migrant has remained in 
Tunisia. But you see, this is not that much…”  
This vague idea of a successful return was rather surprising for me as an observer, 
especially when one takes into account that Switzerland’s migration office 
evaluates the return migration programme for Tunisian asylum seekers on a 
regular basis. How, I was asking myself, is it then possible to evaluate a program 
without having an idea of what you measure?  
Digging deeper in documents and conducting further interviews, I discovered 
two dimensions of success and successful return that emerge as the dominant 
ideas in the governance of return migration. The first idea of successful return is 
expressed through the use of statistics and numbers. It refers to the number of 
Tunisian asylum seekers who return to their country of origin with the so-called 
program for assisted voluntary return. High number of return migrants – i.e. 
voluntary returns with the exception of forced deportations – is considered as a 
success. The second idea of success is expressed in the so-called success stories 
that portray a series of return migrants and their projects. This introduces a more 
subjective side to successful return. In this case, the notion of success refers to 
the realisation of individual return migration projects. In other words, there is 
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both a quantitative notion of successful return and a qualitative notion. Let me 
explore this aspect in more detail.  
Narrating Success 
The qualitative notion of a successful return is of particular interest, as it 
combines the perspective of the return migration office with the subjective 
perspective of the individual return migrants. In the following, I ask what success 
means in the perspective of return migration bureaucrats and the migration 
bureaucracy in general. I explore the different notions of a successful return and 
show how these ideas structure the organisation of the return migration 
programmes, as well as they legitimise and justify the work of the return 
migration counsellors. This leads to the concluding discussion of the specific 
image of the successful return migrant that is enshrined in these success stories. 
Through these success stories, one discovers the emerging frictions between a 
totalising mode of governance on the one hand and the individualising mode of 
governance on the other hand that are both characteristic for the operation of 
the governance of voluntary return.  
Success stories are short summaries of individual projects realised by return 
migrants with the support of the return migration programme.82 They showcase 
 
82 The following description relies on booklets with success stories I collected during my research. They 
were given to me by one of the return migration counsellors I interviewed.  
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on just two pages projects that are considered as typical examples for successful 
return migration projects. Each success story follows a stereotypical narrative. It 
begins with a summary of the migration trajectory and includes some remarks 
on the familial background and the socio-economic situation of the migrants 
before their departure. Typically, it omits a detailed account of the trajectory 
between the departure from Tunisia and the deposition of the asylum 
application in Switzerland. However, the previous chapter with its six migration 
biographies highlights that this time in-between is often more decisive for the 
understanding of the motivation to apply for asylum in Switzerland or the 
decision to return back to Tunisia. The fact that they stranded in Switzerland 
and decided to return at a certain moment is more the result of what happened 
before and not of a deliberate and well-thought decision as the typical success 
story narrative suggests.  
In contrast to the experiences and the perspective of most of the Tunisian 
migrants I encountered, the success stories picture the asylum application in 
Switzerland as the decisive turning point. Typically, the asylum application is 
presented as a dead end. The narrative creates an image of the desperate asylum 
seeker who does not know how to continue his life. He faces a reality in 
Switzerland that does not meet his expectations. In this moment of desperation 
and disillusion, help comes in the form of assisted voluntary return: Together, 
return migrant and return migration counsellor draft a project. After the 
description of this decision to return back home and the preparations, the 
narrative fast-forwards and meets the return migrant again once he has set up his 
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business successfully and with the help of the return migration programme once 
back in Tunis. The whole story is accompanied by a couple of quotes of the 
portrayed return migrant. Typically, he testimonies how happy he is now back 
in Tunisia and tells the reader how the return migration programme has allowed 
him to restart his life.  
Overall, the narrative is a straight-forward blueprint that depicts the AVR 
programmes as a solution to a dead-end. Through the programme, the asylum 
seeker as a passive object without any plans about his future is turned into an 
active and economically rational subject, who organises his life and learns how 
to set up and run a business successfully. The stereotypical narratives of the 
success stories contain two different notions of success. The first aspect links 
success to help and assistance. And the second aspect links success to the 
becoming of an economically rational subject.  
The aspect of successful help demonstrates the effectiveness of the return 
migration programme. It describes how useful the return migration programme 
is for the return migrant; the success stories highlight the immediate impact of 
the programme on individual lives. With comparably little financial 
commitment, it is possible to make a huge difference for the lives of the 
individual return migrants, thus far the underlying idea.  
However, the connection between the notion of a successful return and help 
contains a further dimension. The success stories suggest that the return migrant 
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is unable to organise his own life as he bases his decisions on false expectations 
and who is therefore in need of help from outside. As the previous chapter on 
the individual migration trajectories has shown, this is a very narrow and 
questionable assumption. In order to explain this point, let me return to the case 
of Fathi, the fisherman from Jebiniana. His decision to escape Tunisia and his 
migration trajectory was not driven by irrational choices and illusions, but firmly 
grounded in the everyday experience of how the local economy works and how 
marginal his chances were to find a stable job. Therefore, he made a very rational 
and well-thought decision to stop working as a fisherman and investing into the 
harraga instead. In other words, as the whole small-scale fishing industry in the 
area is on decline and one makes barely a living with this economic activity, he 
decided to invest in another plan, the harraga. It is true that the harraga is a high-
risk strategy with a very uncertain outcome. But to continue working in the 
fishing industry is also a decision with a high degree of uncertainty. The return 
migration project thus did not turn Fathi into an active subject that makes 
rational choices in economic terms: in fact, he was it already. Therefore, his 
application for a return migration project was just another decision that made 
perfectly sense to Fathi in his particular situation and at that particular time. By 
the way, he demonstrated his economic skills later once again, when he found a 
way to keep the money from the return migration project that was provided to 
him in order to buy a boat within the extended family, as he simply bought his 
uncle’s boat.  
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Counting Success 
Opposed to this notion of success that relies on individual stories and the 
assumed impact of the programme on individual live, there is a second idea of 
success. It is an idea of success that does not focus on the individual return 
migration project, but rather on the success of the return migration programme 
as a whole. And in this case, the narrative is different. It is not the individual 
project that matters. Return migration officials often use the word “impact” in 
order to describe the success of the AVR programme for Tunisian return 
migrants. Impact becomes a synonym for success. And this impact is measured 
in terms of numbers of so-called voluntary departures of Tunisian asylum 
seekers.  
Even in this case that relies on the simple technique of counting numbers, there 
is no clear idea of what success means at all and how it is measured. As we will 
see, the category of voluntary departures is far from a meaningful and well-
defined entity, as the number of voluntary departures includes every registered 
departure with the exclusion of the number of forced deportations. This category 
suggests an implicit idea of a causal link between voluntary departures and the 
programme, as high numbers of voluntary departures are used to legitimise the 
success of the return migration programme. In interviews as well as in the 
numerous reports on the programme on behalf of the administration and 
politicians, each time I was given the number of departures of Tunisian asylum 
seekers who had decided to join the return migration programme, when I asked 
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what success means. However, when I raised the question how this number is 
related to the actual number of successfully realised projects, no one was able to 
provide me with a precise number, nor were there any statistics that would 
answer this question. My interlocutors explained this failure with the still 
ongoing programme and the lacking final evaluation that would allow to 
determine the precise number of realised projects.83 Interim reports I was able to 
consult always provided a list with the precise number of voluntary departures 
of Tunisian asylum seekers, while the number of realised projects remained a 
rough estimation at best. The only conclusion I could draw from it: Apparently, 
for the return migration bureaucracy as a whole, the number of realised projects 
is not a relevant item to measure success, in contrast to the number of departures 
that is indeed a key figure.  
The most accurate number of realised projects provided a return migration 
official who was working for the International Organisation for Migration IOM 
in Tunis. Due to the lack of any detailed statistics, she based her estimation on 
her personal experience. We met during a workshop organised by a French 
research institute in Tunis, where she was engaged as an expert.84 During a coffee 
break, we came into a conversation and I asked her how her office has to report 
back to Switzerland’s State Secretariat of Migration SEM. Her first answer was 
 
83 This information dates from 2014, when the programme was still running. 
84 This conversation dates from May 2014.  
 233 
that there were no detailed statistics available with regard to the number of 
realised projects. It was the same answer I was given already a couple of times 
before. But then she deliberated for a moment and added that she would guess 
that two thirds of all Tunisian migrants who return in the context of the AVR 
programme successfully realise their project. This is a “fairly high success rate”, 
she added.  
Comparing Different Ideas of Success 
I do not aim at making an argument how to measure the impact of the return 
migration programme in the most accurate way. What we can retain from this 
discussion so far is rather that this second notion of success does not focus on 
realised return migration projects, but on the number of voluntary departures of 
Tunisian asylum seekers. Apparently, the second notion of success considers the 
number of realised projects as irrelevant. This finding suggests a reading of the 
AVR programme not as an administrative tool to facilitate returns of individual 
asylum seekers (as the success stories would emphasise), but rather as a tool for 
the governance of transnational migration with the goal of keeping the number 
of asylum seekers low in Switzerland. This interpretation is backed by several 
reports, for example the 2011 report Wirksamkeit und Kosten der Rückkehrhilfe 
that can be loosely translated as “effectiveness and cots of the return assistance.”85 
 
85 http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/pressemitteilung/2014/2014-06-10/ber-po-mueller-11-
3062-d.pdf; last accessed 05.02.2016) 
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It measures costs and effects of the AVR programmes. Again, the report measures 
the effectiveness in the number of voluntary departures.  
We can retain so far, both the success stories and the different approaches of 
measuring the effectiveness of return assistance lack any explicit conception of 
success. I read this lack of criteria as a hint that both the success stories and the 
interim reports have rather the function of legitimising the AVR programme 
towards different stakeholders than evaluating it and measure its actual 
performance.  
The two meanings of success contain specific images of the migratory subject 
and the governance of migration, reflecting different ideas of migration policies. 
They both share the idea that the return migrant is the passive object of 
governance. In the first case, success is associated with the idea of the 
transformation of the passive migrant into an active and economically rational 
subject. In the second case, success refers to the number of voluntary returns, 
although the causal link between the programme and the number of return 
remains in the dark.  
Governing Return Between Compassion and Repression 
This chapter started with the question how the state “sees” migration. The 
analysis of the flowchart and its meanings has shown how the asylum 
bureaucracy imagines itself as a succession of coordinated and well-planned 
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actions and institutions that follow a strict and logic order. And the discussion 
of the notion of successful return highlighted how in reality “success” is used as 
a legitimising tool rather than an instrument for measuring performance, as the 
migration bureaucracy claims. Both cases show how the state sees migration: 
through the reduction of complexity. This reductionist representation of a 
complex and ambiguous social reality is the condition that makes social reality 
governable at all. However, it does not only describe social reality, it also 
prescribes it, as it forms the basis on which the state operates. In general lines, 
this follows Scott’s (1998) argument how the state sees social reality. The 
material further shows that – despite its reductionist representation of social 
reality – the governance of return migration is not necessarily completely 
ignorant towards the individual subject.  
In order to explore this point further, let me consider the different orientations 
of the self-perception of the return migration bureaucracy. The discussion of the 
flowchart and of the notion of success both reveal an orientation of the 
bureaucracy towards the self-perpetuation of the system and the maintenance of 
its inherent logic. This observation has been made and discussed also in the 
literature on bureaucracy that emphasises the self-perpetuating tendency of 
bureaucracies (e.g. Bauman 1998; Weber 1922: 660f).  
However, there is a second orientation at work. Its principle is not self-
perpetuation – in a Luhmannian-language one could call this autopoiesis 
(Luhmann 1987) – but the appropriate procession of cases. In the discussion of 
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the flowchart, one can discover this aspect in the insistence of the return 
migration counsellors on their autonomy and their discretionary power that 
allows them to judge cases on an individual basis. In the discussion of the notion 
of success, it becomes visible when the return migration bureaucrats understand 
success as the successful realisation of an individual project.  
These two orientations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, they 
constitute each other. This double orientation of the return migration 
bureaucracy’s self-perception corresponds to Didier Fassin’s description of the 
contemporary European asylum policy in general. He argues that migration 
policies oscillate “between sentiments of sympathy on the one hand and concern 
for order on the other hand, between a policy of pity and a policy of control” 
(Fassin 2005:366). The return migration counsellor is the prototypical figure 
that combines the policy of pity and the policy of control.  
However, there is a difference between the case of the governance of voluntary 
return this dissertation focuses on and the argument made in the literature on 
the humanitarianisation of the Europen asylum regime (e.g. Fassin 2005; 
Ticktin 2011, 2014). This strand of literature argues that a policy of compassion 
has replaced the language of rights. In the case of assisted voluntary return, it is 
the combination of a humanitarianism relying on the threat of violence in the 
form of forced deportation that has replaced the language of rights. The 
humanitarian act of an assisted return is based and relies on the threat of violence. 
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In short, it is a policy of compassion that conceals the underlying state-
sanctioned violence of deportation.  
In this particular setting, the principle of compassion is only conceivable against 
the backdrop of the threat of forced deportation. A return under the condition 
of the AVR programme has always to be considered within this larger 
framework. As the analysis of the two return migration officials and their 
interpretation of the flowchart in the first part of this chapter has shown, the 
logic of the enforcement of the decisions of the previous instance eventually 
means that a voluntary return simply anticipates the negative decision, rather 
than offering a real choice between two alternatives. This same tendency can be 
observed in Switzerland’s latest asylum law reform from 2015 and accepted in a 
popular referendum in 2016. With the promise to speed up the often lengthy 
asylum procedures and in order to make it more transparent and fair, one of the 
announced measures was the systematic integration of assisted voluntary return. 
The idea is that return assistance should be systematically offered to any asylum 
seeker, and the sooner she or he withdraws his or her application and agrees in a 
voluntary return, the higher the benefit would be. Until now – as of mid 2016 
– this idea has been tested in a pilot project in a reception and procession centre 
in the canton of Zurich but has not been implemented further yet.  
This brings me to the last example that helps to illustrate how a policy of 
repression constitutes the policy of compassion. It is the case of a return 
migration consultation project of a local section of the Red Cross in a canton in 
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Switzerland. The project is entitled as „Detention: Future-Oriented And Return 
Migration Counselling“. It offers return migration consultation for imprisoned 
rejected asylum seekers, who serve a criminal sentence.86 The project description 
reads as follows: “The consultation takes place in the prison […] The 
consultation is based on the principle of serving the interest of the detained 
person.”87 Just recall that it is the Red Cross – still a synonym for humanitarian 
action – that is responsible for the realisation of the project. It gives the 
impression that the return migration consultation for the detainees is grounded 
in purely humanitarian reasons. The claim to base the consultation on the 
principle of “serving the interest of the detained person” conceals entirely the 
circumstances and constraints under which the counselling takes place; in the 
prison as the prototype of the “total institution” (Goffman 1990). It is even more 
significant in the case of rejected asylum seekers who are in administrative 
detention and not even serving a criminal sentence. Deprived from any real 
choice, return migration counselling in such a setting insinuates that there is still 
a choice. The policy of compassion that might aim at an alleviation of the 
hardship of forced deportation is presented in the form of an offer without 
 
86 This return counselling project is not part of the AVR programme, as rejected asylum seekers who serve 
a prison sentence are not eligible for assisted voluntary return. In exceptional cases, they may receive a 
small amount of money as a starting aid once back in their country of origin.  
87 Original: „Die Beratungen finden in den Hafteinrichtungen des Kantons Bern statt […] Die Beratungen 
orientieren sich am Interesse der inhaftierten Personen.“ (https://www.srk-bern.ch/de/migration/detention-
perspektiven-und-rueckkehrberatung; accessed 09.10.2014, English translation D.L.) 
 239 
engagement. Deprived of any alternatives of mobility, negotiation and choice 
are reduced to the terms of the return that are in total control of the institution.  
As a conclusion, let me briefly return to Max Weber’s important distinction 
between “formale rationale Sachlichkeit” (Weber 1922: 664; formal and rational 
objectivity) and “materielle Gerechtigkeit” (Weber 1922: 664, substantive 
fairness). Weber argues that bureaucracy only strives for formal and rational 
objectivity. It is unable to provide substantive fairness. He considers this self-
restraint at the same time as a virtue of bureaucracies and deplores it as a failure. 
The interpretation of the return migration bureaucracy through the lens of 
Fassin’s (2012) distinction between a policy of repression and a policy of 
compassion highlights how it is caught in Weber’s dialectics of the bureaucratic 
self-restriction to formal and rational objectivity as a virtue and a failure at the 
same time. As long as the policy of control follows a mere bureaucratic logic, it 
relies on the principle of the formal and rational objectivity. When the 
bureaucrats argue that their work as return migration counsellors consists in the 
enforcement of negative decisions, they argue in the logic of a policy of control. 
In contrast, the policy of compassion cannot be entirely subsumed under and 
determined by a policy of repression, as well as the policy of compassion cannot 
be read as an analogy to the provision of substantive fairness. Rather, this chapter 
has shown that the policy of compassion is a false substitute of the principle of 
substantive fairness. It renders invisible the power structures inscribed in the 
logic of formal and rational objectivity of the return migration bureaucracy. The 
question of differentiated exclusion and the unequal distribution of possibilities 
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of mobility is concealed by these humanitarian actions of the return migration 
bureaucracy.   
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VII. Governing Voluntariness 
“We are here to help those who need to leave Switzerland.” This is a postcard’s 
tagline advertising the services of a regional return counselling service in 
Switzerland. It perfectly captures the ambiguity of return counselling in a 
nutshell. Return counselling services offer advice and help, but address those who 
are brought into and captured in a situation of constraints by the very same 
border regime that now enters the scene as the helping and assisting authority. 
This chapter discusses this ambiguity of the return counselling service. It 
highlights the contradictions of assisted voluntary return AVR as an important 
part of border policies. Based on the interviews with return migration 
bureaucrats and the advertising material of the return counselling services, I 
discuss how the return migrant is conceived and shaped as a self-entrepreneurial 
subject. In the concluding remarks of this chapter, I suggest to read this 
governance of voluntariness through the lens of David Graeber’s (2012; 2015) 
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remarks on bureaucracy and violence. This whole discussion prepares the ground 
for the following conclusion that takes up again the dissertation’s main concern: 
the contradictions of the modern liberal nation in the governance of 
transnational mobility.  
On Grey Geese and Return Counselling 
During an interview with a return consultant on her work, my interlocutor gave 
me the above-mentioned postcard. It advertises the different services of the 
return counselling service. She explained that she designed the postcard herself 
during an advanced training course on public relations she had completed 
recently. The counsellor explained to me that she spent a lot of time developing 
the design of the postcard, reflecting on the appropriate message, and choosing 
the perfect image that illustrates the return counselling service’s aim.  
The postcard features the faint, blue coloured image of a group of grey geese 
flying from left to right. Above in white letters, the already mentioned tagline 
that reads: “We are here to help those who need to leave Switzerland.” The 
postcard’s backside contains further information about opening hours, the 
office’s address, and the offered services. It targets rejected asylum seekers eligible 
for AVR.  
Analysing the explicit message and the symbolic language of this postcard opens 
a window onto the meaning of the return counselling service and its imagined 
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role in border policies. On a first level, the postcard’s symbolic language 
emphasises freedom and voluntariness; not only in text, but also through the 
image. The image of grey geese evokes the transnational character of migration 
between Europe and North Africa. It refers to the dense network of transnational 
connections between both shores of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, it contains 
a hidden specific reference to Tunisia, whether it is intended or not. Each year 
large grey geese colonies spend the winter in the Ichkeul national park with its 
mild climatic conditions compared to the cold winter in Europe. The Ichkeul 
region is a wetland in the North of Tunisia, located in the hinterland of Menzel 
Bourguiba in the gouvernorat of Bizerte. While the image of grey geese refers to 
a temporary transnational migration pattern, the return counselling service does 
not offer programmes for temporary transnational mobility, but a voluntary 
return that is intended as a one-time migration back to the country of origin. In 
this point, the image contradicts the intended aim of the return counselling 
service. While the grey geese come and go with the change of the seasons, the 
target group of the postcard is supposed to stay “at home” once back in Tunisia. 
This highlights the fact that there are different meanings of freedom of 
movement at stake, and it refers to the ambiguous and contested character of 
voluntary return assistance.  
The image with the grey geese evokes a further meaning. Flying birds refer to 
infinite freedom. They cross borders at will in the rhythm of the seasons and the 
changing weather conditions. The postcard represents human mobility through 
the image of the mobility of animals, as if human mobility is in the same way a 
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natural right as it is for animals. The specific condition of transnational human 
mobility is stripped from any context and reduced to the mere flow of mobility. 
The visual substitution of human mobility with non-human mobility omits any 
reference to rules, regulations, or law that shape the conditions of human 
mobility. As a consequence, symbolically the counselling service is placed in an 
clean space devoid of any external constraints and imagines itself as if it was here 
to merely help migrants realising their projects of mobility.  
However, the back of the postcard – and the whole text in general – tells a 
different story. The AVR counselling service is precisely not the place to seek 
assistance for the realisation of one’s plans of transnational mobility. The tagline 
reveals that the service is for those “who need to leave Switzerland.” This is plain 
text. In contrast to the visual reference to unlimited freedom and mobility, the 
text explicitly mentions the constraints of transnational mobility. Apparently, 
certain people are not allowed to exercise their right to transnational mobility 
but have to leave the territory. The postcard’s text discloses no further details 
why the counselling service’s target group is in a situation of constraints and 
“needs to leave Switzerland.” It simply offers advice and consultation for those 
who are in such a situation.  
The postcard thus makes explicit where AVR counselling is located. It is precisely 
at the point, where constraints and voluntariness meet. The notions of assistance, 
help, and voluntariness organise the work of the return migration bureaucracy 
during the consultation of migrants. The previous chapter already discussed the 
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dimension of assistance and help. The reconstruction of the realisation of return 
migration projects let us now discover how the return migration bureaucracy 
oscillates between these two poles of constraints and voluntariness. In particular, 
it allows to explore how voluntariness is conceived and realised.  
“Facilitating Voluntariness” 
With these preliminary observations in mind on the self-imagination of the work 
of return counselling, let us now have a closer look at the return counselling 
process itself. One key document during the return counselling is an outline of 
a “return project” (Rückkehrprojekt) the return migrant has to develop with the 
help of the return migration counsellor. On the basis of this outline, a first 
calculation of the costs is made. However, the return migration counsellor does 
not necessarily dispose of any specific knowledge on the country of return, on 
the local economy, or the local context in general. As I have learnt, this does not 
matter any way, as one return migration counsellor once told me. The only 
importance at this stage of the return migration process is to draft a first idea and 
not developing already an elaborated and detailed plan. Although a first general 
decision is taken whether the AVR programme supports the project, it seems to 
have particular relevance, as both return migrants and return counsellors told me 
repeatedly. Especially for return migrants, this signifies to agree in a voluntary 
return on very insecure grounds. They do not have the guarantee that they will 
get their project supported once back in their country of origin. This leads to an 
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increasing power asymmetry. For example, one interlocutor I met in Tunis 
decided to pull out from the programme as his original project idea was 
eventually rejected by the local return migration office in Tunisia. Frustrated and 
with the feeling of having been betrayed, he decided to break off any further 
contact with the office.  
The fact that the first outline of the return project is often “of poor quality” – 
thus the voice of a return migration official in Tunisia – the Tunisian colleagues 
of the Swiss return migration counsellors often wondered how little knowledge 
they had on local context and the Tunisian economy. Others rather emphasise 
that the contribution of the Swiss colleagues is marginal to the development and 
realisation of the projects, “because we on the ground have to start again from 
scratch anyway,” as a Tunisian return migration official explained.  
In many cases, this difference in perspective is fuelled by different ideas of the 
role of the return migration officials. Although they share the assumption that 
all officials in the AVR migration bureaucracy are here to “help” and “assist” the 
asylum seekers, they consider themselves either as controllers and enablers, or as 
social workers and assistants. Let me explain this point by returning back to the 
AVR migration counsellor who designed the grey geese postcard in the 
introduction to this chapter. In the interview she told me:  
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“It is important that my clients feel responsible for their own 
projects. Therefore, they have to search for the necessary 
information for themselves. I assist them, when they need help.”  
The issue of responsibility comes up over and over again as a leitmotiv in 
conversations with return counsellors. It adds a further dimension to the 
provision of help, as explored already in the previous chapter. Like many of her 
colleagues, the return counsellor stresses the importance of responsibility, and 
how her work is geared towards the goal that asylum seeker “assume 
responsibility” for their return. It is an expression that shows how return 
counsellors consider their clients as persons who do not assume responsibility on 
their own. Therefore, they see their mission in raising awareness for the self-
responsibility of the return migrants’ projects.  
The AVR migration counsellors’ widespread assumption of the return migrants’ 
lack of self-responsibility is interpreted in two different. Either it is interpreted 
as an outcome – and failure – of the asylum system that produces passive 
subjects, or it is interpreted in an individualistic perspective intertwined with a 
cultural reading of Tunisians as “not used to work and assume responsibility.”88 
It is an interesting detail that bureaucrats who tend to the first interpretation 
 
88 It is worth noting that this culturalist assumption can be found not only among Swiss return migration 
counsellors, but as well – and often even more strongly expressed – by AVR migration officials in Tunisia, 
though in the second case, the very same expression should be read less as a culturalist assumption, but 
rather as a classicist assumption. Often in the same age group as the return migrants, the AVR migration 
officials have another educational background with degrees in higher education, either from a university or 
a university of applied sciences.  
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consider their work rather in terms of empowerment, while those who tend to 
the second interpretation consider their own work in terms of help and charity. 
No matter where return counsellors position themselves in this field between 
empowerment on one side, and help and charity on the other side, both camps 
draw a sharp line between their work as return counsellors and the foreigners’ 
police. The following section explores the return counsellors’ permanent effort 
to uphold and highlight this separation.  
Return Counsellor and Return Migrant – A Complicated Relationship 
The general tendency among the AVR migration counsellors to draw the line 
between counselling and policing (in the form of the foreigners’ police) is 
reflected in different ways – discursively and symbolically. On a symbolical level 
for example, it is often expressed in the way the return migration offices are 
arranged, where consultation takes place. Typically, these offices avoid giving the 
impression of an ordinary administration. Rather, return counsellors try to create 
a warm and welcoming atmosphere. The following exemplarily description of 
such an office shows how this is achieved. The description derives from the 
fieldnotes I took at the occasion of an interview with a return counsellor.  
The return counsellor’s office was located in the highly secured and controlled 
compound of one of the reception and procession centres in a smaller border 
town in Switzerland. After registration as a visitor at the entrance of the centre, 
you had to pass several security gates in order to reach the inner parts of the 
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compound. Here, hidden at the end of a long and winding corridor, the office 
was located on the first floor. From one window you could see the inner 
courtyard, a grey concrete square with a few benches. The other window – the 
blinds half closed – showed a no-man’s land between an industrial zone, a main 
road, and the railway tracks. One corner of the office was equipped with a couch 
and a low table, an old suitcase and a small palm tree stood close by. On the 
wall, some maps completed the scenery. The whole arrangement reminded of a 
travel agency rather than an office of the state administration, though it remained 
a rather desperate attempt to create a warm and welcoming atmosphere. The 
whole decoration stood in sharp contrast to the whole security architecture of 
the building in concrete. In another return migration office, the counsellor had 
pinned a series of postcard on the wall behind her desk. These were postcards 
former clients had sent her after their return. All of these symbols aimed at the 
setting AVR consultation apart from the rest of the asylum bureaucracy. Instead, 
they aimed at creating proximity between counsellors and return migrants.  
On certain occasions, these attempts to create a more informal and intimate 
atmosphere led to the confusion of the type of advice the office provides. 
Migrants who expected legal advice complained to me that the office was not 
able to provide it. “They should fight for us, and appeal against the decision. But 
instead, I was only given advice on the possibilities of return” I was told for 
example by Foued, when we were talking about his experiences in the reception 
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and procession centres in Switzerland.89 It was this disillusion that led him to 
take the decision to leave the centre and to try finding a way on his own in 
Switzerland. He is not the only person I met who made similar experiences. 
Many rejected Tunisian asylum seekers who were in contact with one of the 
return consultation services at one point or another during their trajectory 
expressed a deep ambiguity and mistrust about the role of the return consultation 
services. Instead of return consultation, most of them would have preferred legal 
advice, as they told me when asked about their experience. Legal support – and 
not return counselling – would have allowed them to appeal against the projected 
negative decision.90 For many of them, return consultation was only the second-
best option, lacking “proper legal advice” as an informant expressed it. In 
contrast to a legal aid office, return consultation is not considered as something 
serious by many Tunisian asylum seekers, though there were indeed few who 
took a different stance. This minority argued that return consultation service had 
at least a substantial outcome. Or, as a former Tunisian clandestine migrant 
explained to me in Tunisia: “It gave me access to return assistance. And this is 
why I sought for advice.”  
 
89 See also Foued’s migration biography in Chapter 5.  
90 Rejected asylum seekers do have the possibility to appeal against a negative decision. And there are 
legal aid offices who take in charge these cases. However, many of my informants were unaware of the 
precise legal procedure. And at the moment when they came in contact with the return consultation 
service, the time limit for appeal had already expired. 
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The thorough attempts to separate the different stages of the border regime is 
one important strategy of the AVR counsellors when they interact with return 
migrants. We discovered this tendency already in the analysis of the flowchart 
and how it is mobilised to separate AVR from the decision-making process in 
Chapter Six. AVR counsellors deny that they are part of the very same border 
regime that differentiates the possibilities of transnational mobility. In contrast, 
they consider themselves as advocates of the rejected asylum seekers, thus 
imagining themselves as outsiders to the asylum administration. During a 
conversation with me, one of the consultants explicitly insisted that she does not 
consider the aim of her work as the “execution of deportation orders.”91 She 
explained that consultancy only works when it is an open-ended process without 
any expectations of the possible outcome from her part. This echoes the logic of 
consultancy in social work, which emphasises the importance of a working 
alliance (Arbeitsbündnis) between counsellor and client; a term that refers to a 
mutual and sometimes explicit agreement on the aims and subjects of the 
consultation process.  
Starting from this particular bureaucratic ethics, she considers AVR counselling 
as something clearly set aside from the whole rest of the asylum procedure. In 
her case, it was easier to uphold this separation, as the return counselling service 
 
91 This statement (from an interview with a return migration counsellor in June 2013) stands in sharp 
contrast with the two return counsellors portrayed in the last chapter and the argument they made with the 
help of the flowchart.  
 252 
was not part of the state administration in contrast to the two return counsellors 
portrayed in the previous chapter. Instead, it was an independent organisation 
with a mandate from the state to provide AVR counselling for asylum seekers. 
The return counsellor thus considered the independence of her organisation as 
a virtue. She argued that this independence was essential to guarantee the high 
quality of the return consultancy. With her conviction of the necessity of the 
open-ended character of AVR consultation, she sometimes even suggested to 
some clients that a voluntary return might not be the best choice in their 
particular situation, though these were rather hidden remarks than concrete 
recommendations.  
It is remarkable with how much effort return migration counsellors – consciously 
and unconsciously – hide the everyday violence in the form of the permanent 
threat of forced deportation that shapes and structures this institution. The 
consultation appears as a process that is not result-oriented and without 
prejudging the outcome. In this context, the return migrant is considered as 
someone who needs help and assistance. This terminology used in the everyday 
language of the return migration counsellors, but also in the written advertising 
material that is distributed among the asylum seekers, positions the return 
migration bureaucracy outside the structures of the asylum procedure. This 
ignores that they follow a similar logic of differentiated mobility.  
The figure of the return migrant is imagined not only as a person that needs help 
or assistance, but also education. Therefore, return migration consultants see 
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their offer also as an opportunity to raise the self-responsibility of the return 
migrants. This aspect of education and the shaping of the migratory subject 
through the governance of its return is discussed in more detail in the following 
part.  
Learning the Ropes of Doing Business 
In order to better understand how the AVR migration programme aims at 
educating the return migrants “to become successful businessmen” I will have a 
closer look at what is happening in Tunisia, once the return migrants are back 
home. I examine how the AVR programme aims at transforming the return 
migrants from undesirable migrants into self-entrepreneurial subjects. This 
analysis begins with an encounter with professor Karaoui, as I will call him here. 
He teaches a compulsory three-days business training course for return migrants 
that is required to be eligible for applying for the remaining full amount of return 
assistance. It then shifts the attention on the realisation of an actual return 
migration project. I will analyse the encounter between two return migration 
officials and a return migrant. The latter was about to accomplish his project and 
asked for further support, which led to a dispute between him and the return 
migration officials who was on one of his inspection tours and visited the recently 
opened farm. Through these two encounters, I answer the question how the 
return migrant is shaped and imagined as a self-entrepreneurial subject in the 
eyes of the return migration programme.  
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Becoming a Successful Businessman 
A small, accurately trimmed moustache, a neat suit with a perfect fit, and a 
distinguished language; this is professor Karaoui’s appearance when I first met 
him in a cafe in El Menzah 1.92 I was a bit ahead of time, sat down and ordered 
my coffee already. He joined me a couple of minutes later, ordered coffee and a 
shisha, greeted the others in the café. Apparently, he was a regular client. He 
knew the waiter and half of the other guests in the room. Soufiene Karaoui 
taught business administration at one of the universities in Tunis. He had 
developed the compulsory course for migrants who joined Switzerland’s 
programme for assisted voluntary return migration and apply for the funding of 
their projects. Emphasising his cultural and symbolic capital, he presented 
himself as an overachieving businessman who had successfully established several 
companies. Trying to impress with his manners and his knowledge, he not only 
talked with me in his elaborated French – in general considered as a marker of 
distinction of the Tunisian bourgeoisie, proud of a so-called western-oriented 
education in colloquial language – but he also explained in detail his professional 
trajectory as a businessman. A bit later in the evening, an old friend of him joined 
our conversation They began to indulge in reminiscences when they had started 
their professional careers as businessmen some decades ago. Only very late, the 
 
92 The first meeting with M. Karaoui from which this description derives took place in March 2014. 
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conversation came back to my initial intention why I decided to meet him, and 
he began to explain to me his role in the AVR migration programme. 
Throughout the whole evening, the conversation meandered between stories of 
the two men about their successful business affairs in the past, and Karaoui's 
work as a professor for business administration at a private university in Tunis. 
In contrast to his job as a professor and businessman, he considered the 
engagement in the context of the return migration bureaucracy as his “duty as a 
proud citizen to contribute to the development of the country” as he told me 
once, although –as I concluded from his occasional side remarks – he was 
probably way better paid with this mandate than with is ordinary job at the 
university.  
Overall, I was intrigued by two remarks of M. Karaoui. First, I was puzzled by 
the way he depicted his work as a civil duty, and second, I was wondering what 
he meant by the expression that he was responsible for “teaching the basis of 
doing business successfully” to the return migrants. In order to explore these two 
questions further, I immediately asked him whether it would be possible to 
attend one of his courses. Unfortunately, there were no concrete plans for further 
courses during my fieldwork time in Tunisia. For this reason, I was forced to 
substitute participant observation with other methods in order to explore these 
questions at least partially, and I opted for a reconstructive method (Bohnsack 
2014). I conducted a series of interviews on this subject with different 
administrators in the return migration bureaucracy who were involved in this 
course, and I asked return migrants who completed the course about their 
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experiences and their perspective. In addition, I collected documents that were 
used for this course, for example the template for the return projects the 
beneficiaries have to fill in order to apply for the necessary funding. A central 
figure in this whole setting was professor Karaoui who designed the course on 
behalf of the IOM.  
After the arrival in Tunisia, the business training course is a precondition for the 
return migrants in order to receive funding for their return migration project. 
Initially, the course took three weeks and was held in Tunis. During this time, 
the return migrants learned the “basis of doing business successfully,” as M. 
Karaoui used to express it. However, it quickly turned out that the three-weeks 
course was wrongly designed, as M. Karaoui admitted. For the return migrants, 
it was not possible to spend three weeks in a row in the capital, as they could not 
afford the high living costs, especially when they did not know any relatives or 
friends there. In addition, M. Karaoui first insisted to teach the course in French; 
a language that many of the return migrants only barely knew. For these two 
reasons, the initial course was a failure. With this experience, M. Karaoui was 
commissioned to redesign the course and he transformed it into a three-day 
intensive course and switched the study language to Arabic. In this new format, 
the course consisted mainly in the completion of the application form and the 
drafting of the return migration project; a fact that M. Karaoui deeply deplored, 
as he would not be able to “educate the return migrants properly,” as he disclosed 
to me.  
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Reduced to the correct completion of forms and a simple calculation of the 
estimated costs of the planned business activity, M. Karaoui nonetheless insisted 
on his initial ambition of teaching the return migrants at least some essentials of 
business administration. For this reason, the form included a “market analysis” 
and the identification of “direct competitors.”  
In contrast to M. Karaoui’s enthusiastic account of the business training course, 
return migrants’ take on the compulsory course was less positive. Many judged 
the course as a tiresome obligation in order to finally receive the necessary and 
promised funding for their project. In a certain way, even M. Karaoui would 
endorse this perspective. “The first course day is always really, really hard”, he 
acknowledged. According to him, the participants would enter the seminar room 
with a lot of scepticism, and it always needed a lot of persuasive efforts from his 
side to convince them of the usefulness of the course. He considered this lack of 
interest as a result of the “poor education” of the return migrants in general.  
This recurrent motive of a poor education seems to be the outcome of a conflict 
of a completely different socio-economic background between them. M. 
Karaoui’s perspective on “doing business successfully” is shaped by his own 
middle-class background, disposing of the necessary means for investments. In 
contrast, the return migrants even struggled to make ends meet on a daily basis 
and to be able to cover the costs for spending three days in Tunis only to attend 
the course. Most of the return migrants did not dispose of any savings when they 
returned. Even more, many of them have had considerable debts to their 
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relatives, as they asked them to lend some money of the harraga. Instead of 
thinking about investments – as the business-minded teacher expected – they 
were rather thinking about how to pay back their debts. This was not only the 
case for example for Fathi, who had to find ways in order to pay back the debts 
to his uncle, but also for Amine, who was indebted to the family of his uncle as 
well. When Amine returned to his father’s home, his social environment 
expected him to pay back the debts immediately.93 After all, he was in Europe 
and everyone around him imageined that he made a lot of money there.  
This shows that the diverging interests between M. Karaoui and his students is 
less a matter of education and more a matter of the respective socio-economic 
situation. The lack of “business-mindedness” of his students that M. Karaoui 
deplored so much is an effect of the economic pressure the return migrants were 
facing from their extended families. As a result, the return migrants’ economic 
strategy is rather focused on short-term decisions, as they do not dispose of the 
necessary financial resources to pursue a long-term economic goals.  
In the Field 
The conflict between different economic strategies and the qualification of the 
return migrants’ short-term economic strategies as irrational by return migration 
 
93 In the conversations, he sometimes refers to the paternal uncle when he told me that story. But at 
another moment, he insisted that it was a maternal uncle who had lend him some money in order to pay 
the harraga. 
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bureaucrats emerged again in a conflict between two return migration officials 
and a return migrant I witnessed when I was accompanying two local return 
migration officials on one of their “field trips” as they were called.  
I received the long-awaited call from a return migration official from a regional 
return migration office. It was mid-September 2014 and I returned to Tunisia 
for a short follow-up fieldwork. Among other already planned meetings, I 
wanted to try for one more time to join a team of return migration officials on 
an inspection tour of some running projects. Since months I was trying to get 
access. Each time I was promised to be able to join one of the missions, the 
scheduled meeting was eventually cancelled. Therefore, I was not very hopeful 
that it would actually work out this time. All the more I was excited to receive 
the call. The local return migration official told me that they plan to visit the 
farm of a return migrant I will call Mouldi here. His farm was somewhere in the 
remote hinterland of Sfax.  
My contact on the phone was working for one of the local migration offices. He 
holds a degree in agronomics from the university of Tunis, but originates from 
the South – from a small town close to Médenine. On the phone, we arranged 
the meeting for the next day and he insisted to pick me up at the hotel where I 
spent the night. It would have been impossible for me to reach Sfax the same 
day by train or with a louage (shared taxi circulating on a defined route) from 
Tunis, where I was based for this follow-up fieldwork. Although I told him that 
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my hotel was just a few steps away from his office and that I could easily walk 
the short distance, he insisted picking me up at the hotel.  
In the next morning, the driver was waiting for me in the hotel lobby. He had 
parked the brand-new white SUV with diplomatic registration plates in front of 
the hotel in a parking lot. I climbed into the car and we drove the 60 seconds or 
so to the office of the local return migration office. There, the return migration 
official received me in his office. It was located on the first floor of an 
inconspicuous and modest building. He offered coffee and water and showed 
me the office. “No time to lose” he suddenly exclaimed, interrupted his 
explanations, and grabbed a pile of documents. We went downstairs back to the 
car, where he threw the documents on the back seat climbed into the car and 
slammed the rear door. He asked me to take the front seat. The driver grabbed 
some bottles of water from the boot, handed them over to me and the return 
migration official, and started the engine.  
During the ride that took us northwards out of town, the return migration 
official explained his professional career at length. Before working in Sfax, he 
was engaged in another NGO development project in Zarzis near Djerba. 
Sometimes, he interrupted himself and pointed to a small farmhouse or a shop 
at the roadside and explained that these were all successfully realised return 
projects he had supervised.  
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An hour later or so, we arrived at Mouldi’s farm. It was a couple of weeks before 
the aïd el-kebir. At this occasion, traditionally every Tunisian family who could 
afford it sacrifices a lamb for the feast. The 32-year-old farmer was rather restless. 
Thefts of lambs occur very often around the aïd, and Mouldi was worried about 
his livestock. Only a few days ago, someone had stolen a couple of lambs from a 
neighbouring farm. At least this was the rumour that spread here in the region. 
Therefore, he decided to sleep in the stable in order to protect his flock. “Any 
loss would be a catastrophe” he explained to me in Italian, the language in which 
we used to communicate. Due to his long stay in Italy, he spoke way better 
Italian than I Arabic. And as he left school early and without a diploma, he 
virtually did not speak any French. He was eagerly awaiting the next market days 
in the nearby villages. For the first time since he had started breeding sheep, he 
would be able to sell part of his livestock. This would allow him to cover some 
of his debts. Before his departure to Europe, he borrowed some money to pay 
the harraga from his uncle, and then again after his return in order to make a 
living. This uncle was now expecting that Mouldi would pay back his debts 
before the aïd.  
The return migration expressed himself very satisfied with the progress of 
Mouldi’s project. “As you see, he takes care of his livestock. And he works very 
carefully” he judged. But the longer the visit took, the more his mood was 
changing. At some point, he got apparently annoyed. During the inspection, 
Mouldi was asking him several times whether there would be the possibility to 
enlarge the project and get additional financial support for this. He was 
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considering buying one or two cows in order to “diversify” his business, as he 
called it. For obvious reasons, this business language immediately reminded me 
of M. Karaoui. As he explained to the local return migration official, his 
intention was to use the milk for daily own consumption, selling the surplus and 
the calves.  
It was obvious that the return migration official did not agree at all. Rather angry 
now, he commented to me in French that Mouldi would always complain that 
he would not receive enough money. “It is always the same. They try to extract 
some extra money from the project”, he concluded, branching out from this 
particular case to a general judgement through the use of the word “they”, 
thereby referring to return migrants in general. He then switched back to this 
particular case and added: “But he knows very clearly that he already received 
the full amount of assistance.”  
It was not for the first time that I witnessed this suspicion against return migrants 
by staff members of the local AVR migration office. Among them, the saying 
was that in general, return migrants would be rather clever in exploiting strategies 
to obtain some extra money. This general mistrust is one of the reasons why 
return migrants would not receive direct payments. When I discussed this issue 
with a senior staff member the year before, he indirectly confirmed my guess. 
Distributing money directly to the beneficiaries would lead to situations, where 
they spent the money not for investing in the projects, but rather for 
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consumption, he argued.94 However, Mouldi was suspicious too, as he explained 
in a calm moment when the return migration official was out of earshot. He 
suspected that he never received any money directly, as the return migration 
officials would give preferential treatment to a specific supplier of animal 
nutrition and construction material and would receive a share from the profits 
in return, thus far Mouldi’s theory.  
The dispute between Mouldi and the return migration official continued 
without coming to a conclusion. While Mouldi insisted that an additional cow 
would be “an investment for the future” that would allow him to better care for 
his family and in particular for his new-born son, the return migration official 
argued that Mouldi did not dispose of the necessary knowledge to raise cows, in 
addition to the fact that his project was concluded anyway and no further 
support could be guaranteed. Rather, he should focus on raising sheep, the return 
migration official recommended him. If at all, it would be better to invest the 
money to enlarge the herd of sheep. “But anyway, forget it. It is excluded to 
receive more money” he ended the discussion. Mouldi continued and replied 
that this would not serve his needs at all. What he needed was something that 
would give him an immediate benefit, he insisted. A cow that gives milk on a 
daily basis would cover his needs better, he argued once again. Annoyed by the 
on-going discussion, the staff member concluded that it was Mouldi’s 
 
94 Informal conversation with senior staff member, November 2013. 
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responsibility how he would spend the earned money. “But in what concerns the 
project, there are rules. And I have to follow them!” he exclaimed.  
This episode shows how the idea of doing business successfully – the leitmotiv 
of M. Karaoui’s educational effort – is interpreted in contradictory ways. On the 
one hand, there is the long-term economic strategy expressed in the logic of the 
return migration project and expressed in the reasoning of the return migration 
official. This logic interprets investments as long-term future-oriented. On the 
other hand, there is a different economic logic at work in the case of the return 
migrant. He has much shorter cycles of investment in mind, and the main 
concern is to be able to make ends meet by the end of the day. The dispute 
further highlights that the clash of these two different economic logics is 
embedded in unequal power relations. Mouldi and the return migration official 
clearly did not argue on a levelled playfield. Eventually, the long-term economic 
perspective of the return migration project prevails over the short-term and daily 
economic needs to make a living. Mouldi would not have another choice than 
adopting the long-term economic strategy, although it did not meet his interests.  
This ethnographic vignette sheds light on a further aspect. The longer the whole 
assisted return migration procedure lasts, the more important becomes the 
imbalance of power between return migrant and the return migration 
bureaucrats. At the beginning, the return migration bureaucracy indeed relies – 
at least to a certain extent – on the voluntariness and willingness of the asylum 
seeker to agree in a return and collaborate with the bureaucracy. The longer the 
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process proceeds, the more the return migrant becomes dependent from the 
return migration bureaucracy. In the initial situation during the return migration 
consultation, the immediate bargaining power of the return migration 
bureaucrat is rather limited. The threat of deportation is one aspect, the 
promised financial support another one, though these are no more than rather 
abstract threats and incentives respectively. This situation radically changes once 
back in Tunisia. For the return migration bureaucracy, the aspect of persuasion 
and incentives diminished, as the programme has already achieved its main goal: 
an inexpensive return without the use of physical violence, as we have already 
discussed in Chapter Six. The return migrant, however, is in a more fragile and 
vulnerable situation than ever before. Through the return, he has given up his 
main argument in this power game with the return migration bureaucracy in the 
form of his “undesired” presence in Switzerland. All the sudden, he finds himself 
in a weak position back in his country of origin. He has not yet received the 
financial assistance he was promised, and he is facing a series of conditions he 
has to meet in order to receive any further assistance.  
Conclusion 
In this conclusion, I would like to relate the ethnographic observations on the 
governance of voluntariness to David Graeber’s work on bureaucracy (2012; 
2015). Graeber argues that bureaucracy is ultimately based on violence in its 
literal form. For his argument, he uses a specific notion of structural violence, 
distinguishing between social structures based on violence and structures that 
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produce violence. In other words, in the first case, violence is the generating 
principle, in the second case, violence is the effect or outcome (see Graeber 
2012:112ff). A similar distinction can be found also elsewhere, for example in 
Scheper-Hughes’s (1993) work on children in favelas in Northeast Brazil, 
growing up in an environment that is marked by a general situation of scarcity, 
sickness, and death. In this book, she develops a similar idea of social structures 
based on violence.  
With a specific focus on bureaucracy, Graeber (2012) argues that we should take 
the aspect of violence seriously and in its literal meaning when discussing 
bureaucracies as agencies that exercise structural violence. In this perspective, 
bureaucracies are at the same time structures of violence and violent structures. 
This means that they are structures that operate on the basis of violence, and 
they are structures that have violent effects. The omnipresent threat of physical 
violence is needed to make the per se nonviolent bureaucracy work.  
The detailed analysis of the return migration bureaucracy through the different 
ethnographic vignettes – in particular the study of the encounters between 
individual bureaucrats and migrants, as it was the focus in this chapter – tend to 
overlook the aspect of structural violence. It is difficult to capture the everyday 
violence of the return migration bureaucracy, as it is beyond reach of the direct 
observational gaze. It can be captured only indirectly through reconstruction. 
The narrated reconstruction of the return migration biographies of my 
interlocutors allow way better to capture the agency of the return migrants and 
 267 
how they navigate assisted voluntary return between constraints and possibilities 
than discovering and elaborating the bureaucratic structures of violence. Many 
of the return migration biographies in Chapter Five highlight this aspect. Let me 
recall the example of Fathi the fisherman once again. His narration allows to 
discover a lot of deliberate choices to continue his transnational migration 
trajectory or stay at a certain place for longer. The lens of the autonomy of 
migration risks to gloss all too easily over the broader structuration of the field 
with its enabling and constraining aspects. This chapter – and the previous one 
as well – compensate somewhat this one-sidedness. They both bring back into 
focus the structural aspects of the return migration bureaucracy.  
For this reason, this chapter aimed at exploring how everyday violence of the 
migration regime is expressed and experience in the small everyday encounters 
between the return migration bureaucracy and return migrants. This allowed to 
explore at the same time how AVR migration operates on the basis of violence – 
i.e. the threat of forced deportation. At the same time, it showed that return 
migration is not necessarily the admission of a failure from the perspective of 
return migrants. Under specific circumstances, joining the AVR programme can 
be considered as an appropriation of mobility within the context of the AVR 
programme. As such, this chapter has demonstrated how the appropriation of 
mobility not necessarily works “against” the logics of the migration bureaucracy, 
but sometimes rather “within”.  
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Let me explore this aspect further with a reference to Mouldi, the sheep farmer 
we encountered in this chapter. The European border regime denies the 
possibility of transnational mobility for migrants like Mouldi. From the very 
beginning of his migration trajectory, his intention was always to return back to 
his family. He considered the temporal labour migration as a means to improve 
his economic conditions in Tunisia. As there was no other path than the harraga, 
he opted for this type of transnational mobility. When he later applied for the 
return migration programme, it can be read as an appropriation of mobility 
within the logic of the return migration bureaucracy. He tried to use the few 
possibilities of transnational mobility open to him in his own way.  
However, it would stretch too far the thesis of the autonomy of migration AOM 
to describe his choice as a moment of autonomy, and neither are his particular 
mobile practices challenging the border regime in any way, as the thesis of the 
AOM would argue. Rather, it is the temporal alliance of individual mobile 
practices, and the dominant prescribed paths of mobility. The intentions of 
Mouldi meet for a certain and very specific moment with the logics of the return 
migration regime. However, it is important to insist on the temporality and 
provisional character of this alignment; while the return is definitive in the logics 
of the return migration regime, it is only a provisional snapshot of the actual 
situation for Moulid. Or as he succinctly explained: “For the moment, it is the 
right decision.”  
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This brings up a further aspect; the incommensurability of the different 
economic rationales and how the return migration bureaucracy’s rationale 
prevails. Return migrants are forced to take short-term decisions and follow 
short-term economic strategies. They cannot afford to invest large sums in a 
project with the vague prospect of a potential return-on-investment in the far 
future. In contrast, the logic of the return migration programme follows precisely 
the rationale of a long-term economic strategy. It thus requires a considerable 
amunt of financial resources and time. This creates a permanent tension between 
the return migrant and the return migration bureaucrats. Firstly, return migrants 
as Mouldi (discussed in this chapter) or Fathi (discussed in Chapter Five) are 
embedded in networks of mutual dependencies.95 Just recall how Fathi’s uncle 
pressed him to pay back the debts within short notice. These social obligations 
do not allow the return migrants to follow the long-term investment-based logic 
of the return migration bureaucracy. Instead, they have to search for quick-fixes 
in order to satisfy the demands of all sorts from their social environment. And 
secondly, as mundane as it might sound, their first concern is to make ends meet 
at the end of the day and to struggle for covering the daily costs of living. The 
discussion in this chapter thus shows that the return migration bureaucracy's 
 
95 The idea of a network of mutual dependencies and financial obligations has been developed by Graeber 
in his work on debts (Graeber 2011), building on the long anthropologic tradition of theories of gift 
exchange (Mauss 1925). He sketches a picture of premodern societies where the state is absent. In these 
societies, financial obligations are linked to and embedded in social networks. In contrast, with the 
emerging state, this mutual dependency between social ties and financial obligations is disrupted. Financial 
obligations become impersonal and are turned into debts. In his account, Graeber idealises the mutual 
dependency between social networks and financial obligations, as social networks might be at the origin of 
highly unequal and extremely dependent social relationships as well.  
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perspective on return migrants as subjects who need education in order to 
become economically rational subjects falls rather short. It reduces the 
perspective of economic rationality to one single and hegemonic perspective on 
economic actions and reasoning.   
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VIII. Conclusion: The Governance of 
Transnational Mobility and the 
Contradictions of the Modern Liberal 
Nation State 
In this conclusion, I come back to the inherent contradictions of the modern 
liberal nation-state in the governance of transnational mobility. The institution 
of assisted voluntary return migration AVR is a prime site where these 
contradictions come to light and can be observed empirically. The idea of free 
movement as a genuine core value of liberalism meets the idea of nation-state 
sovereignty that consists – among other features – in deciding autonomously 
who is allowed to cross the state borders and who is denied the entry. 96 
 
96 I do not further discuss the different shades of philosophical liberalism and their position with regard to 
the freedom of movement. There are indeed significant differences, yet the majority shares in theory the 
idea that restrictions to free movements are inherently illiberal and need careful justification and deliberation 
(see Cassee 2013, cf. the communitarianist approach of Walzer 1983). Outliers are theories that could 
rather be described as libertarian (e.g. Wellman 2008).  
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Clandestine migration undermines the second idea, as it ignores the explicit rules 
of border crossing. This ignorance can be read as part of the autonomy of 
migration AOM.97 It thus creates a dilemma for the modern liberal nation-state: 
How shall the state react to the undermining of state sovereignty and questioning 
state borders through migratory practices? The institution of assisted voluntary 
return AVR is the attempt to address this dilemma. The analysis of the empirical 
material of this dissertation suggests that AVR is a response that does not solve the 
underlying dilemma, but rather transforms and conceals the inherent 
contradictions. The previous chapters presented a series of ethnographic 
vignettes of the return migration bureaucracy that allowed the study of these 
inherent contradictions of the modern liberal nation state, confronting the 
perspective of the mobile subjects with the perspective of the state. The 
dissertation suggests capturing these contradictions with the notion of governed 
voluntariness.  
Throughout the chapters, there are two major recurrent and contested fields that 
are constitutive for this governed voluntariness. The first field of contestation 
can be described as humanitarian reason (see Fassin 2012). This notion opens 
an analytical window on the return migration bureaucracy’s attempts to 
 
97 As my review of the thesis of the AOM shows, this condensed statement does not capture the dialectics 
between the hegemony of the border regime and its undermining by the autonomy of migration in full 
detail. As I have shown, the ignorance of the explicit rules of border crossing might comply with the logics 
of the border regime on a larger scale, as it contributes to the production of a group of people 
characterised by their exploitability through their precarious status as deportable aliens. This shows that the 
ignorance of the explicit rules of border crossing is not necessarily and exclusively an act of – unarticulated 
– resistance.  
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reconcile the incommensurable contradiction between voluntariness and 
governance. The other field of contestation – described through the analytical 
lens of the thesis of the autonomy of migration AOM – is the appropriation of 
transnational mobility at the same time against and in accordance with the 
migration regime.  
The following discussion of these two fields of contestation lead to some 
concluding remarks on bureaucracy as structural violence and as a structure of 
violence alike. The argument is then summarised with a discussion on assisted 
voluntary return migration as an expression of the contradictions of the modern 
liberal nation state facing transnational mobility.  
Compassion Instead of Rights and Entitlements 
In recent years, we can observe the rise of humanitarian reason as a dominant 
idea for the governance of asylum seekers. A language of compassion – in 
combination with means of repression – has gradually replaced the language of 
rights and entitlements that traditionally accompanied the discourses around 
asylum (see Fassin 2012). This replacement restructures the relationship between 
the state and asylum seekers with regard to entitlements and obligations. In a 
humanitarian perspective, the asylum seeker is no longer subject and bearer of 
rights. Simultaneously, the state is no longer the institution with the legal 
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obligation to protect asylum seekers from prosecution. 98  Instead, asylum 
applications are considered in a perspective of deservingness. As Fassin (2005) 
shows, suffering has become the point of reference for the question whether an 
asylum seeker is worth of protection. Eventually, the suffering body has become 
the ultimate proof for the deservingness of asylum. In other words, questions of 
rights have given way to this humanitarian gaze on suffering.99  
The Tunisian migrants we met in this dissertation do not qualify as refugees 
according to the law. From a purely legalistic perspective, none of them fulfils 
the relevant criteria for protection; neither on the basis of the relevant national 
laws nor the international laws and conventions.100  Such a narrow legalistic 
perspective leads to the prevailing image of the “bogus asylum seeker” in 
Switzerland’s migration bureaucracy with regard to Tunisian asylum seekers and 
legitimised by the officials in their colloquial discourses with reference to the 
asylum statistics that show an extremely low percentage of asylum granted to 
Tunisians. The humanitarian discourse with its shift in perspective from rights 
to charity is thus intertwined with a “hermeneutics of suspicion” (see Leiter 
 
98 More precisely, the obligation of the state is legally captured in the “non-refoulement” principle under 
international human rights law. Strictly speaking, the principle of humanitarian reason does not question 
this principle in legal terms. However, the shift from a rights-based discourse towards a humanitarian-
based discourse obfuscates the legal background of asylum as a right and replaces it with the idea of a 
charitable act.  
99 See also Ticktin (2006). She shows how humanitarianism and compassion makes illness a mean for 
sans-papiers to obtain a residence permit in France. 
100 On International level, the relevant legal document is The International Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, on European Level it is the European Convention on Human Rights, and on national level it is 
the Asylum Act.  
 275 
2005).101 As a consequence, every asylum application is accompanied by the 
shadow of doubt. The state’s perspective of “solving a migration problem” thus 
shifts the attention away from the question of rights – even in its narrow legalistic 
definition – towards a managerial problem. In short, from a state’s perspective, 
the Tunisian asylum seekers’ mobility is not considered in terms of rights, but 
rather in terms of a problem of governance or management of mobility. Asylum 
becomes a problem to be solved and is no longer a right to be granted.  
This shift from a rights-based perspective to what I would call here a managerial 
perspective has two effects: First, it implicitly denies any right to transnational 
mobility to Tunisian migrants, as the question of rights is shifted beyond reach. 
And second, it transforms the struggles and contestations over the right to 
transnational mobility into a technical issue to be solved. Tunisian asylum 
seekers are not subjects and bearers of rights (no matter how substantiated their 
asylum claims might be), but become the objects of governance and passive 
individuals that deserve – at best – a “return in dignity” as a return migration 
counsellor described the orientation of her work. The bureaucratic instrument 
of assisted voluntary return that aims at regulating transnational mobility is 
clothed in a language of charity. The conflicts between return migrants and the 
return migration officials I described in the previous chapters are therefore the 
result of this reduction of the return migrant to a passive recipient of charity and 
 
101 The term hermeneutics of suspicion is borrowed from Leiter (2005) who applied it to describe a certain 
strand of social theory and goes back to Ricoeur (1977).  
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benevolence, and of different ideas and concepts of the right to mobility. All the 
more as the Tunisian migrants we encountered through their stories of mobility 
in this dissertation did not only insist on framing their transnational mobility in 
terms of rights but strategically mobilised the asylum law to claim their right to 
transnational mobility. 102 This amplifies the above-mentioned state’s perception 
of the “bogus asylum seeker” who “abuses the law”. Framed in this language, it 
is only the logical consequence that the state considers clandestine Tunisian 
migration as a problem to be managed and solved.  
The state narrative of the “bogus asylum seeker” is tightly linked to another 
popular image of transnational mobile people; the image of the economic 
migrant. Instead of asylum seekers in need of protection, clandestine Tunisian 
migrants are conceived of as economic migrants. As a consequence, the legal 
point of reference is not the asylum laws, but the immigration laws with its 
economistic focus with regard to third country nationals. In the context of the 
Schengen-Dublin agreements, the legal architecture to capture transnational 
mobility of third-country nationals narrows down the possibilities and 
expressions of mobility to these two alternatives: admission through asylum or 
economic migration. As third-country nationals, Tunisians do not enjoy the 
right of free movement into and within the Schengen-Dublin area. As economic 
 
102 The notion of the right to transnational mobility does not refer to a codified law but originates in de 
Genova’s (2010) argument of the freedom of movement as a genuine human quality. As such, it can be 
understood as a natural right. Mobility is thus a fundamental quality of human life itself.  
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migrants, they can claim their right to transnational mobility only under very 
specific circumstances.  
These two contradicting notions of rights to mobility put forward by Tunisian 
migrants and the return migration officials eventually lead to two mutually 
exclusive perspectives on AVR. As sketched above, for return migration officials 
AVR is one instrument among others in their toolbox in order to complete their 
mission – the management of migration. In their perception, AVR is entirely 
dissociated from any form of rights to mobility. In contrast, for the migrants it 
might be simply a means to get their stuck migration project moving further 
again and exercising their right to mobility. For example, this becomes highly 
visible in the mutual misunderstandings between return migrants and return 
migration officials about the role of return migration consultancy. While the 
return migration bureaucrats interpret their role as providers of help and 
assistance, return migrants often frame it in a rights-based perspective – at least 
in the first instance and until they discover that the return migration office is not 
at all a legal advice office. This mutual misconception is a source of conflict in 
the everyday interaction between the return migration consultants and potential 
return migrants: The migrants are seeking legal advice and are disappointed to 
find the return migration office as an institution that offers assistance for a so-
called voluntary return. Instead of providing legal assistance for a potential 
appeal against a negative asylum decision considered as unjust or wrong by 
migrants, the return migration office provides alleviation of the hardship of 
return, caused by the very same migration regimes.  
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Appropriation of Transnational Mobility 
The thesis of the autonomy of migration AOM provides a productive way to 
capture these contradictions from a perspective of mobility. The six individual 
migration biographies of the clandestine Tunisian migrants discussed in detail 
in this dissertation have shown the complicated and contested relationship 
between rights and compassion as well – but from a radically different 
perspective and with a radically different outcome. The Tunisian return 
migrants capture their transnational mobility in terms of rights. Along the same 
lines, they consider AVR in terms of entitlements rather than charity, as shown 
in the previous section.  
As already mentioned, from the perspective of the asylum bureaucracy, the 
overwhelming majority of Tunisian asylum seekers is considered as “bogus 
asylum seekers” (in the words of one migration official I interviewed) who do 
not deserve protection. As such, they are threatened by deportation and reduced 
to objects of governance due to their precarious status, described by de Genova 
(2010) as deportability. Excluded from the freedom of movement in the 
European border regime that has established a system of differentiated mobility, 
there is often only one way to claim and exercise the right to transnational 
mobility for young male Tunisians; the – in general temporal – subjugation 
under the rules of the asylum bureaucracy.  
At first sight, this subjugation might appear as a paradox, yet this tactic can be 
read in two different ways; either as an imposition of the hegemonic rules of the 
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border regime on the mobile subject, or as a contestation of the hegemonic rules 
of transnational mobility through subjugation under the rules of the asylum 
bureaucracy and transforming AVR migration into a tool for one’s own 
aspirations of mobility.103 The latter reading of this subjugation shares the core 
premise of the thesis of the autonomy of migration AOM. The appropriation of 
mobility is thus a tactics from the repertoire of the “weapons of the weak” (Scott 
1985). Using the legal institution of asylum is thus a means to reclaim one’s 
transnational mobility against all odds.  
As outlined in the theoretical remarks in Chapter 2, I suggest considering the 
thesis of the AOM as a productive analytical lens and less as a descriptive tool. It 
allows to understand migration patterns and the individual aspirations of 
clandestine Tunisian migrants. In particular the examination of the six migration 
biographies in Chapter 5 emphasises the dialectics of individual migration 
decisions; often they are both contestation and subjugation at the same time. 
While the thesis of the AOM tends to draw an exaggerated picture of the 
individual migration decision as conscious contestations and an unarticulated 
act of protest simultaneously, my analysis of the individual transnational 
migration trajectories rather suggests that they are the results of a search for 
individual responses to economic deprivation and the lack of prospective upward 
 
103 I use de Certeau’s (1990) distinction between tactics and strategy to indicate the radical difference in 
the way individual choices are structured in a field of fundamental unequal distribution of power. Tactics 
refers to the practice where choices are restricted. Individuals have to radically align their choices with the 
few remaining options left to them by the dominant social power structure. 
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socio-economic mobility. Quite often, these individual responses even serve as a 
stabilising force to the hegemonic migration regime; an aspect the thesis of the 
AOM tends to neglect.  
However, taken as an analytical lens, the thesis of the AOM allows dismantling 
of the dominant hegemonic figures of the “bogus asylum seeker” and the 
“economic migrant” and expose their normative underpinnings. It shows that 
both figures are the result of a perspective that takes immobility for granted and 
mobility as the exception. Although the empirical description of the 
transnational trajectories of the young male Tunisian harragas indeed suggests 
that economic reasons are a major driving force for their departure, the thesis of 
the AOM as an analytical lens provides a different tool to describe their 
trajectories; as an appropriation of transnational mobility, or as escape (see 
Papadopoulos et al. 2008).  
Considered in this perspective, the harraga is a means to escape the socio-
economic dead-end many young male Tunisians experience in their everyday 
life. Since the collapse of the Ben Ali regime, things have turned from bad to 
worse with respect to the socio-economic situation of the younger generations. 
For many young people, the revolution of 2011 was linked to economic hopes 
and expectations in particular. All the greater was the disappointment, when 
these expectations crushed in the post-revolutionary economic decline.  
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The thesis of the AOM thus provides a further corrective against a narrow 
reading of the harraga of young male Tunisians as a merely economic migration 
and sheds light on a further field of contestation between migrants and the return 
migration bureaucracy; the idea and meaning of labour. For the migrants, labour 
– or the lack thereof – is a major driving force of their respective mobile 
trajectories. For most of them, it is the reason to leave Tunisia and try their luck 
elsewhere; either in Italy in the legal grey zone of self-employment and informal 
employments, or as undocumented migrant labourers in France, Switzerland or 
some other Eurpean country. Yet their search for work is not an end in itself, 
but rather part of their aspiration to conduct a meaningful and dignified life. In 
most of the migration narratives this dissertation analysed, this implies the 
striving for upward social mobility.  
In contrast, the return migration bureaucracy relies on a more simplistic notion 
of labour. Its explicit aim is the removal of the Tunisian harragas from 
Switzerland, where the migration regime sees them as the unproductive and 
undesirable surplus population. A successful return consists in their reinsertion 
into the Tunisian labour market. 104  In other words, the notion of labour 
mobilised in the context of the AVR programmes is not connected with the idea 
 
104 As discussed in Chapter 6, the return migration bureaucracy assesses a successful return in a very 
particular and idiosyncratic way. A return migrant’s project is a success, when he first has remained in 
Tunisia and second still pursues some kind of economic activity related to the project six months after his 
return.  
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of pursuing a meaningful and purposeful human activity but reduced to its 
economistic core.  
The thesis of the AOM thus allows an understanding of the Tunisian harragas 
not as mere economic migrants but as subjects who are striving for a life worth 
living. The escape from Tunisia is the expression of an individual and 
unarticulated protest against a society that denies them the possibility of freedom 
and upward social mobility. Trapped in low-paid and insecure jobs in the 
informal labour market, the harraga is the attempt to realise one’s freedom and 
to define oneself as a human being that pursues a purposeful activity. It is the 
attempt to escape “the waiting room of Tunisian society”, as one young Tunisan 
told me once. This indefinite waiting and the feeling of having no place in 
society is characteristic for the younger generation in Tunisia (see also Elliot 
2016). 
Deportation, Voluntary Return, and Structural Violence 
The shift from rights and entitlements to benevolence and compassion leads to 
a second aspect I want to address in this section; return migration bureaucracies 
as structural violence and as structures of violence at the same time. In contrast 
to the previous part that focused on the mobile trajectories of the harragas in an 
AOM perspective, the following part returns to the infrastructure of migration 
control and management. Framing the governance of mobility in a 
humanitarian perspective ignores that the institution of assisted voluntary 
 283 
return migration is embedded in a wider context of migration management, 
and – in particular – of deportation. In his reflections on bureaucracies, David 
Graeber (2012) emphasises that bureaucracies have to be understood as 
structures of violence, and not only as structural violence. In other words, for 
Graeber bureaucracies are the direct outcome of state violence. He suggests 
taking the meaning of structural violence at face value and rejecting its 
reduction to a mere metaphorical meaning. Although Graeber’s reading of 
structures of violence tends to overemphasise violence as a generic feature of 
bureaucracies barely hiding the monopoly of violence of the modern liberal 
nation state, it provides a useful analytical lens for the discussion of return 
migration bureaucracies. I therefore refrain from identifying bureaucracies as 
structures of violence per se, though I retain Graeber’s attention to the 
underlying violence in its literal sense. In particular in the case of AVR, it is 
of particular importance to point out the relationship between the threat of 
forced deportation and assisted return that relies precisely on this threat of 
violence as a constitutive aspect of this bureaucracy as described by Graeber.  
Although the denial of the right of transnational mobility finds its expression 
in a language of help and assistance, it is impossible to understand the 
programmes for so-called assisted voluntary return without its underlying 
counterpart; forced deportation. The deportability (de Genova 2002) as an 
always present possibility structures assisted voluntary return in a 
fundamental way. The ethnographic data suggests that some of the return 
migration officials are well aware of this relationship and even emphasise it, 
juxtaposing explicitly assisted voluntary return as the way that enables the 
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execution of a negative asylum decision through deportation without falling 
back on explicit state violence through forced deportation. Other return 
migration officials rather conceal this relationship, presenting their role much 
more in terms of advisors, indebted to both the state and the individual asylum 
seeker simultaneously. They deny the fact that assisted voluntary return and 
forced deportation are simply two sides of the same coin that co-constitute 
each other. In short, the compassion they offer in the form of assisted 
voluntary return is only possible through its counterpart; the threat of forced 
deportation.  
Simultaneously, forced deportation without the more subtle forms of coercion 
– in particular assisted return – is inconceivable as well. A migration regime 
relying only on brute force and forced deportation to execute negative asylum 
decision would collapse immediately. Forced deportation is an extremely 
expensive and ineffective method of governing transnational mobility and 
enforcing negative asylum decisions. The state is thus dependent as well on a 
certain degree of “cooperation” of the rejected asylum seekers. Furthermore, 
a “successful” migration management – in the state’s perspective – is 
dependent not only on the cooperation of the asylum seekers, but also of the 
returning state. It requires the international cooperation between states. For 
this reason, Switzerland has signed a series of bilateral migration partnerships 
and migration cooperation agreements to facilitate the deportation of rejected 
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asylum seekers.105 However, these agreements do not always secure a smooth 
and swift readmission procedure, as for example the case of Algeria 
demonstrates. Although Switzerland concluded a readmission agreement 
with Algeria, it has remained dead letter in practice.106 This is due to the 
conditions under which the country accepts return migrants: It allows the 
readmission of its fellow citizens only under the condition of a voluntary 
return. Unsurprisingly, this is common knowledge among Algerian asylum 
seekers in Switzerland. They know exactly how to escape a return to Algeria: 
when they oppose to a return, there will be no deportation as Algeria as the 
country of destination simply refuses their readmission.  
So far, this summary of the migration bureaucracy as structure of violence 
focused on various forms of migration governance, where the state takes an 
active role. Let me now introduce a further form, which I suggest calling non-
intervention or ignorance for the lack of a more precise term. I argue that the 
 
105 The migration partnership—laid down in the form of a memorandum of understanding—is the most 
encompassing form of agreements. The self-description reads: “The objective of migration partnerships is 
to adopt a comprehensive, global approach to migration while taking account of Switzerland’s own 
interests, those of the partner country and those of the migrants themselves (a ‘win-win-win’ approach).” 
(https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/internationales/internat-
zusarbeit/bilateral/migrationspartnerschaften.html; last accessed 07.01.2016) As in the case of Tunisia, it 
includes not only detailed specifications on readmission procedures, but also promises traineeship 
exchange places. However, the realisation of the different parts remains often cumbersome. For Tunisians, 
the traineeship programme has remained dead letter. The migration cooperation agreement is a bilateral 
agreement that specifies the memorandum of understanding on a migration partnership. It stipulates in 
detail the procedures of the different parts of the migration partnership. (For an overview of Switzerland’s 
migration cooperation agreements, see https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/internationales/internat-
zusarbeit/bilateral/migration.html; last accessed 07.01.2019). In the case of Tunisia, it is remarkable that 
the agreements lays out in detail the readmission procedures, but only provides some cursory remarks on 
the other aspects of the agreement (see https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2014/586/de; last accessed 
07.01.2016).  
106 See “Abkommen zwischen dem Bundesrat der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Regierung 
der Demokratischen Volksrepublik Algerien über den Personenverkehr” from 2007 
(https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/2007/894/de; last accessed 07.01.2016).  
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state’s decision not to intervene has to be placed in the same picture. The case 
of Foued can serve as an example to explain this aspect of migration 
governance. The argument here is that it is not necessarily the expression of 
a failed governance of transnational mobility, when migrants escape the 
control of the migration regime. Rather, leaving space for escape might be a 
result of the border regime’s deliberative strategy. Remember Foued who was 
fed up with the tight surveillance and strict rules in the procession and 
reception centre. As these centres are not closed detention centres, but semi-
open where you can enter and leave at any time, it is a simple thing to escape 
the asylum procedure.107 Foued simply left the centre, abandoned his asylum 
procedure, and decided to try his luck elsewhere. In the official statistics, 
cases like him are counted as “unsupervised departures” (“unkontrollierte 
Abreise” in German or “depart non controlé” in French). In other words, this 
disappearance from the statistics signifies that the case is settled for the 
migration bureaucracy, although it is an open secret that many of the asylum 
seekers did not depart but remained in the country as so-called sans-papiers.  
 
107 There is simply no legal basis for the imprisonment of asylum seekers. An ongoing asylum procedure is 
not sufficient for an administrative detention – contrary, for example, to a detention pending deportation, 
which requires a final negative asylum decision and the feasibility of the deportation itself.  
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Governed Voluntariness and the Contradictions of the Liberal Nation 
State 
The third set of concluding remarks returns back to the contradictions of the 
modern liberal nation state that emerge in full detail in the governance of assisted 
return migration. I suggested the notion of governed voluntariness to capture the 
fundamental contradiction constitutive for assisted voluntary return as a tool of 
migration management. It allows to describe how voluntariness is produced in 
this specific context of clandestine migration and deportability. As laid out in 
detail by several political philosophers of liberalism dealing with the problem of 
transnational migration and the modern liberal nation state, (e.g. Carens 1995, 
Cassee 2016), liberalism embraces the idea of free movement – at least in theory. 
Limiting the free movement of people is thus the dark side of liberalism, though 
it is constitutive for any modern liberal nation state, as the social reality 
demonstrates on a daily basis. In particular when we descend from the heights 
of political philosophy into the messy social realities, the empirical data suggests 
that these two faces of the modern liberal nation state in dealing with 
transnational mobility are inextricably intertwined and cannot be separated.  
One might now object that coercive measures are necessarily and always part of 
the governmental instruments of the modern liberal nation state and do not 
constitute a contradiction in any form per se, nor is it a particular feature of the 
governance of transnational mobility specifically. Graeber’s (2012) reflections of 
the notion of state bureaucracy as structures of violence might point into this 
direction. The police as the institution with the legitimate monopoly on the use 
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of force is a prime example how the state bureaucracy is backed by the threat of 
mere violence. The case of transnational migration, however, is different and 
cannot be simply subsumed under the same argument. What is precisely the 
difference? The migration bureaucracy does not govern aspects of common 
goods, rights, or services as other parts of the state bureaucracy. Rather, it governs 
the boundaries of who belongs to the community of those who are – in whatever 
form – entitled in the common goods, rights, and services, governed by the other 
parts of the state bureaucracy. In other words, the migration bureaucracy decides 
the question who falls under the sphere of governance of the state and who is 
excluded from it. This adds an entirely different quality to the state bureaucracy: 
It is not only the power of disposition over certain aspects, but over the 
fundamental question of being entitled to make legitimate claims towards the 
community or the state. One could draw a parallel to Hannah Arendt’s (1951: 
267-302) famous reflection on human rights and the “right to have rights”. To 
rephrase it in a different way, the migration bureaucracy governs a common good 
of second order, as it decides on the right of the legitimate participation in the 
community with all legal rights and obligations.  
The institution of assisted voluntary return is thus a reminder of the multi-
layered relationship between the modern liberal nation state and the individual 
whose capacity to raise legitimate claims towards the community or the state is 
constantly questioned. Simultaneously, clandestine migration in the form of the 
harraga is the reminder that borders always remain porous and the many forms 
of escape of state control are constitutive for the border regime as well. The 
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harraga is the appropriation of mobility of those who are excluded from the 
promises of transnational social mobility – even though this appropriation may 
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